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In the last two decades, the production of agrifood products in China has increased 
dramatically. However, accompanied with rapidly rising quantity, many food scandals 
were reported. For example, nearly 53,000 children in China were made ill by 
contaminated milk powder with the industrial chemical melamine in 2008 and an 
illegal additive used to make some soft drinks for more than ten years was exposed in 
2011. To support consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply following 
numerous “food scares” and to protect rural incomes, developing a “quality” strategy 
in the contemporary Chinese agrifood market is becoming a topic of political 
argument and of the focus of research. Firstly, in the face of many food scandals over 
the last two decades, Chinese consumers are looking for “quality” agrifood products 
to meet their daily needs. Secondly, Chinese farmers have struggled to adopt a viable 
way to increase their incomes, pressured by strong market competition. Thirdly, the 
Chinese government has realised that improving rural incomes and thus reducing the 
urban and rural income gap may be essential for China’s long-term economic security 
and social stability. Against this backdrop, the GI system which links agrifood quality 
and production origins tightly has become an attractive issue in the Chinese agrifood 
sector.  
 
Attention paid to the GI system often relates to the notion of “quality” as GI schemes 
are often perceived as a means of helping producers to receive higher incomes 
through raising product quality in the market. Therefore, the emphasis on quality is 
central to this thesis. In particular, the aim of this research is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of GIs in terms of developing agrifood quality in contemporary China. 
As little similar research has been undertaken, this thesis makes a conceptual, 
methodological and empirical contribution to knowledge in this research area.  
 
By tracing the historical root of the “quality” concept from a management perspective 
and reviewing different researchers’ opinion on agrifood quality, the thesis draws a 
key conceptual framework for “agrifood quality” based on socio-economic theory, a 
network approach and concentrating on power relationships between diverse actors. It 
indicates that “agrifood quality” cannot be defined based only on production or 
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consumption aspects but can be understood or analysed through exploring power 
relationships between different actors within quality forming processes based on a 
given context. Accordingly, focusing on the power relationships, three agrifood 
systems, namely the industrial agrifood system, the alternative agrifood networks and 
GI networks, and three GI networks in developed countries, namely Cassis wine, 
Parma ham and Florida citrus, demonstrate how power relationships influence quality 
meanings and quality forming processes in different agrifood sectors.  
 
After reviewing the relevant liteature and examining the context of the Chinese 
agrifood sector, the thesis uses three cases to analyse the quality forming process in 
the Chinese GI system by adopting documentary techniques and conducting 
semi-structured interviews. Following the three GI networks, the results show the 
development of Chinese GI networks is driven by a government with the intention to 
raise farm and rural incomes rather than in response to consumers’ quality 
requirements, and consequently there remains a focus on economic rather than quality 
concerns. “Basic” GI standards, inappropriate GI issuing procedures and weak 
government enforcement on securing quality based on GI standards are becoming 
unavoidable results. Therefore, an overall conclusion argues that the quality of 
Chinese GI products cannot be secured by Chinese GI schemes alone.  
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 1 
Chapter 1 The Connection Between GIs and Agrifood Quality: An 
Introduction and Outline of the Thesis 
 
 “Food is the first necessity of man, and it is the most direct and most important 
consumption product of mankind. China is a responsible country, and the Chinese 
government is devoted to working for the benefits of the people. Over the years, the 
Chinese government has endeavored to improve food quality, ensure food safety and 
protect consumers around the world. But, it must be pointed out that China is still a 
developing country, and the overall level of food safety, including the standards and 
the industrialization level of food production, still lags behind that of developed 
countries. China has a long way to go to improve the quality of foodstuffs” 




This research is concerned with understanding the quality forming process in the 
Chinese GI system as many GI food crises have been uncovered in China over the last 
decade but almost no research can be found dedicated in this area although GIs are 
treated as quality marks in the market by many consumers. In particular, the research 
builds on previous studies that explore “agrifood quality”, the GI system and the 
Chinese agrifood sector (e.g. Murdoch et al., 2000; Goodman, 2003; Harvey et al., 
2004; Hughes and Reimer, 2004; Marsden, 2004; Tam and Yang, 2005; Tregear et al., 
2007; Bristow, 2007; Engardio et al., 2007; Roth et al., 2008). After building a 
conceptual framework for agrifood quality and a methodological approach, three 
sample cases, namely “Gannan navel orange”, “Nanfeng mandarin” and “Wuyuan 
green tea”, are explored to evaluate the effectiveness of GIs in terms of developing 
agrifood quality in China.  
 
Chapter 1 provides a brief context and outlines the main issues will be explored in the 
thesis. It makes some general connections between Chinese food quality and GIs in 
order to contextualise the research and indicate the importance of building a 
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conceptual framework for agrifood quality which underpins the whole research. The 
arguments outlined here will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters of the 
thesis. Beside the main issues, the aim and objectives of the thesis are also listed to 
explain the purpose and content of following chapters. Therefore, three main sections 
are included in this chapter. Section 1.2 summarises the increasing concern about 
agrifood quality in China and the promotion of GIs as quality certification marks by 
the government. Section 1.3 focuses on explaining the importance of establishing a 
conceptual framework for agrifood quality which is a key objective underpinning this 
research. Following this, section 1.4 clarifies the rationale for the research and 
outlines the aims and objectives of the thesis. The structure of the thesis is also 
presented in this section. 
 
1.2 Increasing Chinese food quality concerns and the promotion of GIs 
 
In the last two decades, the production of agrifood products in China has increased 
dramatically. For example, between 1998 and 2010, fruit production rose from 54.5 
million tonnes to 214.0 million tonnes and milk production increased from 7.5 million 
tonnes to 35.8 million tonnes. In 2010, the gross output value of all agricultural 
products was 6932.0 billion RMB
1
 which was more than 2 times that of 1998 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). However, accompanied with rapidly 
rising quantity, many food scandals were reported. 78 primary school children in the 
southern town of Beihai were poisoned after drinking contaminated soya milk in 2003; 
transparent “glass” noodles were banned in major Chinese cities after the products 
were found to contain whitener in 2004; sewage was reported to be used in tofu 
manufacture in 2007; nearly 53,000 children in China were made ill by contaminated 
milk powder with the industrial chemical melamine in 2008; an illegal additive used 
to make some soft drinks for more than ten years was exposed in 2011. 
Understandably, Chinese consumers’ concern for food safety has grown with these 
high profile food crises. In 2007, a survey published by “Xiao Kang” found that 
92.74% of consumer respondents worried about the safety of the agrifood they 
bought
2
. In 2011, a similar survey was published by “Xiao Kang” again, and the 
results show 94.5% of consumer respondents questioned the safety level of Chinese 
                                                        
1 6.3 RMB = 1 US dollar in May, 2012 
2 The research group of Xiao Kang magazine, 2007 
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agrifood products (Ouyang, 2011). The number is 1.76% greater than that of 2007. To 
support consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply following numerous 
“food scares” and to protect consumers’ right to purchase food products with “good 
quality”, securing agrifood safety in the China market is becoming a topic of political 
argument and of the focus of research.  
 
Normally, consumers lack full or perfect information due to the cost of investigation. 
It is not easy for them to judge the quality of products and make the right purchase 
decisions between numerous similar goods in the market (Allaire, 2004; Watts et al., 
2005). They may therefore prefer to repeat-purchase the branded products which have 
previously met their needs, under the estimation that with the same brand, the 
products have the same features. Brands, as contracts here, link producers and 
consumers together, and help producers stand out from numerous commercial 
products in the same category. It is easier for customers to build their confidence with 
branded products rather than unknown products. Therefore, branding is believed to be 
an effective way to offer agrifood products with certain stable quality characteristics 
into the market and thus generate higher financial returns for producers (Henchion 
and McIntyre, 2000). Even though investments are needed to build brands, producers 
get financial feedback within this tight producer-consumer relationship. However, in 
the Chinese agriculture sector, agrifood production is characterised by numerous 
small-scale producers and businesses (Calvin et al., 2006; National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2011) who often lack capital and know-how to develop brands. To 
promote “safe” and “healthy” agrifood products into the market and secure farmers’ 
incomes, the Chinese government established GI schemes offering certifications to 
counteract the effects of quality uncertainty from the 1990s.  
 
GIs have been used informally for thousands of years around the world to indicate the 
origin of agrifood products and to influence positively consumers’ perspectives, such 
as “French” for wine, “Chinese” for tea, and “Indian” for spices. Consumers rightly or 
wrongly believe that products from certain areas are of a higher quality than products 
from elsewhere. Producers and sellers can thus charge higher prices and obtain 
premium margins by producing and selling products from specific areas (Ilbery and 
Kneafsey, 2000a, b; Marsden et al., 2000a; Barham, 2003). For instance, the price of 
AOC cheeses is on average 30 percent higher than their non-AOC counterparts in the 
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French market (Sylvander, 1998, cited in Parrott et al., 2002). To meet consumers’ 
quality requirements and increase producers’ incomes, government and research 
interest has increasingly focused on agrifood products from specific origins or areas 
during the last fifteen years (e.g. Storper, 1997; Nygard and Storstad, 1998; Ilbery and 
Kneafsey, 1999; Acebron and Dopico, 2000; Weatherell et al., 2003; Whatmore et al., 
2003; Babcock and Clemens, 2004; Hayes et al., 2005; Treager et al., 2007). 
According to these researchers, GIs are owned by groups of producers and thus also 
called “farmers’ owned brands”. But, they are very different from brands owned by an 
individual company, although both have been used by producers to overcome 
information asymmetry in the market, reduce consumer research costs, distinguish 
their products from competitors’ products, and provide an indication of quality for 
consumers. Anybody, who located in the certain area and makes products meeting the 
requirements of the certification process, has the right to use GIs on their products 
after application. 
 
As a product has to show that it has met all the requirements specified by certain rules 
before using the GI, GIs are supposed to work as signs to indicate certain quality 
characteristics in the market (Allaire, 2004). However, this system can have two main 
weaknesses in building trusted relationships between consumers and producers. 
Firstly, as the process of setting up codes of practice for GIs always involves different 
individuals and groups, the quality standards of GIs may be “low” or “basic” (Anania 
and Nistico, 2004). Secondly, GIs are owned by groups or organisations. As a sort of 
spatially specific public good, GIs cannot be bought and sold, but protect the 
geographical name of products from a given region. Like some quasi-public products, 
there is a reduced incentive for individual producers to invest in improving the 
collective reputation of GIs because the reward is shared by every GIs user. Bad 
products may thus drive out the good, and a certain amount of fraud or cheating might 
appear in the GIs market, especially with lax market supervision (the “lemon” market 
effectiveness) (Akerlof, 1970). These two weaknesses show quality food products 
cannot be generated by GI schemes automatically and the quality of GI products may 
vary under different contexts.  
 
Over the last decade, many sub-standard GI agrifood products have been reported in 
the China market, such as Jinhua ham poisoned by pesticides, illegal food additives to 
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produce Longkou cellophane noodles, and Baiyangdian duck eggs containing a 
poisonous red dye. Although the effectiveness of Chinese food safety regulatory 
system can be questioned due to overlapping and unclear functions of regulatory 
authorities between different government ministries and administrations (Tam and 
Yang, 2005; Roth et al., 2008), GI schemes are supposed to offer an extra guarantee of 
agrifood quality through the certification process. GI agrifood products with an 
“unacceptable” level of quality appearing in the market show that not only the food 
safety regulatory system, but also the GI certification stage are not working well. If 
not tackled, it could lead to “GI” labels becoming worthless indicators. In order to 
rebuild consumer confidence with GIs and to protect rural economic revenues, 
evaluating the operation mechanism and analysing the advantages and weaknesses of 
the Chinese GIs sector on improving quality are becoming urgent. 
 
1.3 Analysing agrifood quality  
 
Exploring Chinese agrifood quality of GIs firstly requires defining agrifood quality. 
However, previous research papers dedicated to agrifood quality have indicated 
quality analysis is not a straightforward task because the quality meaning varies under 
different contexts. 
 
First of all, different actors have different opinions about what agrifood quality is and 
how it should be measured. For example, for the government, the definition of quality 
may concentrate on “safety” and “health” (Barling, 2004) through a large number of 
measurable quality standards indicating a minimum level of food quality below which 
food products have to be removed from the market (Henson and Caswell, 1999). But, 
for consumers, quality may be measured by other indicators such as, taste, a very 
subjective standard and one which can be impacted upon by numerous factors, such as 
age, gender, circumstances, time, emotion, cultures, social network, nationalities 
(Ilbery and Kneafsey, 2000b; Parrott et al., 2002; Mansfield, 2003a, b; Sage, 2003; 
Kotler and Keller, 2006). Compared with consumers, the producers’ definition of 
quality is more likely to reference to measurable standards, like costs, profitability, 




Secondly, agrifood quality has different meanings in different agrifood 
systems/networks. In the industrial agrifood system, quality is mainly defined by 
large-scale retailers or giant agrifood companies through measurement standards or 
grades and definition standards (norms) (Renard, 2005). But, the quality in AAFNs is 
a very general idea due to complex consumers’ quality concerns (Goodman, 2003). It 
may include products perceived as healthier (e.g. organic products and GMO free 
products), local (e.g. products with GI labels), with improved animal welfare (e.g. 
“free range” products), or more sensitive to the ecological environment (Nygard and 
Storstad, 1998; Winter, 2003a, b). As a branch of AAFNs, GIs concentrated on 
localised quality because some consumers are looking for more “local” information to 
judge the agrifood quality and make their buying decisions (Storper, 1997; Ilbery and 
Kneafsey, 1999; Whatmore et al., 2003). However, such “localised quality” is not 
uniform as well. The quality meanings of different GI products are very different. For 
example, the quality of Cassis wine is related to “terroir” and low quantity, whilst that 
of Florida citrus is related to natural environment, modern technology and consumers’ 
specific requirements.  
 
In face of different agrifood quality meanings in different contexts, establishing a 
conceptual framework for agrifood quality to enhance the analysis of the influence of 
GIs on improving quality becomes a critical task for this thesis. It is thus believed to 
be an important objective for this research.  
 
1.4 Research aim, objectives and structure 
 
Facing many food scandals, more and more Chinese consumers are looking for 
quality food products in their daily life. In this situation, GIs are promoted by the 
Chinese government as quality signs to meet consumer expectations and thus increase 
rural incomes. However, numerous food scandals uncovered over the last decade have 
proved that food quality “cannot be completely controlled by government” in China 
(MacLeod, 2007). Under the weak government enforcement, the ability of the current 
government supported GI schemes to guarantee or enhance certain quality 
characteristics of agrifood products is questionable. So, given that little research has 
been undertaken on Chinese GI schemes and in order to discover whether the Chinese 
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GI system can contribute to quality agrifood products, this research is dedicated to 
evaluating the effectiveness of GIs on developing agrifood quality in China. Through 
research, a picture of the quality forming process within the Chinese GI system will 
be presented. 
 
Therefore, the overall aim of this thesis is:  
To evaluate the effectiveness of GIs in terms of developing agrifood quality in 
contemporary China 
 
The objectives of the thesis are: 
1. to establish a conceptual framework for analysing agrifood quality; 
2. to review shifting quality meanings in the world agrifood sector and the role of 
GIs in constructing agrifood quality in a range of geographical contexts; 
3. to examine the social-economic environment of the Chinese GI system with 
specific foci upon the food safety regulatory system and GI legislative system in 
contemporary China; 
4. to develop a research methodological approach in order to undertake empirical 
analysis in three selected Chinese GI networks; 
5. to assess the contribution of GIs in the construction of quality of specific Chinese 
agrifood products through the selected case studies; 
6. to provide an overall evaluation of the Chinese GI system in the construction of 
quality and establish a foundation for the future study through joint conclusions 
from the case studies. 
 
In order to achieve the aim and objectives, this thesis is divided into two key parts 
(Figure 1.1): chapters two to four establish an agrifood quality conceptual framework, 
summarise the key debates on agrifood quality and GIs within the literature, and 
provide a methodological framework. And, chapters five to nine present an empirical 
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Figure 1. 1: The structure of the thesis 
 
1.5 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has briefly summarised the key issues on GIs and agrifood quality in the 
Chinese agrifood sector, provided an overall rationale for the research and explained 
the importance of establishing a conceptual framework for agrifood quality to 
underpin the whole research. Based on the indicated aim, the main issues to be 
explored were outlined and the structure of the whole thesis was listed. According to 
the objectives, the following chapter will concentrate on exploring the conceptual 
framework for agrifood quality and explain why the focus should be upon the 










Chapter 2 Changing Agrifood Quality & GI Networks 
 
 “[i]t is about judgement in contexts where there is no final and definitive arbiter 
of the most relevant quality or the absolute standard whereby better or worse can be 
identified …”                                      (Harvey et al., 2004 p.2) 
 
“[t]he distribution of power in the agrofoods chain is increasingly associated 
with definitions of what constitutes a ‘good’ quality product or ‘good’ production 
and/or marketing practice. The assignation of quality in product, production and/or 
marketing terms implies by extension a setting up of rules of market-access and, also, 
of market exclusion (Valceschini and Nicolas, 1995). As quality definitions 
increasingly shape market access, the ‘quality economy’ likewise becomes a site of 
negotiation and power” 
(Renard, 2005 p.420) 
 
“By the late 1990s, a new geographical diversity of agro-food emerged. While the 
globalisation of trade in foodstuffs continues apace, Europe has experienced an 
increasing interest in foods with local and regional identities. Local agri-food 
production systems have indeed been characterised by various strategies to promote 
local/regional food products (Murdoch, 2000; Goodman, 2004; Marsden, Banks, & 
Bristow, 2002; Ilbery & Maye, 2005).  
(Negrini et al., 2008 p.1212) 
 
“Social scientists have identified three primary benefits of GI protection schemes. 
First, economists note that GI products sell for higher prices than their 
industrially-produced counterparts, and so help farmers to remain competitive in the 
face of globalisation (Babcock and Clemens, 2004). Second, because GIs are linked to 
a particular territory, and because GI protection is collectively owned, GIs are 
credited with having feedback effects throughout rural economies (Belletti and 
Marescotti, 2002; Albisu, 2002). Finally, by ‘‘short-circuiting’’ industrial supply 
chains, GIs are said to better connect producers and consumers, providing 
information (about the place of production, the people involved in production, and the 
methods employed) that allow the true environmental and social costs of production 
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to be accounted for (Marsden et al. 2000, Renting et al. 2003, Van der Ploeg and 
Renting, 2004)” 




The introductory chapter provided a brief context and outlined the main issues to be 
explored in this thesis. This chapter will discuss these issues in more detail. 
 
In this thesis, the most important and complex concept to note is “agrifood quality”. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, with the growing interest in economic globalisation, 
researchers focused on “industrial conventions” to describe and understand agrifood 
quality based on political economy perspectives (e.g. Friedland et al., 1981; Salais and 
Storper, 1992; Murdoch and Miele, 1999). As the analysis in this period concentrated 
primarily on economic and production aspects, the influences of social, ecological and 
ethical concerns of consumers were ignored (Busch and Juska, 1997; Goodman, 2002; 
Hughes and Reimer, 2004; Jackson et al., 2006). To understand agricultural activities 
and agrifood quality appropriately, more and more scholars (e.g. Hughes, 2000; Ilbery 
and Maye, 2005b; Tregear et al., 2007) turned to socio-economic theory and network 
approaches, which have enable researchers to explore agrifood quality by 
deconstructing agricultural systems into multiple complex economic, political and 
social relationships, described as “power relationships” (Latour, 1987). Drawing on 
these approaches, agrifood quality in this thesis is understood as the outcome of 
co-operation between actors within networks. The main actors involved in quality 
development processes and the power relationships between these actors are thus 
becoming the key aspects in the analysis of agrifood quality. 
 
After establishing the conceptual framework for agrifood quality, the focus turns to 
review the shifting agrifood quality meanings in the world agrifood sector through 
examining the main actors and power relationships involved in quality construction 
processes. The research shows that “agrifood quality” in different agrifood 
systems/networks may vary under complex power relationships. For example, in the 
industrial agrifood system, the quality corresponds closely to “industrial standards” 
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set by large-scale retailers or giant agrifood companies for maximising economic 
rewards (Storper and Salais, 1997; Freidberg, 2003). In order to maintain a “shelf 
place”, producers have to produce their agrifood products based on these quality 
“conventions” (Ngige and Wagacha, 1999; Millstone and Lang, 2003). However, in 
the GI system, mainly based on the requirement of “quality” consumers, agrifood 
quality is concentrated on “local” identity which is a very board idea and mainly 
related to a unique combination of local soil, climate, and cultural resources (Ilbery 
and Kneafsey, 1999; Overton and Heitger, 2008). As agrifood quality may vary under 
different power relationships based on various contexts, the agrifood quality under 
Chinese GI schemes is worthy of being a suitable research topic. 
 
To provide a more detailed review of the recent literature on agrifood quality and GIs, 
the rest of this chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 2.2 defines GIs. 
Section 2.3 outlines the conceptual framework for agrifood quality, in which the 
theory and approach adopted to analyse agrifood quality in this thesis are clarified. 
Section 2.4 highlights quality construction processes in the industrial agrifood system, 
alternative agrifood networks and GI networks along with shifting power relationships. 
To draw a clear picture of the main actors and power relationships involved in the 
quality construction process in GI networks, Section 2.5 briefly describes three GI 
networks in France, Italy and America. 
 
2.2 Conceptualising GIs 
 
GIs are defined in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) as follows: “[G]eographical indications are, for the purposes of this 
Agreement, indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or 
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin” 
(article 22.1) (World Trade Organization, 2009). 
 
Some multilateral treaties were created to define and protect geographical 
denominations before the advent of TRIPS in 1994. Three main international 
conventions, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, the 
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Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False and Deceptive Indications of Source 
on Goods 1891, and the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of 
Origin and their International Registration 1958, contain regulations to define related 
concepts such as “indications of source” and “appellations of origin”. Two 
multilateral agreements, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
1883 and the Madrid Agreement 1891, deal with “indication of source”. Even though 
both agreements do not present a specific definition for “indication of source”, a 
notion is available in the Madrid Agreement as follows: “[A]ll goods bearing a false 
or deceptive indication by which one of the countries to which this Agreement applies, 
or a place situated therein, is directly or indirectly indicated as being the country or 
place of origin shall be seized on importation into any of the said countries” (Article 
1.1) (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2010a). According to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), “indication of source” means “any 
expression or sign used to indicate that a product or service originates in a country, 
region or a specific place” (1998, P.115). But, a GI product must not only originate 
from the geographical location indicated, but also have quality characteristics which 
are essentially attributable to that geographical origin. “Indications of source” do not 
fulfill the additional requirement. At the same time, the protection of GIs only covers 
goods, whereas “indications of source” cover goods and services. Another notion, 
“appellation of origin”, is defined by the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of 
Appellations of Origin and their International Registration 1958, as “the geographical 
name of a country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a product originating 
therein, the quality and characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to 
the geographical environment, including natural and human factors” (article 2.1) 
(World Intellectual Property Organization, 2010b) (Table 2.1). “Appellations of 
origin” are more tightly defined than GIs, because “reputation” is not a sufficient 
condition in the definition (Addor and Grazioli, 2002).  
 
Because the numbers of signatory states of these multilateral treaties are limited and 
protection levels of these multilateral treaties are slight, none of these treaties could 
have a significant impact on the global market to protect GIs (Addor and Grazioli, 
2002; Das, 2006). Therefore, as many as 149 member countries of the WTO including 
France and the U.S.A, signed the TRIPS agreement in April 1994 at Marrakesh, 
which includes specific norms and standards for the protection of GIs. This agreement 
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contains requirements that nations’ laws must be met, and also establishes a 
















“Geographical indications are, for the 
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which identify a good as originating in the 
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locality in that territory, where a given 
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designate a product originating therein, the 
quality and characteristics of which are due 
exclusively or essentially to the 
geographical environment, including 
natural and human factors” 
Indications of 
source  
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Agreement for the 
Repression of False 
and Deceptive 
Indications of Source 
on Goods 1891 
“All goods bearing a false or deceptive 
indication by which one of the countries to 
which this Agreement applies, or a place 
situated therein, is directly or indirectly 
indicated as being the country or place of 
origin shall be seized on importation into 
any of the said countries” 
Table 2. 1: A comparison between GIs, Indications of source, and Appellations of origin 
 
2.3 Conceptual framework for agrifood quality  
 
2.3.1 Defining quality from a general, management perspective 
Providing a definition of quality is a difficult task, because producers and consumers 
have different understandings of quality in different periods of history and contexts.  
 
Before the middle of the 20
th
 century, most producers believed quality was an inherent 
characteristic and could be measured and controlled during the production process to 
perform the function of being “useable”. Juran and Godfrey (1999, p.24) define this 
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sort of quality as “[F]reedom from deficiencies— freedom from errors that require 
doing work over again (rework) or that result in field failures, customer 
dissatisfaction, customer claims, and so on”. Obviously, products with problems 
would disappoint customers. A buyer may return the problem product and ask for a 
new one, which is very costly for the producer. Looking to decrease costs, producers’ 
definitions of quality concentrated on reducing the failure rate in factories (Juran, 
1951). The quality control department, responsible for inspecting the quality of 
finished products before they are sold became a very common institution in the 
factory. Statistical methods also were used in production process, to provide a 
“systematic, rigorous approach to quality” (Bendell, 1989 p.4). Feigenbaum (1956) 
takes Juran’s idea and statistical methods a step further. He argues that all departments 
(e.g. purchasing department, engineering department, manufacturing department, and 
marketing department) should share the responsibility for the control of quality 
because high quality products will never be made if quality only relates to the quality 
control department or just one of several departments. He presents a new theory called 
“total quality control”, which is defined by Bendell (1989, p.16) as, “[T]he agreed 
companywide and plantwide operating work structure, documented in effective, 
integrated technical and managerial procedures, for guiding the co-ordinated actions 
of the people, the machines and the information of the company and plant in the best 
and most practical ways to assure customer quality satisfaction and economical costs 
of quality”. However, Feigenbaum (1956) still believes the definition of quality is in 
the producers’ hands, as enhancing quality means decreasing error rates.  
 
In the face of the competitive market of the 1960s, some researchers moved away 
from producers’ opinions to consumers’ preferences to define quality. Levitt (1960) 
stresses that customer satisfaction is the ultimate goal for any business and the most 
important aspect of the concept of quality should be satisfying consumer needs. 
Crosby (1979, p.14) defines quality as “conformance to requirements (of consumers)”. 
Juran and Godfrey (1999 p.23) emphasise quality as “those features of products 
which meet customer needs and thereby provide customer satisfaction”. From a 
marketing perspective, researchers indicate that producers have to explore consumers’ 
quality expectations and incorporate them into production processes, or they will find 
it is very difficult to sell their products and make profit in the market (Kotler and 
Keller, 2006). Quality is no longer what the supplier puts in, but what the customer 
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gets and is willing to pay for. 
 
Focusing on customer satisfaction is a popular way to define quality in contemporary 
markets because such quality provides a high level of customer satisfaction and thus 
additional business opportunities for the firm itself. For consumers, however, quality 
is about judgements in contexts (Harvey et al., 2004). Consumer perceptions of what 
constitutes quality vary between individuals, regions, and countries. Factors, such as 
age, gender, circumstances, time, emotion, cultures, social networks, and nationality 
have great influences on consumer quality perceptions (Kotler and Keller, 2006). The 
American Society for Quality (2010) thus proposes that quality is “a subjective term 
for which each person has his or her own definition” and indicates evaluating a given 
product can vary with different customers in different situations. Garvin (1987) tries 
to summaries various consumers’ preferences. He points out that according to 
consumers’ observations, product quality is not a single recognisable characteristic, 
rather, it is a multifaceted characteristic that appears in many forms. Eight dimensions 
of product quality in the market are thus described: performance, features, reliability, 
conformance, durability, serviceability, aesthetics, and perceived quality. He also 
states that it is impossible for a company to score highly at all levels and meet all 
customers’ needs because different consumers have different needs, and an 
improvement in one area may only be achieved at the expense of another.  
 
Producers and consumers have fundamentally different agendas
3
 and judge quality in 
different ways
4
. But, producers and consumers cannot be separated to analyse quality 
in practice. Lancaster (1979, p. 20-21) points out that “goods are simply a transfer 
mechanism whereby characteristics are bundled up into packages at the 
manufacturing point… and opened up to yield their characteristics again at the point 
of consumption”. Logothetis (1992, p.82-83) identifies three critical ingredients of 
quality, which include integrity, a dedication to communication and customer 
satisfaction, and company-wide policies and operations which support perceived 
quality trust of consumers. Quality is judged by consumers based on what producers 
actually offer. Both consumers’ requirements and producers’ participation cannot be 
denied when examining and evaluating quality. Meanwhile, the line between 
                                                        
3 Producers seek profitable products whilst consumers value for money 
4 One is mainly dependent on measurable objective standards and one is mainly based on subjective criteria 
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producers’ and consumers’ quality criteria is blurred in the contemporary market. On 
the one hand, a producer’s definition of quality is influenced by consumers. As 
Crosby et al. (2003, p.18) argue, quality provides a competitive edge, based on the 
understanding of “how a company’s customers value a given quality dimension” and 
“when and if that quality dimension can increase (or decrease) in importance over 
time”. Nowadays, many firms rely heavily on external consumers to improve the 
quality of their products (Jeppesen and Molin, 2003). On the other hand, consumers’ 
quality judgements are also impacted by producers’ standards. For example, the 
information provided by producers’ advertising may change consumers’ quality 
criteria and purchase decisions in someway due to consumers’ learning behaviour 
(Huffman et al., 2007; Sung, 2010). In short, consumers and producers form the 
quality definition together. 
 
Because quality criteria change over time and both producers and consumers have a 
great influence on quality definition, Parrott et al. (2002) conclude, quality is difficult 
to define. The analysis of quality must be set against the context under the specific 
category. 
 
2.3.2 Agrifood quality 
Agrifood is also known as agrofood. According to the dictionary, agri-food is “used 
for describing industries that are involved in the mass-production, processing and 
inspection of food made from agricultural products” (Bateman et al., 2006). As this 
thesis is located in China, the definition given by The Center for Agri-food Quality & 
Safety, the Ministry of Agriculture of the Peoples Republic of China (2008) will be 
adopted for the purpose of this thesis, which states that agrifood products are 
“primary products sourced from agriculture, namely, plants, animals, microorganisms 
and the products thereof obtained in agricultural activities”.  
 
Agrifood quality is a really complex term than many other products as not only 
producers and consumers are involved to define quality but also the impact of the 
government, natural environment, technological, and social factors have to be 
considered carefully when exploring agrifood quality. For example, a consumer’s 
definition of agrifood quality may relate to concerns over safety or the taste. 
Producers may regard agrifood quality as “a marketing opportunity” or “a chance to 
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increase sales or gain premium prices” (Morris and Young, 2000 p.104). But, both of 
them have to conform to the government’s biological, chemical, and physical 
standards to discuss quality
5
. And, the appearance of new technologies, such as the 
transgenic technology, has changed agrifood quality criteria fundamentally. Many 
agrifood researchers (e.g. Nygard and Storstad, 1998; Henson, 2000; Parrott et al., 
2002; Harvey et al., 2004) have recognised there is a division in agrifood quality 
between producers and consumers, and different factors may provide various 
dimensions according to which agrifood quality can be evaluated. For instance, 
Henson (2000) distinguishes three types of agrifood quality in the market: “product 
oriented quality” (physical characteristics such as fat content, colour, texture, etc.), 
“process oriented quality” (characteristics of the process by which the product is made, 
e.g. organic), and “user oriented quality” (the perception of the product on the part of 
the consumer), and stresses the first two types of qualities are measured by objective 
criteria, while the third is a subjective, experiential type linked to the consumer. 
 
Agrifood quality normally has a subjective definition for consumers. Ilbery and 
Kneafsey (2000a) classify consumers’ measures of agrifood quality in four 
dimensions: certification, association, specification and attraction. Certification, 
usually represented by a symbol or a quality mark, is a form of regulated quality 
achieved by satisfying conditions set by the state or by a professional organisation. 
Association relates to links with a region or local environment (e.g. Scottish Salmon) 
or with a traditional culture (e.g. Whisky using traditional Scottish production 
methods or skills). Specification highlights the nature of the production process, such 
as traditional recipes, the use of high quality raw materials, and the particular skills of 
the production team. Attraction comes through the food’s physical properties of 
design, texture, flavour, taste, appearance and premium price. The research of Parrott 
et al. (2002) shows that for consumers, quality is not only determined by physical 
properties, but also impacted by place and context of production or consumption, as 
retailers’ reputation, purchasing environment, culture, tradition, historical patterns, 
social relationships and local knowledge system etc. Sage (2003) has similar opinions 
to Parrott et al. (2002). He indicates three basic attributes that consumers prefer to use 
when distinguishing a “quality” agrifood product. The first is the sensual attributes of 
                                                        
5 Or, the product cannot be sold in the market 
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the product, such as taste and appearance. The second is the ecologically embedded 
characteristics, such as the natural qualities of raw materials and the methods of 
production. The final is the socially embedded features, which relate to the 
social-cultural context. Taylor et al. (2012) also point out that consumers’ purchasing 
criteria are greatly influenced by age, gender, income and education level. Affected by 
numerous factors, consumers hold very subjective quality criteria to judge agrifood 
products.  
 
Compared with consumers, agrifood producers’ quality is more objective with 
accountable criteria, such as containing levels of certain materials (e.g. Vitamin A and 
B) and market rewards. However, producers are a “group” of actors, which normally 
includes farmers, processors and retailers. They may also have various opinions on 
agrifood quality. For example, Ilbery and Kneafsey (2000b) list local small-scale 
producers’ quality criteria, such as product differentiation, association with region, 
traceability of inputs, production method, premium prices, raw materials, involvement 
of owner, presentation/promotion, and certification/quality mark. Winter (2003a, p.25) 
announces that retailers may define quality as “a means of segmenting market and 
increasing market share”. Marsden (2004) argues that many local producers treat 
quality as a tool of economic competitiveness which is closely linked to particular 
types of products (locally sourced and identified) or comparatively small quantity. 
Murdoch and Miele (2004) indicate that some producers believe quality is formed by 
a series of “qualification processes” which mix the intrinsic and extrinsic attributes 
together and give food products social identity. Focusing on different aspects, 













Consumers’ quality criteria Producers’ quality criteria 
 Certification, association, 
specification and attraction (Ilbery 
and Kneafsey, 2000a); 
 Determined by physical 
properties, and impacted by place 
and context of production or 
consumption (Parrott et al., 2002); 
 The sensual attributes of the 
product, the ecologically 
embedded characters and the 
socially embedded features (Sage, 
2003); 
 The criteria are great influenced 
by age, gender, income and 
education level (Taylor et al., 
2012). 
 Product differentiation, association 
with region; customer perception; 
traceability of inputs; production 
method; premium prices; raw 
materials; freshness/appearance; 
involvement of owner; 
presentation/promotion; good 
environmental conditions, and 
certification/quality mark (Ilbery and 
Kneafsey, 2000b); 
 A means of segmenting markets and 
increasing market share (Winter, 
2003a) 
 Enhancing economic 
competitiveness: particular types of 
products or  comparatively small 
quantity (Marsden, 2004); 
 Qualification (Murdoch and Miele, 
2004). 
Table 2. 2: Quality criteria of consumers and producers on agrifood products 
 
Agrifood quality not only has various meanings for producers and consumers, but also 
frequently changes under different contexts. For instance, Ilbery and Kneafsey (2000a, 
p.219) argue that agrifood quality “is indeed a social construction and thus dependent 
on the socio-cultural, political and economic contexts within which 
production-consumption relations exist”. Harvey et al. (2004 p.2) believe that 
agrifood quality is “about judgement in contexts”, and impacted by different factors, 
such as government regulations, the socio-cultural environment, economic context, 
and organisations (e.g. firm groups and consumer groups) (see also Mansfield, 2003a, 
b). The influence of contexts cannot be ignored when analysing agrifood quality. 
 
First of all, focusing on “safety” and “health”, the government always defines the 
legally acceptable composition of agrifood products to protect the public from poor 
quality and diseased foodstuffs (Barling, 2004). The Food Standards Agency in the 
UK (2011), for example, announces that its aim is “to ensure you can have trust and 
confidence in the food you buy and eat”. Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
(2011) which “develops food standards to cover the food industry in Australia and 
New Zealand”, states that the government “makes sure food in Australia and New 
Zealand is safe and suitable for us to eat” through the Australia New Zealand Food 
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Standards Code. Based on scientific rationale, a large number of measurable quality 
standards are issued and quality controlling and monitoring systems are developed by 
the government in response to “both real and perceived food safety problems” 
(Henson and Caswell, 1999 p.589). Such objective quality standards can be used to 
“define the legally acceptable composition of some goods”, to detect fraud, to ensure 
that labels are not misleading, and to correspond with regulations across multiple 
countries (Atkins and Bowler, 2001 p.191). In other words, the government defines a 
minimum level of agrifood quality below which agrifood products have to be 
removed from the market.  
 
Secondly, much research in the area of agrifood quality (Tovey, 1997; Hinrich, 2000; 
Parrott et al., 2002; Winter, 2003b; Bergeaud-Blackler, 2004; Weatherell et al., 2003; 
Tregear et al., 2007) shows the significant influence of social-cultural factors on 
producers’ and consumers’ quality criteria and thus the agrifood quality forming and 
judging processes. The research of Bergeaud-Blackler (2004) on the quality of halal 
clarifies how social factors influence consumers’ quality perspectives and producers’ 
production activities and indicates that a combination of ethnic identification, 
commercial competition, religious ambivalence and state regulations create a 
perception of quality which is recognised, endorsed and socially valued. Teil and 
Hennion (2004) point out, judgements about taste, which are always used by 
consumers to define quality, are made under certain contexts, as “taste becomes a 
consequence of the practical performance of tasting, and that taste, or what tastes 
good, is not in any sense given or static. Rather taste is constantly disputed among 
amateurs, who are obliged to consider the views of others in the community, change 
their minds, develop their competences, talk about the activity and justify their 
judgements” (Harvey et al., 2004 p.8). Weatherell et al. (2003, p.242) believe, 
“practical, nutritional and socio-cultural dimensions are critical to understanding 
them (food products) as items for exchange, usage and consumption”. Also, Murdoch 
and Miele (2004, p.159) note that, quality is not a fixed set of characteristics, rather it 
“is fluid and malleable, and tends to shift as a good passes from one social context to 
another”.  
 
Thirdly, the economic aspect is also critical when analysing agrifood quality. Marsden 
(2004) emphasises the importance of economic competition in producing “quality” 
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food products. Although providing quality features usually requires an investment in 
consumers’ requirements and hence involves an increase in costs, quality products can 
generate profit which is the fundamental motivation to stimulate producers to produce 
“quality” agrifood products for the market (Marsden, 2004; Tregear et al., 2007). 
Meanwhile, economic factors, such as price and income, also help consumers to 
evaluate “quality” in their purchasing decisions. For instance, price has become a way 
in which quality can be evaluated, because the price of “quality” food products is 
usually higher than low quality goods (Ilbery and Kneafsey, 2000b). For both 
producers and consumers, quality cannot be discussed without mentioning economic 
factors.  
 
Furthermore, other factors, such as organisations, technology and nature also 
influence agrifood quality in different ways. For example, de Roest and Menghi (2000) 
investigate the production processes of Parmigiano Reggiano cheese in Italy. To 
generate products with certain quality characteristics, all producers have entered “a 
collective agreement” regulating production activities to form unique qualities. 
Mansfield (2003a) analyses the international surimi seafood industry. He indicates 
that the nature of the biophysical and production technology is very important in the 
quality assembly process. The research of Ulin (2002) shows the technology and 
cultural co-influence on quality forming processes. For example, Bordeaux wine 
producers refused to adopt the science of wine-making (oenology) because traditional 
processing methods are believed to be a critical factor in producing quality wine and 
technical interventions may present a modern quality image to the market. The 
influence of nature can also be found in the research of Macnaghten and Urry (1998) 
and Murdoch et al. (2000). 
 
Many factors involved collaboratively shape agrifood quality. Marsden and Arce 
(1995) and Atkins and Bowler (2001, p.197) suggest an alliance perspective — a 
“network” to better understand agrifood quality. Similarly, Goodman (2003) and 
Watts et al. (2005) also indicate that agrifood quality should be treated as a form of 
“collective action” and that quality perceptions can be understood as a “relational 
materiality” produced by different actors’ exchanges and interactions within certain 
contexts. In other words, agrifood quality should be understood within different 
co-operation models between various producers (such as farmers, processors, traders 
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and retailers) and consumers based on certain government regulations and 
enforcement, cultures, economic context, etc. Therefore, a conceptual framework for 
agrifood quality is presented here to help understand agrifood quality (Figure 2.1): 
 
 
Figure 2. 1: The conceptual framework for agrifood quality 
 
According to this conceptual framework, the agrifood quality is impossible to be 
defined based only on production or consumption aspects but can be understood or 
analysed through exploring inter-relationships between different actors within quality 
forming processes based on a given context. To examine main factors involved in the 
“context” category and clarify the “inter-relationships” between actors, the following 
parts will start to explore the theory and the approach underlying this conceptual 
framework.  
 
2.3.3 The foundation of conceptual framework: socio-economic theory 
In the middle of the 19
th
 century, scholars found that producers were mostly motivated 
by profit to produce their product (e.g. Found, 1971; Thomas and Huggett, 1980). For 
example, farmers preferred to make their production decisions by calculating their 
inputs and estimating their economic rewards. Producers are assumed to be totally 
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rational and economic factors “set limits within which farmers are able to operate” 
(Tarrant, 1974 p.11). With economic stimulation, the agricultural sector focuses on 
surplus value, runs as a “relentless mass of the capitalist machine” (Whatmore and 
Thorne, 1997 p.290), and leads to “a restructuring of production in order to maintain 
acceptable levels of profitability” at a global level (Cloke et al., 1990 p.14). Within 
the “restructuring” process, different actors co-operate for long-term planning, growth, 
and investment provision, and finally present agrifood products filled with industrial 
quality characteristics. The giant fast food franchise, McDonalds, is a perfect example 
of this. Economic theory focuses on economic rationality to explore the interactions 
between various actors but ignores the consequence that capital flows may lead to 
unbalanced development between different areas and groups (Robinson, 2003). For 
example, suitable natural environments (such as the plain land with warm climate) 
may attract capitalist investment and the farmers located in this area may thus prosper. 
Conversely, as it is difficult for some areas with unfavourable environments (such as 
mountain areas with cold weather) to maintain their investment, the income of those 
areas may decline. This situation has made an underdeveloped “area” or “class” (e.g. 
small-scale farmers) struggle for their rights (such as adopting trade protectionism and 
setting specific quality standards) and asks for capital redistribution, which introduces 
a political dimension into the agrifood research (Robinson, 2003 p.37). 
 
As traditional economic theory excludes political factors, it is necessary to find a 
wider realm to explain how the agrifood quality developed under certain political 
contexts. Political economy theory is therefore introduced, where the political 
dimensions provide a structure or context within which the economy operates (Cloke 
et al., 1990). It suggests that if the relationships between different actors involving 
quality development processes are to be understood, then “it is necessary to examine 
the nature of the economy and the power relationships that it sustains” (Mannion and 
Bowlby, 1992 p.15). Political economy theory has been widely adopted in the 
agricultural sector and agrifood quality analysis (e.g. Marsden, 1988; Cloke et al., 
1990; Bonanno et al., 1994) because it is very useful for analysing various activities 
by exposing “the new connections and relationships that surround and shape food 
commodities” (Murdoch et al., 2000 p.112). However, although Robinson (2003, p. 
37) indicates that the “division of property ownership, both land and capital; the 
structure and conduct of relationships between employers and workers; the structure 
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and conduct of relationships between the sexes and between different ethnic groups; 
political groupings; and the organisation of state power” are all included in the 
political economy sphere, many researchers (e.g. Bowler and Ilbery, 1987; Fine, 1994; 
Castree, 1996) argue that the term “political economy” in the agricultural sector is 
applied rather loosely. Most of the time, it only “refers to the management of the 
economy by the state” (Robinson, 2003 p.36).  
 
In general, after the Second World War, the history of global agriculture has become 
political history as the great impact of the state on agricultural activities (Morgan et 
al., 2006). For example, French government planning had a great influence on 
agriculture that ranged from farming regions of large-scale, specialised cereal 
production in the north, through to small scale livestock farming in the Massif Central, 
to intensive wine, fruit and vegetable production in the Mediterranean south. And, the 
government of the former Soviet Union controls its agriculture sector from variety to 
quantity and from input to price. Indeed Yarwood (2002, p. 13) describes, “decisions 
about which crops to grow or which farming practices to follow are influenced more 
by government … policy than local farming conditions or local market forces”. 
Specifically, agrifood quality is also unavoidably influenced by the state. The CAP in 
Europe, for examole, defines a minimum level of quality, below which products have 
to be removed from the market. As Whatmore et al. (2003, p.390) argue that, 
“without too much exaggeration, ‘quality’ has become the hallmark of policy shifts 
and political realignments”. Actors within the agrifood production sector (e.g. 
farmers and processors) have to make sure the quality of their agrifood products is 
above the state baselines. 
 
The political economy theory crosses from purely economic to the broader political 
sphere and provides a greater understanding of the agrifood quality. However, this 
theory has its limitations. First of all, the political economy theory is still over-reliant 
upon economic rationalisation and the political dimensions are only evaluated as a 
structure or context (Buttel, 1996). For example, under the driving force of the 
capitalist economy and market competition, political economy researchers can 
predicate that an agricultural processing company prefers to cut its costs rather than 
improve certain quality characteristics of its products to gain a competitive advantage 
in the market. Just like Porter (1985) indicates, if a firm can produce products with 
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similar quality characteristics but more cheaply than its competitors, it is more likely 
to survive and make profit in a competitive market. The costs that a processing 
company cut could have a dramatic influence on farm-gate prices and hence lead to 
mass production based on very basic quality standards, because “mass produced 
commodities cheapen the inputs” (Fine, 1994 p.521). It fails to consider the 
differences between people and places. Therefore, Buttel (1996) criticises political 
economy theory as not being suited to explain the production activities of family-run 
businesses because farmers and farming are culturally constructed and farmers are not 
always focused on maximising economic rewards. Cain and Hopkins (1993) argue 
that even though capital internationalisation fuels mass industrial agrifood products to 
the world market, the globalisation process are still based on socially, economically 
and politically uneven ground. For example, McDonalds has to avoid producing beef 
hamburgers in India because of local specific religions. And, Tregear (2003) proposes 
that all “production” aspects, including labour, trade, quality, technology, 
mechanisation, and the behaviour and motivations of actors, cannot be separated from 
socio-cultural relationships, such as local production history. Socio-culture 
dimensions, which are critical ingredients involved in the agrifood quality forming 
process and have a great impact on quality judgement, are often disregarded by 
political economy researchers (Robinson, 2003 p.42). 
 
Secondly, in political economy theory, explanations of economic activities are 
disproportionally focused on the production aspect at the expense of consumers’ 
preferences and buying power (Tovey, 1997). Consumption is “neglected, 
under-theorised, treated as an exogenous structural category” (Goodman and DuPuis, 
2002 p.9). Nevertheless, production and consumption are like two-sides of the coin. 
Both producers and consumers impact upon the quality forming process together. 
Even the founder of political economy theory, Marx (1958 [1970]), realises that 
although production is the predominant moment, it is determined by the “other 
moment”. Producers, who only focus on production aspect and overlook consumers’ 
quality requirements, cannot survive in contemporary saturated markets (Kotler and 
Keller, 2006). As political economy theory is still too focused on economic 
rationalisation, a new theory which incorporates the socio-culture dimension and 




Investigating the agricultural sector, researchers found many social factors, such as 
complex social hierarchies (Warde, 1997), culinary habits (Mennell, 1996), changing 
special interests (Beardsworth and Keil, 1997) and membership of kinship or social 
groupings (Fischler, 1988), all having profound influences on agricultural activities as 
well as agrifood quality. Firstly, consumers are living in certain social contexts 
(Morris and Young, 2000). The consumption of agrifood is not only intensely 
personal relating to age, gender, and personality but also profoundly social (Loureiro 
and McCluskey, 2000). As the research of Parrott et al. (2002) shows, consumers’ 
quality criteria in southern Europe are very different from northern Europe because of 
cultural differences and long-established traditions. For consumers, “flavour, texture, 
nutritional qualities and other biological properties are underplayed in favour of 
social context” (Atkins and Bowler, 2001 p.5-6). Secondly, “economic behavior 
tends to become more embedded in a more complex web of social relations” (Block, 
1990 p. 53). Block (1990) argues that the market only exists when relatively 
independent actors come together to make economic transactions, but “transaction ... 
is social in the broader sense of the term: congealed into every market exchange is a 
history of struggle and contestation that has produced actors with certain 
understandings of themselves and the world that predispose them to exchange under a 
certain set of social rules and not another” (p.53). In other words, not only 
consumption but also producing and trading activities are embedded in social 
practices (Granovetter, 1985; Winter, 2003a). Social embeddedness is “a convenient 
shorthand for social ties, assumed to modify and enhance human economic 
interactions” (Hinrich, 2000 p.296). Quality forming activities are all embedded in 
and mediated by a complex and extensive web of social relations. With further 
consideration of the social aspects, socio-economic theory is introduced into this 
research stressing that “markets are socially structured institutions, infused with 
cultural norms and meaning” (Hinrich, 2000 p.296). As Callon (1998) implies that 
there is an ongoing “entanglement” between economic and social relations whilst 
Krippner (2001, p.800) indicates that agricultural activities are “complex 
combinations of multiple dimensions of social life”. 
 
Agrifood quality has long been recognised as being influenced by social, political, and 
economic factors (Morris and Yong, 2004). Murdoch and Miele (1999, p.469-470) 
conclude that food quality not only links to efficiency and cost to producers, but also 
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relates to “traditions, tastes and food cultures” to consumers. Sage (2003) points out 
that the government defines the minimum level of food quality in the market by its 
objective biological, chemical and physical standards. And, Harvey et al. (2004, p.193) 
argue that quality is a multidimensional and contextual concept within which “the 
variety of different attributes” should be considered. Based on these researchers, 
socio-economic theory is obviously more suitable to analyse agrifood quality as it can 
involve more factors into the research and thus generate more reliable results. 
However, although socio-economic theory can help analyse agrifood quality, how 
various economic, social and political factors influence the agrifood quality forming 
process remains unknown. The role of these factors will be examined in the following 
part. 
 
2.3.4 Competing perspectives in the agrifood system: chain and network approaches 
In the 1980s and 1990s, with growing interest in economic globalisation, the 
commodity production processes became very complex. Gereffi et al. (1994, p.1) 
describe, “in today’s global factory, the production of a single commodity often spans 
many countries, with each nation performing tasks in which it has a cost advantage”. 
By tracing the development of global commodity transactions to establish a relatively 
coherent paradigm to examine this global commodity system, researchers highlighted 
the links between the production, distribution and consumption of commodity 
products as “chain” relationships (Maye and Ilbery, 2006), which Friedland et al. 
(1981) call a “commodity chain”, and Allacre and Boyer (1995) call a “supply chain”.  
 
By examining the vertical separation of a given product’s trip from design and input 
to consumption, the chain approach highlights “how capital intervenes at as many 
points as possible between production and consumption in order to maximise 
opportunities for profit and control” (Lang and Wiggins, 1985 p.53). But, based on 
the political economy theory, this approach unavoidably not only fails to “consider 
how buyers may control and condition the economic fortune of ‘the periphery’” 
(Hughes and Reimer, 2004 p.3) and treats consumption as a simple outcome of 
production activities (Fine, 1994) but also neglects social influences and takes social 
life as a “purified” category having a simplified influence on the act of purchasing 
rather than producing (Goodman, 2002). Neglecting consumption aspects and social 
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factors make Cook et al. (1996) criticise the chain approach as only emphasising 
large-scale agricultural transactions and overlooking the cultural richness of regions. 
Busch and Juska (1997) blame an over-reliance on political economy theory making it 
difficult for the chain approach to reflect the increasing complexity of the agricultural 
sector as a whole, in which social, economic and political interactions hold different 
actors together. Jackson et al. (2006, p.132) also accuse the chain approach of being 
“too linear, too mechanistic and too focused on the simple metric of length as 
opposed to other issues such as complexity, transparency or regulation”. These 
researchers clearly indicate that, even though the chain approach takes researchers 
beyond the farm-gate to explore the agricultural sector more systematically, its ability 
in cooperating consumer and sociological factors into the research is limited (see also 
Krippner, 2001). As both consumers and social factors cannot be ignored when 
examining agrifood quality, the agrifood quality study has to turn “towards a more 
socially inclusive rather than reductionist approach” (Marsden, 2000 p.22). 
 
Facing the limitations of the chain approach, some agricultural researchers’ interest 
shifted to commodity circuits (e.g. Cook et al., 1996; Cook and Crang, 1996), which 
follow the commodity from production, processing and consumption with non-linear 
“circuits” rather than a linear chain (Leslie and Reimer, 1999), and examine “the 
culturally inflected dynamics of relationships between moments of production, 
circulation and consumption” (Huge and Reimer, 2004 p.3). As researchers believe 
the commodity transformations (in both meaning and form) take place at different 
“moments” which are inhabited by different social/cultural practices (Johnson, 1996; 
du Gay et al., 1997), the food commodities are seen as symbolic of the interactions in 
society through “the hands they are passing” (Atkins and Bowler, 2001 p.10). The 
special research attention is thus paid to “the system of social division in which each 
moment is located” (Leslie and Reimer, 1999 p.406). However, as this approach 
focuses on socio-cultural influences with “more contextual understandings of 
meanings attached to goods in different times, places and phases of commodity 
circulation” (Huge and Reimer, 2004 p.3), it has less interest in the connections 
between producers and consumers and thus fails to systematically incorporate 
interactions between different factors into a wider framework. For understanding 





The network approach based on socio-economic theory, was initially adopted to 
interpret agriculture globalisation and how the global is related to the response of 
local actors engaged in the production and distribution processes (e.g. Marsden and 
Arce, 1995). As this approach encompasses a wide range of influential factors in the 
agricultural sector and explains the interaction activities successfully, it is accepted by 
more and more national and local agriculture researchers (Marsden, 2000). According 
to Callon (1991, P.133), a network is a “coordinated set of heterogeneous actors 
which interact more or less successfully to develop, produce, distribute and diffuse 
methods for generating goods and service”. Different from linear relationships, the 
network approach examines ways in which human and non-human entities (e.g. 
contract, regulation, and agreement) are bound into alliances and indicates that the 
impact of any actor is dependent upon its interaction with others (e.g. nature, social, 
technology, human organisation, and government) (Atkins and Bowler, 2001). Any 
phenomenon cannot be examined appropriately in isolation from the other factors 
making up the agrifood network (Lockie and Kitto, 2000). It avoids one-dimensional 
linearity and economic links of commodity circulation and focuses on “how different 
kinds of nodes (people, firms, states, places and organisation) are connected to one 
another in complex and multi-stranded ways” (Hughes, 2000 P.178) to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of various activities within the agricultural sector. 
Based on the network approach, the agrifood quality research can be extended to 
include numerous human or non-human actors (e.g. consumer groups, science, 
technology, and nature), who are connected through both “vertical commodity 
exchange relationships” and “the multi-directional flows of information and 
materials that variously support these exchange relationships” (Hughes, 2000 p.178). 
 
But, some researchers (e.g. Latour, 1987; Murdoch, 1994, 1997a; Marsden et al., 1996; 
Goodman, 1999, 2001) are critical, and state that over a long period of time, science, 
technology and nature, these non-human factors have not been considered as a vital 
part of research on networks. While socio-cultural factors have increasingly been the 
focus of researchers’ attention, those non-human actors, especially nature, are also 
believed to be critical factors influencing agrifood quality. As Page (1996, P.382) 
indicates that agrifood quality is always “conditioned by the natural basis” and is 
locally and regionally based, even though the capital always seeks to outflank nature. 
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To confirm the importance of non-human actors, especially “nature”, many scholars 
turn to Actor Network Theory (ANT) examining agrifood quality. For example, based 
on the ANT approach, Busch and Juska (1997) explore the impact of technoscience on 
the quality construction process of rape seed, and Stassart and Whatmore (2003) 
analyse the Belgian co-operative Coprosain and the changing meanings of quality of 
its meat product. The ANT approach not only explores “the same state agencies and 
similarly large institutions that other approaches to food studies have focused on”, 
but also concentrates on “the status of natural and technological entities within 
agro-food networks” and focuses on “how rural nature is incorporated into food 
sector studies” by weighting non-human actors and human actors with an equal 
importance which differs slightly from the network approach that is mainly based on 
human actors (Lockie and Kitto, 2000 p.12; Marsden et al., 1996; Murdoch, 2000 
p.409). As the agrifood quality is tightly related to the nature and technology aspects, 
the ANT approach is believed to hold more potential in understanding agrifood 




However, the ANT approach has its own unavoidable limitations which make some 
important initial supporters of ANT, such as Marsden, Murdoch and Goodman, 
question this approach. First of all, how to treat both natural and technology objects 
and social subjects equally is a problem. Latour (1983, quoted in Murdoch 2001) 
admits that it is impossible for sociologists to have a full understanding of science 
unless they study the area of complex ecologies, which Murdoch (2001, p.116) 
criticises as “neither feasible nor necessary”. Benton (1994) describes it as a 
“daunting” task to do a whole scale combination between sociological categories and 
natural categories, because this requires sociologists to describe and explain the 
relationship between science, technology and nature. Based on the research of 
Burningham and Cooper (1999), Murdoch (2001) also asks “would not a truly 
ecological sociology necessarily need to revisit the distinction between the social and 
the natural so that the boundary between the two domains were, in some sense, 
dissolved?” Unsurprisingly, most sociologists prefer to analyse agricultural activities 
based on socio-economic factors. It is very difficult for them to embrace 
interdisciplinary thinking which is the ambition of the ANT approach. As Goodman 
(in Goodman and Dupuis 2002, p.16) admits that “current efforts to use the resources 
of actor-network theory … fails to meet this integrative challenge”. Secondly, the idea 
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that non-humans actors play central roles in social networks (Lockie, 2002) is 
debatable. Marsden (2000, p.23) points out that “it is the social actors who are the 
only actors who have the power to endow different types of ‘actor status’ on to 
natural properties”. Nature is a socially constructed category, not an entity with full 
active properties, and always shaped by human intentions. For example, Brazilian 
farmers work with scientists to change the “natural” content of soil for planting 
potatoes and agrifood scientists have long been testing and altering agrifood DNA by 
genetic engineering to change certain quality characteristics of agrifood products. It is 
better to define nature with socially constructed “environmental” issues rather than 
“biological” issues (Soper, 1995; Bloor, 1999; Murdoch, 2001). The agricultural 
sector should be understood as social composites of the various (natural and social) 
factors (Whatmore and Thorne, 1997). Thirdly, the ANT approach may help and guide 
researchers to consider what to study, but “without making any assumptions about 
how we interpret what we eventually find” (Marsden, 2000 p.24). For example, it may 
be easy to explain how human actors possess “powers of reflection” to non-human 
actors and thus change certain agrifood quality characteristics, but it is very difficult 
or even impossible, to describe how non-human actors provide motivation forces for 
human actors’ actions (Murdoch, 2001). After realising the limitations of the ANT 
approach, Marsden (2000, p.22) proposes, “whether it is possible that other 
approaches, in addition to ANT, are also worthy of consideration in achieving a 
better grasp of the hybridity of social and natural life?”. And, Murdoch (2001, p.111) 
emphasises, “[W]hile various attempts have been made to link nature and society 
more closely together within environmental sociology, it now appears as though there 
is a general acceptance of rather traditional divisions between these two domains”.  
 
As “nature” part cannot be incorporated into agricultural research by social scholars 
appropriately, the network approach which focuses on human agency is believed more 
suitable to do this research, although the important influence of “non-human” factors 
on agrifood quality forming processes has been recognised. However, as the network 
approach tries to “deconstruct” the agrifood quality by examining “how relations 
amongst people and things might be imagined, assembled and translated to effect 
co-ordination at a distance” (Larner and Le Heron, 2002 p.417), the specific 
relationships between actors within agrifood quality construction processes still need 




2.3.5 Power relationships involving agrifood quality forming processes 
From a marketing point of view, quality is not a condition inherent in a product, but 
constructed in order to sustain a collective comparative advantage in the market 
(Renard, 2005). If there is no “cognitive paradigm” (co-ordinated with the same 
quality dimensions in mind) constructed by the actions of various actors, quality will 
never have fixed features and will become fluid and malleable in the market (Callon 
et al., 2002 p.199). The direct result will be that quality can never be forecast and 
long-distance trading will never be maintained. In order to establish a stable 
transaction system, different quality opinions of actors in the network must be 
mediated by someone or something to fulfill certain quality characteristics (Busch and 
Juska, 1997 p.692). After choosing the socio-economic theory and network approach 
to analyse agrifood quality, how various actors frame or bundle together to develop 
agrifood products with certain quality characteristics has to be considered. 
 
According to Whatmore and Thorne (1997, p.294), to develop durable quality in the 
network relies on “strong fabrics of social organisation at all points in the network, 
making the patterning of social and environmental practices in particular times and 
places integral to the business of network enrolment”. Law (1994, p.40) and 
Whatmore and Thorne (1997, p.293-294) use the notion of “modes of ordering” to 
describe the relationships that link producers, various organisations and consumers 
into a network, and indicate that “modes of ordering” are both narrative, “ways of 
telling about the world … what used to be, or what ought to happen”, and material, 
“acted out and embodied in a concrete, non-verbal, manner in a network”. Latour 
(1987) prefers the word “power” to describe such relationships and how actors 
co-operate or otherwise with each other. He defines power as a relationship performed 
by mobilising, stabilising and combining people, actions or events to fulfill certain 
functions in a stable network. 
 
According to Murdoch (1997b), quality is assembled by power relationships between 
various actors. But, based on income, prestige and status, actors are differentiated 
which leaves space for some actors to “dominate the network by defining what form 
and character the commodity should take, and how the income earned should be 
distributed” (Busch and Juska, 1997 p.702). The co-operation activities between 
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actors may thus be biased in favour of the stronger party and the coercive power 
relationships, in which the behaviours of a dominated actor align with the dominant 
actor’s will, may appear in the network (Morgan and Murdoch, 2000). Such “coercive 
power relationships” may express in different ways. Based on Lockie (2002, p.283), 
power to influence another agent does not necessarily depend on the ability to control 
them, but may be based on attempts to “influence either the environment in which 
they make decisions … or the ways in which they are likely to understand and respond 
to that environment”. Allen (2003, p.196) also argues power often presents itself 
“through a variety of modes”, such as the arrangement which can be used to define 
what counts as legitimate or illegitimate statements and practices, and the authority 
which “implies that the more direct the presence, the more intense the impact” 
(p.149). 
 
However, it should be noted that power is “a relational effect of social interaction” 
(Allen, 2003 p.2). It is a consequence rather than a cause of action (Latour, 1987) and 
should not be considered to be in the hands of any actor. Of course, actors with certain 
resources, such as knowledge, information, and capacities, may put themselves in a 
strategic position to provide their best interests and distribute economic benefits in 
their own favour and therefore shape power relationships within networks. For 
example, holding huge economic buying power, large-scale retailers may set quality 
standards by themselves and therefore control the whole supply system by forcing 
producers to produce agrifood products according to these standards. It is not a wise 
idea to analyse power relationships without taking into account the fact that resources 
and capacities are often imbalanced in the network. But, the distribution of power 
resources does not necessarily correspond to the distribution of power (Dahl, 1989). 
The effects of using resources and capacities “may be modified, displaced or 
disrupted depending upon the relationships that come into play” (Allen, 2003 p.97). 
For example, the research of Juska and Busch (1994) and Juska et al. (2000) shows 
that power is negotiable and shifts through time in the network. As power is unstable 
and reversible in the network (Lockie, 2002), it is very dangerous to see power 
centered on some actors with certain resources because it may lead to the opinion that 
the structure within certain networks will never be changed and actors with an 
unequal position and with fewer resources and capacities will never have a chance to 
compete for their power. Allen (2003, p. 38) proposes that “power is an effect which 
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is produced through the actions of groups or individuals, then it is not something 
which may be held in reserve”. Power is not structurally given based on resources or 
abilities or capacities but involved with interaction and interplay of various actors 
(Lockie, 2002). 
 
In order to present products with consistent quality into the market, actors have to 
co-operate and stabilise their joint actions. Co-operative activities imply a process of 
setting rules involving interpretation and negotiation (visible or invisible, conscious or 
unconscious) between actors about who define quality, how norms and criteria are set, 
and who assess whether products conform to these norms (Mansfield, 2003a, b; 
Renard, 2005). Quality thus cannot be examined appropriately in isolation from the 
power relationships (Fine et al., 1996). All quality forming activities shape and are 
shaped by power relationships in the network (Morgan and Murdoch, 2000; Lockie, 
2002; Renard, 2005). As “it is not resources but the exercise of power which actually 
puts us in place” (Allen, 2003 p.194), the objective of agrifood quality analysis within 
the network approach should not be emphasising who has resources and the potential 
to exercise power, rather who exercises power in fact and how the power operates, 
through which quality is constituted and presented (see also Murdoch, 1995; Lockie 
and Kitto, 2000; Dicken et al., 2001; Csurgóet al., 2008). Therefore, revealing power 
relationships between the main actors within the network is becoming a critical issue 
to explore and understand agrifood quality.  
 





2.4.1 Industrial agrifood system 
Traditionally, the farmer, who sells small-scale agrifood products into the market 
individually with flexible quality characteristics, is the only actor involved with 
agrifood production. However, in a contemporary global market, various human and 
non-human actors, such as wholesalers, retailers, governments, and modern 
technology, are engaged in the agricultural production sector to improve productivity 
and present agrifood products with stable quality characteristics. To mediate various 
                                                        
6 As the notion of “industrial agrifood system” was used very widely by previous researchers, the word  
“system” is used here instead of the “network” 
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production activities, several agreements, or “conventions”, appear in the agrifood 
sector as results of power competitions between different actors (Lewis, 1969; Salais 
and Storper, 1992; Biggart and Beamish, 2003; Morgan et al., 2006).  
 
Lewis (1969) proposes that conventions are solutions to co-ordination problems 
within an “action framework”. He defines conventions as a broad group of mutual 
expectations. Similarly, Salais and Storper (1992, p.171) indicate that conventions are 
“practices, routines, agreements, and their associated informal and institutional 
forms which bind acts together through mutual expectations”. Biggart and Beamish 
(2003, p.444) define conventions as “shared templates for interpreting situations and 
planning courses of action in mutually comprehensive ways that involve social 
accountability, that is, they provide a basis for judging the appropriateness of action 
by self and others”. Ponte and Gibbon (2005, p.7) describe conventions like “a 
system of reciprocal expectations about the behavior of others”. According to these 
researchers, conventions are “sets of standardised, codified rules and norms that 
impose conventions across a range of diverse contexts” (Murdoch and Miele, 1999 
p.471) which restrict individual’s activities and allow “production and exchange to 
take place according to expectations” (Storper and Salais, 1997 p.16).  
 
The agrifood system includes many types of conventions which cover any form of 
coordination in economic, political, and social life. For instance, Thevenot et al. (2000) 
identify “market performance” conventions which are based on the economic value 
of goods and services in a competitive market; “industrial efficiency” conventions 
which lead to a coordination of behaviour in line with long-term planning, growth, 
investment, and infrastructure provision; “civic equality” conventions which take the 
collective welfare of all citizens as the evaluatory standard of behaviour; “domestic 
worth” conventions, which justify actions with reference to local embeddedness and 
trust; “inspirations” conventions which judge actions based on passion, emotion, or 
creativity; “public knowledge” conventions which refer to recognition, opinion, and 
general social standing; and “environmental” conventions which depend on 
environmental influences to consider collective actions. In face of so many 
conventions, based on economic theory, Storpers and Salais (1997) identify four 
differing productive worlds in the global agrifood sector, namely the industrial world, 
the market world, the world of intellectual resources, and the interpersonal world. 
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They also indicate, in today’s mainstream global agrifood market, under the driving 
force of the capital economy, most agrifood products are produced and traded within 
the industrial world, which distributes low-price industrial standardised agrifood 
products to the market.  
 
Within this industrial world, giant agrifood companies and large-scale retailers, 
especially big supermarket buyers who have superior efficiency in making agrifood 
products widely available and accessible to targeted consumers, have become quality 
conventions makers. Heffernan et al. (1999) describe large-scale retailers as an 
“hourglass”, whereby thousands of farmers with high output volume feed millions of 
consumers through a highly centralised marketplace. Huge buying and distribution 
ability empowers large-scale retailers to set and promote their own quality 
conventions which farmers and most processors have to agree with in order to get 
shelf positions in the market (Renard, 2005). For example, by the mid-1990s, 
supermarkets effectively set the quality standards in the UK market for fresh 
vegetables. Farmers or producers hoping to enter or stay in this market have to invest 
to ensure their vegetable products meet set quality norms (Ngige and Wagacha, 1999). 
There has undoubtedly been a shift in power when defining quality from farmers to 
large-scale retailers (Tansey and Worsley, 1995; Millstone and Lang, 2003). By 
setting quality conventions and requiring predictable and sustainable consistency with 
respect to quality from suppliers, large-scale retailers place strict control on quality 
forming processes (Marsden et al., 1998; Atkins and Bowler, 2000; Millstone and 
Lang, 2003). 
 
Quality conventions set by large-scale retailers normally include measurement 
standards or grades and definition standards (norms) because standardisation has long 
been believed to be central to large-scale industrial production and economic 
effectiveness (Renard, 2005). Schaeffer (1993, p.75) and Murdoch and Miele (1999, 
p.468) indicate that uniformity “is functional to high volume production and repeat 
sales” and “it is easier to make uniform products with a given technology and 
relations of production than variegated ones”. For large-scale retailers, these physical 
quality standards with measurable characteristics can not only increase productivity 
and low cost but also provide clarification within exchange processes and thus bring a 
high economic reward (Morris and Young, 2000; Mansfield, 2003b). By contracting 
 
 37 
common quality goals which include sets of physical measurable characteristics that 
can be worked towards by different actors, agrifood products can be produced a 
considerable distance from its eventual consumption, even though buyers and 
producers may “never meet face to face” (Bonanno et al., 1994). The large-scale long 
distance global trading and agricultural industrial transfer between countries are thus 
becoming possible. However, as these quality conventions are set by large-scale 
retailers in their favour, they may bring disadvantages to other “less powerful” actors 
in the system, such as producers and consumers. Firstly, even though physical 
standards can overcome deviations between actors and enhance a high financial 
reward by mass production, Salais and Storpor (1992) criticise the industrial agrifood 
system as becoming an “industrial world”. It means, agrifood quality is defined by 
“industrial” or “institutionalised” conventions, which serve to assure that production 
codes are met, despite the ecological and socio-cultural conditions of production that 
are potentially quite different around the world (Freidberg, 2003). Farmers and 
processors are therefore treated as “inputs” without power and rights and receive a 
low income. Secondly, the aim of quality conventions is to make different things 
uniform, which often imply a lowering of value (Schaeffer, 1993). As large-scale 
retailers prefer to concentrate on efficiency, cost and price, rather than other actors’ 
preferences (such as consumers) to configure quality standards (Whatmore, 1994), 
presenting agrifood products with “basic” quality standards to mass markets is the 
unavoidable result in this industrial system (Murdoch and Miele, 1999).  
 
In industrial conventions agrifood sector, the term “quality” has been appropriated 
under the economic stimulations of “powerful” actors (Ilbery and Kneafsey, 1999). 
Unequal power relationships which exist between numerous small-scale producers 
and individual consumers and relatively few dealers, turn producers into “inputs” and 
offer agrifood products with “basic” quality standards to consumers.  
 
2.4.2 Consumers’ quality re-orientation 
During the second half of the 20
th
 century, the industrial agrifood system focused on 
“efficiency” to produce agrifood products, in conjunction with growth in output and a 
decline in labour requirements (Allanson, 1992). Most consumers enjoyed a rise in 
mass agrifood products in the market which were low cost, convenient, consistent, 
reliable, and predictable (Harvey et al., 2004). However, from the late 1980s, for a 
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number of reasons, more and more consumers started turning to perceived “quality” 
criteria to choose what they ate.  
 
Firstly, a number of health and safety concerns with agrifood quality have attracted 
consumers’ attention. Accompanied by the expansion of the global agrifood market, 
quality is institutionally regulated and mainly reflecting the interests of large-scale 
retailers and giant agrifood companies (Goodman and Watts, 1997). For several 
decades, this industrial system distributed standardised agrifood products through 
grading and classification schemes which specify objective and measurable technical 
parameters and have met with broad social support (Renting et al., 2003). Consumers 
have come to rely on “common definitions of quality” or “uniform standards” to 
judge agrifood quality (Murdoch and Miele, 1999). However, in the last two decades, 
food crises such as BSE, Salmonella, chemical contamination and concern over 
genetically modified agrifoods, have risen in the industrial agrifood sector. The 
succession of safety problems has actually changed some consumers’ opinions and 
challenged their confidence in mass agrifood products supplied by large-scale retailers 
and giant agrifood companies, even though these retailers/companies claim that all 
their agrifood products are “high quality” foodstuffs as a consequence of the strict 
safety standards set by them and imposed upon their suppliers (Goodman, 1999). 
Meanwhile, health concerns also drive many consumers to avoid buying industrial 
agrifood products. When British consumers were asked to describe the “most 
important thing for you personally in determining how happy or unhappy you are in 
general these days”, 59% of respondents said “health” (Worcester, 1998). Good 
health is not just determined by medicine or hospitals. More and more consumers now 
believe the materiality of agrifood products is a critical part of being healthy, and 
agrifood ingredients are very important for self-medication and disease prevention 
(Valentine, 2002). As Fischler (1988) points out, “we become what we eat”. But, 
some researchers have shown that ingredients within industrial agrifood products are 
questionable. For example, Benbrook et al. (2008) found the content of secondary 
nutrients and vitamins in conventionally produced fruit and vegetables are lower than 
organic produce. The agrifood safety crises and the loss of gene pools make some 
consumers realise that, in the industrial conventions system, quality is treated as a 
marketing function by producers and what they eat into their stomachs are industrial 
properties. As Beck (2001, p.273) states, “many things that were once considered 
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universally certain and safe and vouched for by every conceivable authority [e.g. beef] 
turn … out to be deadly”, some consumers no longer tend to unconditionally believe 
or trust the industrial agrifood system (Renting et al., 2003). For these consumers, 
industrial conventions distribute the “bad” rather than the “good” into the market 
(Beck, 1992). With safety and nutritional considerations, there is an increasing 
demand for “quality” agrifood products (Henson, 1995; Dunant and Porter, 1996; 
Shine et al., 1997). 
 
Secondly, rising incomes enable some consumers with an opportunity to purchase 
quality agrifood products rather than “basic” industrial ones. The price of “quality” 
agrifood products in the market is always relatively higher because providing 
acceptable quality features usually requires an investment on consumers’ requirements 
and hence usually involves increased costs (Juran and Godfrey, 1999; Mohan, 2002). 
Normally, consumers with a lower disposable income cannot afford “quality” 
foodstuff. For example, an investigation (Donkin et al., 1999) found that a healthy 
diet absorbs over 50% of the income of a single person living on state benefits in 
London. Dramatically increasing consumers’ incomes over the last decades
7
 has 
become a critical factor that leads to the growth of quality demand in agrifood 
consumption (see also Morgan and Murdoch, 2000). 
 
Thirdly, the expansion of the middle-class around the world has led to more and more 
consumers purchasing “quality” agrifood products (Watts et al., 2005). Murdoch et al. 
(2000) point out that most quality consumers “tend to be well-educated, middle-class 
professionals” who perceive themselves to be more “at risk” than others (see also 
Dunant and Porter, 1996; Nelson, 2004). Featherstone (1987) also indicate the 
middle-class prefer to consume agrifood products with certain quality characteristics, 
which can help them confirm and portray their social lifestyle
8
. So, even during the 
years of agrifood shortages in the West, from 1939 to 1945, the sale of luxury 
agrifoods such as Scottish Whisky or French Wine continued to rise (Winter, 2003a). 
For middle-class consumers, quality agrifood products are “consumed both materially 
and symbolically” (Lockie and Kitto, 2000 p.15-16). As Bell and Valentine (1988) 
                                                        
7 The world average Gross National Income per capita rose from 5,120 US dollar in 2001 to 9,097 US dollars in 
2010 (World bank, 2003, 2011a) 
8  Agrifood products that are often shared and eaten with others, such as business meals and family celebrations, 
involve the creation of meaning and identity in society (see also Bell and Valentine, 1997; Lockie, 2001) 
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argue, we are what we eat, and what we eat produces who we are. With the increasing 
numbers of middle-class consumers, the market for quality agrifood products, such as 
specialist cheeses or smoked meats, is growing (Winter, 2003a). 
 
Facing standard industrial agrifood products, more and more consumers have safety, 
health, and nutritional issues. Growing quality demand is stimulated by consumer 
anxiety, rising incomes, and the self-identity requirements of the middle class. 
Although individual consumers may never have the ability to set parameters such as 
rights, obligations and rules to govern the quality building process (Mulgan, 1989), 
consumers can still exert their “purchasing power” by influencing other actors’ 
quality construction activities. Over the last three decades, producers have been 
pushed to become more market-oriented under strong marketing competition, and 
respond more proactively to consumer demands. With growing consumer interests in 
“quality” agrifood products, some producers have presented new agrifood quality 
norms and standards which are very different from industrial quality conventions into 
the market in order to obtain higher financial returns (Guthman, 2004). Consumption 
activities do have significant “power” to change society (Allen and Kovach, 2000; 
Guthman, 2008). 
 
2.4.3 Alternative Agrifood Networks (AAFNs) 
The agrifood sector, especially in developed countries, is controlled by giant agrifood 
companies and large-scale retailers mainly through quality conventions (Goodman 
and Watts, 1997). Most producers around the world are required to meet standardised 
protocols to enter the market including demonstrating sets of quality characteristics 
that can be measured and standardised. Standardised conventions reduce local and 
seasonal shortages, increase production effectiveness, decrease the market prices of 
agrifood products, and generate an “industrial world” (Storper, 1997) in which 
minimum quality standards have been “central to economic approach and their 
understanding of markets and competition” (Allaire, 2004 p.61). As “a unilateral 
translation of socio-material value from field to plate” (Whatmore, 2002 P.123), the 
industrial conventions agrifood system has a primary emphasis upon economic 
efficiency, but partly overlooks the consumer demand. 
 
Growing quality demand has had an increasing impact on the agrifood sector 
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(Murdoch et al., 2000). Appadurai (1996, p.68) indicates that “the small habits of 
consumption, typically daily food habits, can perform a percussive role in organising 
large-scale consumption patterns”. According to modern marketing theory, 
consumers rather than producers are the driving force in the market (Kotler and Keller, 
2006). Quality consumers not only have the ability to pursue quality agrifood 
products but also are able to dominate the agrifood sector by making their own 
decisions about “what form and character the commodity should take” and “how the 
income earned should be distributed” (Busch and Juska, 1997 p.702). Morgan and 
Murdoch (2000, P.170) thus argue, “the consumer tends to assume a more active 
role” in the contemporary agrifood market. Based on rising purchasing power, 
consumers’ quality demand has attracted producers’ attention and forced some 
producers to “shift from a homogeneous agricultural commodity market to a more 
segmented market” (Winter, 2003b p.506) in order to obtain the “differential rent” 
(Marsden, 1992). 
 
According to Storper (1997), to respond to consumers’ demand and earn high 
economic rewards, agrifood production has evolved into two categories: 
“standardised-generic” products and “specialised-dedicated” products. Agrifood 
producers not only produce “standardised-generic” products under industrial quality 
conventions to meet the majority of consumers’ quantity needs but also offer 
“specialised-dedicated” products with “quality” to attract “specialised consumers”. 
Against the homogenising, placeless, industrial modes, the quality of 
“specialised-dedicated” products is defined by Murdoch et al. (2000) as “above 
conventional standard” and by Ilbery and Kneafsey (2000a, p.218) as “something 
which is above minimum standards and which gives a product or service (or process, 
company or region) a cutting edge on its rivals”. To show competitive relationships 
from the more standardised approach, the “specialised-dedicated” production category 
is also called “alternative” agrifood networks
9
 (AAFNs) (Goodman, 2003).   
 
Because consumer quality concerns are the prime motivating factor in moving away 
from the homogenised conventions to alternative networks (Storper and Salais, 1997), 
competitive advantage in AAFNs stems not from price, but from the specific quality 
                                                        
9 Many researchers, such as Maye et al. (2007), indicate the “alternative” in geographic food research is a really 
widely concept and not only focuses on the quality aspect. This opinion will be discussed in section 2.4.4 
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attributes. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, there is no clear and simple definition 
of quality in AAFNs because consumers’ quality concerns are very complex 
(Goodman, 2003). “Quality” may include products perceived as healthier (e.g. organic 
products and GMO free products), local (e.g. products with GI labels), with improved 
animal welfare (e.g. “free range” products), or more sensitive to the ecological 
environment (Nygard and Storstad, 1998; Winter, 2003a, b). As Ilbery and Kneafsey 
(2000a) indicate agrifood quality criteria has been affected by a range of hybrid 
economic, social and cultural environments, and contemporary consumers turn toward 
more individualised and hybrid approaches to choose “quality” agrifood products. 
Therefore, in AAFNs, “quality” is a very general idea, which “plays mostly on a 
contrast with the orientations of the mainstream industrialised agrifood system” 
(Harvey et al., 2004 p.4). Based on a range of quality perspectives, AAFNs develop 
various forms to regain consumer trust through creating hybrid quality attributes, such 
as direct agricultural market
10
 and free-range production
11
 (Marsden, 1998; Sage, 
2003; Morris and Young, 2004; Eden et al., 2008). The term AAFNs is thus defined 
as “a broad embracing term to cover newly emerging networks of producers, 
consumers, and other actors that embody alternatives to the more standardised 
industrial mode of food supply” (Renting et al., 2003 p.394). 
 
In fact, it is not only consumers, who have noticed the problems associated with the 
industrialised production process, but also other actors, such as farmers and 
processors. Within the industrial conventions system, producers can only produce the 
volumes and consistencies of quality required by large-scale retailers or giant agrifood 
companies. This situation risks the income to farmers and processors. Under the 
industrial system and the driving force of the capital economy, standardised 
agricultural production grows faster than effective consumer demand (Mitchell et al., 
1997). In face of a saturated agrifood market, large-scale retailers and giant agrifood 
companies are constantly trying to cut costs, which include the price paid to farmers 
and processors. As Page (1997, p.137) indicates industrialised production creates “a 
better coordinated industry aimed at boosting both physical productivity and labor 
productivity while lowering the overall costs of production”. Because it is very easy 
                                                        
10 As some consumers have more faith in direct, face-to-face interaction with sellers, it brings consumer face to 
face with producers directly through farmers’ markets 
11 Due to quality consumers’ preference for smaller scale, more natural agrifood products, free-range production 
assurance scheme ensures production processes through certification 
 
 43 
for large-scale retailers and giant agrifood companies to shift their suppliers in the 
global market with industrial quality conventions, farmers and processors face 
increasingly oligopolistic relations with them, have to accept structurally declining 
economic margins, and are therefore being “increasingly squeezed by 
industrialisation” (Fine, 1994 p.524; Van der Ploeg et al., 2000). For instance, 
Morgan et al. (2006, p.68) estimate that farmers only “receive 26 per cent of the retail 
price for beef, 20 per cent for pork, 21 per cent for chicken, 25 per cent for milk, and 
only 8 per cent for potatoes”. And, Pretty (2001, cited by Ilbery et al., 2005) indicates 
only 7.5% of the final retail price of agrifood products in the UK currently returns to 
farmers, compared to a figure of 50% over 60 years ago.  
 
The increasing dominance of quality control is a major feature in maintaining 
competitive space for large-scale retailers and giant agrifood companies in the 
agricultural sector (Hughes, 1996; Doel, 1996). Farmers and processors, as inputs to 
manufacture agrifood products, have almost no chance to obtain continuous and 
sufficient incomes under industrial quality conventions (Renting et al., 2003). How to 
regain power and subsequently raise financial returns have become important issues 
for producers. Some producers co-operate and try to influence the legislative and 
financial structures when political and economic forces have acted against them 
(Moran et al., 1993). But it is still difficult for a co-operative to resist the efforts of 
“powerful” large-scale retailers or giant agrifood companies directly in the industrial 
system because suppliers can be shift around the world. However, the increasing 
consumer demand for “quality” presents an opportunity for producers/producers 
co-operatives to move the production of agrifood commodities away from the 
“industrial mode” (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2002). Based on specific “quality 
attributes” presented by producers rather than sellers, producers may have some 
degree of autonomy when negotiating with other actors and may thus achieve an 
above-market price that economists refer as a “differential rent” (Marsden, 1992; 
Ilbery and Kneafsey, 1998, 2000a, b). For example, according to the Soil Association 
(2010), organic producers earned 50% more than their non-organic counterparts in 
2007-08 farming season. Thus, to evade price-based competition and improve 
profitability, producers are becoming one of the important driving forces of AAFNs 




As key dimensions of new rural development patterns, AAFNs are also pushed by 
governments, especially in the Europe, to improve incomes in rural areas. In the 
U.S.A. where the modern large-scale agricultural system is dominated by industrial 
conventions, the government encourages producers to increase their agrifood 
products’ international competitiveness through presenting specific quality 
characteristics or quality images under AAFNs. In the Europe, with highly 
fragmented farm lands and thousands of small farmers and businesses involved in 
producing small quantity, typical, traditional agrifood products, AAFNs are also 
believed to be able to create “new economic spaces” and are therefore supported by 
local governments (Parrott et al., 2002; Goodman, 2003, 2004). The industrial 
conventions system only opens market opportunities for “industrial” producers, who 
can achieve significant economies of scale and have the ability to support necessary 
standard quality schemes
12
 (Parrott et al., 2002; Renting et al, 2003; Overton and 
Heitger, 2008). Some European rural regions that are lagging behind (i.e. 
economically marginal) cannot therefore be involved in industrial production 
processes. But, AAFNs offer a chance for small-scale producers and the 
aforementioned rural regions to achieve higher incomes through two approaches 
(Murdoch, 2000). Firstly, specific quality attributes different from industrial quality 
characteristics are the important notions of AAFNs, and are constructed by all parties 
including farmers, processors, traders, etc. who form “vertical networks”. Through 
offering “quality” products into the market, AAFNs may improve employment 
opportunities within the network and bring high economic revenues to all actors 
involved. Secondly, compared with “vertical networks” which increase the incomes of 
actors within agrifood production processes, “horizontal networks” generate higher 
income not only along with agrifood production processes, but also expand to the 
non-agricultural sphere. “Horizontal networks” try to arrange wider networks by 
putting all existing rural resources to best use, as Murdoch (2000, p.412) indicates, a 
“horizontal” approach “implies an attempt to co-ordinate a range of activities located 
within an area so that the capacity of local actors to gain access to markets and to 
other economic opportunities is heightened”. Critical parameters to define the quality 
in AAFNs, such as the place of production (natural conditions, cultural, gastronomic 
traditions, etc.) and the production process (artisanal, traditional, less ecologically 
                                                        
12 The cost of which can be daunting for small-scale producers 
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extractive, etc.), can all be used as sources to promote other industries, such as 
tourism (Renting et al., 2003; Murdoch et al., 2000). By developing “horizontal 
networks”, all aspects of rural regions can be integrated into the national and 
international economy and therefore improve the local economy. Through these two 
approaches, AAFNs may help less-favoured rural areas shift “away from its virtually 
exclusive sectoral emphasis on agricultural production questions towards a wider, 
more endogenous, and multi-dimensional concept of rural development” (The Rural 
Development Regulation 1257/99, cited in Goodman, 2003 p.2).  
 
Consumers can obtain “quality” agrifood products to meet their specific demands 
through AAFNs. Producers have a chance to gain more from AAFNs than the 
industrial conventions system by presenting specific (organic, integrated, regional, 
artisanal, etc.) production codes and establishing new agrifood governance patterns 
(Winter, 2003a). Government can adopt AAFNs to increase rural incomes, especially 
for “lagging” rural areas (Ilbery and Kneafsey, 1998; Murdoch and Miele, 1999; 
Marsden et al., 2000a; Miele and Murdoch, 2002; Marsden and Smith, 2005). All of 
them are major supporters of AAFNs which use quality as a tool to compete with the 
industrial agrifood system and thus support a high economic reward for producers and 
rural areas (see also Marsden et al., 2000b). The notion of quality clearly implies 
exercise of power between relative actors by building new forms of market 
governance.  
 
2.4.4 GIs networks 
With different forms, such as short food supply chains, farmers’ markets, organic 
farming practices, and place-based production, the concept of “alternative” in the 
agricultural sector has generated considerable debate. Much of the initial research 
associated “alternative” with “shorter” supply chains than “long, complex and 
rationally organised industrial chains” or fewer intermediate links between producers 
and consumers including location and processing information (Marsden et al., 2000a 
p.424; Murdoch et al., 2000; Renting et al., 2003). However, more recent research has 
begun to question this understanding of the “alternative” and the “conventional”. First 
of all, the research shows the difference between two systems is blurred. For example, 
Ilbery and Maye (2005a, b) examine the production activities of small-scale local 
food producers in Scotland and find they co-operate with the conventional system, 
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such as processors and wholesalers, to market their products. By examining the 
Australian organic agrifood system, Lockie and Halpin (2005, p.304) also declare 
“the Australian organic industry does accord with some aspects of the so-called 
conventionalisation”. Secondly, the usage of “alternative” varies in different areas. 
Based on Goodman (2003, p.2), “alternative” may have different meanings in North 
American with emphasis on “wrest(ing) control from corporate agricusiness and 
creat(ing) a domestic, sustainable, and egalitarian food system” and in Europe as 
“situated within a wide-ranging public debate on food safety, agricultural policy 
reform and contested trajectories of rural economy and society”. Because a specific 
definition of AAFNs is difficult to draw, Slee and Kirwan (2007, p.249) describe 
AAFNs are “demand-driven by the emergent markets, a supply response to the 
cost-price squeeze in contemporary agriculture, a lifestyle choice for some food 
producers and a policy response to the increased support given to local and regional 
food initiatives”. Kneafsey et al. (2008, p.31&37) explain that by focusing on 
“product, process and place”, AAFNs “attempt to create ‘closer’ relationships 
between producers and consumers”. Based on these explanations of AAFNs, a GI 
system based on “local” quality identity is becoming a specific branch of AAFNs (see 
also DuPuis and Goodman, 2005).  
 
For most of human history, agrifood products have been purchased with simple 
face-to-face trading between producers and consumers at or near its location of 
production. Farmers grow food and then sell it at local markets. However, with 
increasing urbanisation, it is becoming very difficult for farmers to face their 
customers directly. Middlemen emerged to accumulate production from individual 
farms and to trade with consumers. Meanwhile, in order to support the growing world 
population, traditional agricultural production (e.g. family farms, face to face 
producer-consumer relationship) was replaced by a process of industrialisation, which 
focused on economies of scale and cost-price reduction in the production process 
(Fine, 1994). With urbanisation and industrial processes, there is a growing separation 
between production, distribution and consumption. Consumers buy food from urban 
retailers and rarely have any direct contact with producers. Even though this 
disconnection in the agrifood system may bring lower price products to the market, it 
also means that many consumers know very little about where their agrifood comes 
from, what it is made of, how it is produced, and by whom. However, in face of 
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numerous food crises in the market, contemporary consumers want to collect more 
information about their food to make the right decision and protect themselves (Hunt 
and Frewer, 2001). As a lack of time and knowledge may limit consumers’ ability to 
collect and process useful information, for producers who want to gain high economic 
rewards in the market, how consumers collect information, judge the quality and form 
buying decisions are becoming important issues to address. 
 
Countiss and Tilley (1995) examine meat buyers’ decisions. They found during the 
purchasing process, the superior quality (material or symbolic) of a product can 
outweigh any weaknesses. Carimentrand and Ballet (2004) argue the quality 
judgement relies on information that reaches consumers and the confidence 
consumers have in the truth of that information (cited in Renard, 2005). Watts et al. 
(2005) point out that because it is difficult to gather complete information about 
product attributes, to detect the qualities in agrifood products, consumers would like 
to give weights to different pieces (positive and negative) of quality information and 
then determine products’ perceived reliability based on sources of information. In 
other words, facing confusing information, consumers prefer to rely on more 
diagnostic information, such as assurances issued by government agencies, and 
decrease the importance attached to less diagnostic information, such as the shopping 
environment, to evaluate a product and judge its quality. Both information and the 
source of information have been found having a great impact on consumers’ 
perceived agrifood quality and thus purchasing decisions. 
 
At the same time, many scholars (e.g. Storper, 1997; Ilbery and Kneafsey, 1999; 
Whatmore et al., 2003) noted that consumers are looking for more “local” information 
to judge agrifood quality and make their buying decisions. Firstly, any agrifood 
product has a geographic origin. The industrial agrifood system which generates a 
wide range of homogenized agrifood products into the market from nowhere in 
particular, breeds “symbolic danger” in the form of an absence of trace elements 
(Fischler, 1988; Goodman, 1999). Agrifood products with clear local provenance 
which can be traced to a specific place are therefore believed to have an inherently 
higher standard than “unnatural” industrial products (Nygard and Storstad, 1998; 
Acebron and Dopico, 2000; Weatherell et al., 2003). Secondly, agrifood quality is 
believed to be directly related to the location where it is grown. Because some 
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“invisible” quality characteristics of agrifood products are extremely varied by their 
vary nature (e.g. the local climate, vitamin levels contained in soils and water), some 
agrifood products produced in certain geographic origins are thought as being of a 
higher quality than products from other areas (Renard, 2003). Locally recognisable 
agrifoods, evoke traceability and nutritiousness quality, have become desirable objects 
of many consumers (Warde, 1997; Kuznesof et al., 1997; Henson and Northen, 2000; 
Mansfield, 2003a, b). Quality is “increasingly being related to products from a 
specified region” (Ilbery and Kneafsey, 2000a p.220), and “seen as inherent in more 
‘local’ and more ‘natural’ foods” (Murdoch et al., 2000 p.108). 
 
Because both information and the source of information are the main factors used by 
consumers to judge agrifood quality (Renting et al., 2003) and quality has been 
intrinsically linked to the location of production (Murdoch et al., 2000), the visual 
confirmation of agrifood origin through official certification, should have a strong 
influence on consumers’ perceived quality attributes and purchase decisions (see also 
Ilbery et al., 2005). Therefore, some countries/areas, such the UK, Japan, China, and 
the EU, offer formal mechanisms to indicate agrifood products with special 
geographic origins via certification schemes. Examples of this include the French 
appellation d'origin scheme and the European “PDO” and “PGI” systems.  
 
Based upon regulated and authenticated links between product and local identity, GIs 
not only meet consumers quality needs but also have the potential ability to increase 
qualified producers’ incomes (Ilbery and Kneafsey, 2000a, b; Marsden et al., 2000a; 
Barham, 2003). Normally, if producers cannot credibly signal the quality of their 
products, consumers’ perceived quality of the product will be average and producers 
will only be able to achieve average incomes. Branding is recognised as a common 
way to distinguish agrifood products (Henchion and McIntyre, 2000). But individual 
farmers and small-scale processors may not have the resources or skills to develop 
their own brands. GIs, also called “farmers’ owned brands” (Hayes et. al, 2005), are 
popular choices for these producers to brand and market their agrifood products. 
Firstly, GIs are normally owned by groups of producers. The co-operative activities 
can offer the benefit of access to existing resources held by other actors and 
economies of scale to its members, such as groups of producers being able to employ 
marketing specialists to analyse the market that an individual producer alone may not 
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be able to afford (Nygard and Storstad, 1998; Lamprinopoulou et al., 2006). 
Promoting GIs is thus becoming possible for individual farmers and small-scale 
processors. Secondly, producers are required to co-operate together to apply GIs with 
the government based on preset GI certification schemes. Anybody who belongs to 
the group and makes products meeting the requirements of the certification procedure, 
has the right to use GIs on their products after application. For consumers, GIs are 
thus supposed to offer consistent quality guarantees and specify the quality 
characteristics that make a product unique, like third-party certification (Watts and 
Goodman, 1997). Even though Parrott et al. (2002) point out, GIs are not a sort of 
quality mark per se and registration does not involve any quality assessment (other 
than the quality standards defined by producers in the application process), consumers 
still believe the agrifood products with GIs “are somehow defined by their quality 
attributes” (p.246) because their qualification process follows a defined code of 
practice presented by producers in the application process which meets certain 
standards or quality levels. The qualification process enhances consumers’ confidence 
on the quality of GI products and producers may thus receive a high income. Based on 
co-operative activities and government support, qualified GI producers obtain a 
chance to capture extra value in the market by distinguishing GI products from 
anonymous mass produced goods (Hayes et al., 2004). 
 
Meanwhile, in contradistinction to the ‘Fordist’ approach that believes rural incomes 
can increase mainly through increasing total production volume and improving the 
technical efficiency of production, GIs hold particular promise for the rural 
development of peripheral agricultural regions by linking products and places more 
closely (Ilbery and Kneafsey, 1999; van der Ploeg et al., 2000). Firstly, the land owner 
living in that local area may get economic rewards from land rent. Agrifood products 
with GIs are sold by emphasising the site which encompasses the unique combination 
of local soils, climate, and cultural resources (such as growing experiences and 
inherited techniques) and may lead to unique qualities that cannot be replicated 
elsewhere. When the demand for certain agrifood products with GIs grows, the 
demand may be easily transferred to the requirement of higher productive capacity 
(land). Because the land in certain areas is always limited, the unavoidable result is 
the price increase of the local land. The price/sales of a GI product and the value of 
land in GIs’ areas are thus interrelated (Overton and Heitger, 2008). For example, 
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stimulated by the increasing market price of wine from the Gimblett Gravels district 
in New Zealand, the price of local land at the beginning of the 2000s was more than 6 
times of that in 1980s (Overton and Heitger, 2008). And, as the sales of AOC 
Bordeaux wine decreased in the last decade (from 6.4 million hectoliters in 1998 to 
4.88 million hectoliters in 2008), the average price of Bordeaux vineyards in 
Bordeaux Blanc area decreased from 26,200 Euro per ha to 17,000 Euro per ha in the 
same period (Datamonitor, 2004; Comité National des Appellations d’Origine, 2010; 
Wineyard Intelligence, 2010). Protecting and developing GI systems benefit local 
farmers as it inflates the value of the land. Secondly, in the market, promoting 
agrifood products with GIs can be extended to promote certain regions. For 
consumers, GI products are perceived as a combination of the physical environment 
(e.g. distinctive landscapes, local animal breeds and plant varieties), cultural (e.g. 
myths and stories), and economic factors (e.g. skilled employment) (Tregear et. al., 
2007; Fonte, 2008). The territorial identity and associations with the product form a 
base to develop perceived territorial quality and promote territorial products rather 
than the physical outputs of GI products. As Pecqueur (2001) claims, the economic 
rent of local identity can be distributed to a wider range and promote a “basket” of 
goods and services in local areas (cited in Tregear et. al., 2007). Aside from the 
qualified GI producers receiving their premium incomes from GI systems, many 
residents in the place of origin can also benefit from GI networks. Rural areas are thus 
encouraged to adopt a GI strategy, in particular the less favoured areas (LFAs) where 
are becoming increasingly marginal to the productivity regime as they are filled with 
highly fragmented farms and are thus less able to adopt the intensive and mechanistic 
approach associated with industrial agriculture (Marsden et al., 1993). 
 
Concentrated on localised quality, the appearance of GI systems is the consequence of 
power competition in agrifood sector. It develops new co-operation relationships 
between different actors (see also Nygard and Storstad, 1998). Various “powerless” 
actors in the industrial agrifood system, such as consumers, producers, and “lagging” 
areas’ residents, may benefit from this power reconstruction. However, according to 
the conceptual framework, agrifood quality is complex and is assembled under power 
relationships between diverse actors under a given context. The specific meaning of 
“localised quality” and the role that GI schemes plays in agrifood quality constructing 
processes may thus vary in different GI networks. To systematically understand the 
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quality construction process of GI agrifood products and explore the role of GI 
schemes in developing agrifood quality, three sample networks, namely Cassis wine, 
Parma ham, and Florida citrus, will be examined in the next section. The findings will 
also be used to compare with the Chinese GI system in Chapter 8. 
 
2.5 The role of GIs in constructing agrifood quality 
  
2.5.1 Cassis wine 
In France, wine production can be traced back to the 6
th
 century B.C. with the 
colonisation of Southern Gaul by Greek settlers. Around the 1
st
 century B.C., the 
Roman Empire licensed regions in the south to produce wines. During the Middle 
Ages, monks maintained vineyards and developed wine-making knowledge. Today, 
wine is produced in several regions through France with production totally 42.8 
million hectolitres in 2008 (Comité National des Appellations d’Origine, 2010). With 
a long production history, drinking wine has become “a traditional habit, a national 
practice, an expression of French identity, a valorising pleasure, a sensory experience, 
a part of celebration and a hedonistic joy” in France (Brown, 2010 p.12).  
 
To protect the rights of wine producers and to combat fraud, the French Law of May 6, 
1919 was set up to protect “appellation of origin”. According to this law, “an 
appellation of origin consists of the name of a country, region or locality that serves 
to designate a product originating therein, the quality and characteristics of which 
are due to the geographical environment, including both natural and human factors” 
(World intellectual Property Organization, 2004 p.122). “Appellation of origin” is 
defined as a collective ownership associated within a certain territory and shows 
products which originate from specific areas and owe their specific quality to their 
place of origin. To improve the level of protection, France created the Appellation 
d’Origine Controlee (AOC) legislation to protect regional wines in 1935 (Celine, 
1998). At the same time, a branch of the French Ministry of Agriculture, the “Comité 
National des Appellations d’Origine” (National Committee for the Origin 
Appellation), which became the Institute National des Appellations d’Origine (INAO) 
in 1947, was set up to manage the production of wines according to AOC regulations. 





 of winegrowers that meet certain requirements”, “uncovering and 
preventing fraud”, and “working to help implement quality standards” (Gade, 2004 
p.849). The relevant AOC seal was created later. In France, it is illegal to manufacture 
and sell wine with AOC controlled GIs if it does not meet the standards of the AOC 
(Celine, 1998).  
 
More than 300 AOC wines are produced in France (Comité National des Appellations 
d’Origine, 2010). Appellation Cassis controlee comprising 180 ha of vineyards and 
fourteen wine growers, is the third oldest and one of the smallest AOC wine producers 
in the French AOC system. Cassis is a geographical name and located 25 km east of 
Marseille in the Bouches du Rhone Province. With a long production history which 
can be dated back to the late Middle Ages, the Cassis syndicate was formed by fifty 
members included both landowners and sharecroppers and was set up in 1935 under 
the support of the government. This co-operative is a very “powerful” actor in 
securing “certain quality characteristics” in the network based on its ability of 
“proposing” production and quality regulations to the INAO who encourages AOC 
wine co-operatives to build a “quality” image by defining appellations’ specialness 
more precisely. Firstly, as the syndicate believes that increasing yields at the expense 
of quality and over-production will reduce the price and bring significantly lower 
financial returns for growers, the productivity of Cassis wine is restricted to a certain 
level through several ways. Such as, even though the Cassis area comprises 2,686 ha 
of land, according to restriction regulations, only 180 ha vineyards “from 10m above 
sea level near the Mediterranean shore to 150m elevation 3.5 km inland” can be used 
to produce Cassis wine due to the consideration of the impact of natural environment 
on quality (Gade, 2004 p.858). To secure the quality and also to limit the output, a 
plantation density of 4,000 vine stocks per ha and the maximum productivity to 40 
hectoliters per ha are also identified by the syndicate. A large production increase is 
thus impossible in the network. Secondly, to ensure the taste of Cassis wine, the 
designated alcohol content is regulated to a minimum 12%. And, only eleven grape 
varieties, such as Ugni Blanc, Marsanne and Clairette, are permitted to be used in 
Cassis wine blending processes. Winemakers can use as much or as little of these 
grapes as they wish to make Cassis wine but they are not allowed to use any other 
                                                        
13 Winemakers’ co-operatives 
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grapes because only indicated varieties are believed to be suitable to grow in the 
Cassis area. Thirdly, storing Cassis wine in expensive oak barrels of specific sizes 
which cannot be changed to other materials or other sizes, is mandated as a 
requirement in the Cassis decree because it is a traditional way to store wine in the 
Cassis area. Furthermore, to keep an exclusive image, the syndicate even decided to 
increase its production costs. Although this is not an AOC requirement, all syndicate 
members have informally agreed to harvest their grapes by hand. The syndicate 
believes that hand picking is a way to enhance the image of Cassis as an elite wine 
different from other wines made by machine-harvested grapes. Through establishing 
strict production regulations, “terroir”
14
 is becoming a decisive factor in describing 
quality (characteristics) of Cassis wine, even though the grape varieties, local weather 
and techniques of wine-making are very different from the Middle Ages. (Callon et al., 
2002; Gade, 2004) 
 
Under the support of the government, a myriad of rigid production regulations have 
been proposed by the co-operative and set up and regulated by the INAO to control 
quality forming processes and thus protect the integrity and reputation of Cassis wine. 
Both the government and the syndicate are “powerful” actors involved in quality 
forming processes. Under strict decree, small-scale production with a traditional 
image contributes to the reputation of Cassis wine as a drink reserved for the gods, 
and enhances high economic rewards for local wine growers (Gade, 2004).  
 
2.5.2 Parma ham 
Under the influence of the French AOC system, for protecting and promoting regional 
agrifood products and increasing rural incomes, Italy also established its own GI 
regulations in 1963, called Denominazione de Origine Controllata (DOC). 
 
Parma ham is a typical DOC product in Italy. Since Roman times, the special weather 
of the Parma region has been recognised as ideally suited for ham making (Hayes et 
al., 2004). Only hams produced and cured in the hills around the Parma area may 
become Parma hams, other hams cured outside the area may be done in different 
                                                        
14 “Terroir” describes the special quality of an agricultural product that is determined by the characteristics of the 
location, as the synergistic effect of varieties, such as soil, bedrock, landforms, climate, and unique human factors 
acquired from the past, such as the skills or practices passed on from one generation to the next (Gade, 2004 p.849) 
 
 54 
environments and will therefore be considered of a lower quality. Since 1970, Parma 
ham has been protected by the Italian law as a GI product. By law, all Parma ham 
producers must be located within the geographical boundaries of the Parma 
production area, at least 5 km south of the Via Emilia, limited to the east by the river 
Enza and on the west by the river Stirone, and up to an altitude of 900m. (The Parma 
Ham Consortium, 2007) 
 
The voluntary Parma Ham Consortium, formed by 23 producers initially was set up in 
1963 to safeguard the genuine quality of Parma ham and the image represented by the 
name of “Parma” (O’Reilly and Haines, 2004). Today, the Parma Ham Consortium is 
entrusted with the legal authority to regulate the production of Parma ham. It sets out 
rigorous rules to control production activities in every aspect which may influence 
quality, such as justifying a geographic restriction on production, regulating breeds 
used and breeding techniques, limiting the hogs for the production of Parma ham, 
formulating methods and duration of the ageing stage, specifying characteristics of the 
end product, etc. For example, the consortium limits the pigs to traditional Italian 
breeds: Italian Landrace, Italian Large White and Duroc, which have to be born and 
raised in 11 regions of central-northern Italy. The diet of the pig is also specified: a 
blend of grains, cereals and whey from the Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese production. 
Regulations impact the breeding farms, slaughter-houses, ham producers and traders, 
all actors involved in the production process of Parma ham. Meanwhile, the 
Consortium also supports scientific research and marketing programmes to develop 
the Parma ham industry. The results show that this type of support is very useful to 
ensure quality and obtain higher economic rewards. For example, laboratory analysis 
used in the production process is very helpful in ensuring products meet the 
requirements of the quality regulations. And, the marketing programmes designed to 
enhance the image of Parma ham and increase popularity in Italy and abroad, have led 
to a 20% to 25% premium over generic products in the marketplace. (O’Reilly and 
Haines, 2004; The Parma Ham Consortium, 2007) 
 
Beside the Consortium, an independent inspection and quality control agency, the 
IPQ (Instituto di Parma Qualita), was approved by the Italian Ministry of Industry, 
Trade and Crafts to manage the production of Parma ham. Each step in the Parma 
ham production process, from certified pig breeding farms through to the 
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slaughter-houses to ham producers, are closely monitored and controlled by this 
agency based on regulations issued by the Consortium (O’Reilly and Haines, 2004). 
The ham that passes all of the quality control tests will be fire branded with the 
official mark of the Consortium, the five-point ducal crown that identifies them as 
genuine Parma ham (The Parma Ham Consortium, 2007).  
 
Facing relatively small production facilities in rural areas, the Cassis syndicate and 
the Parma Ham Consortium protect and promote their GI products carefully. Even 
though the Cassis syndicate sets stricter GI regulations (such as limiting productivity) 
than the Parma Ham Consortium, both of them ensure quality through the GI 
production codes (presented by co-operatives) and the specific control system (the 
INOA in the Cassis wine network and the IPQ in the Parma ham network) (Figure 2.2) 
and the quality thus links with location, history and culture tightly. 
 
 
Figure 2. 2: E.U. PDO and PGI system 
Source: Hayes et al., 2004 
 
However, in the “new world”, such as Australia, New Zealand, and America, the GI 
system is very different (Hayes et al., 2005). With a relative short history and 
large-scale commodity production experience, it is not a wise choice for local farmers 
to create “history and culture” quality and restrict production quantity. Having a 
relatively short history also limits the ability of the “new world” to build an E.U. style 
GI system because it will be very costly to set a new GI regulatory system beside 
general legislative schemes. So, the “new world” has developed a very different way 
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to construct “quality” of GI agrifood products. To continue to explore the role GI 
schemes play in developing agrifood quality, the Florida citrus network will be taken 
as a “new world” example in the next part. 
 
2.5.3 Florida citrus 
With the exception of wine, the United States does not have a special legislative 
system for GI products. If producers want to identify their goods by GIs, they must 
rely on existing laws for legal protection, for example trademark law (Handler, 2007). 
Nowadays, protecting GIs within the scope of U.S. law is done mainly through 
certification marks (Beresford, 1999) which can be defined as “any word, name, 
symbol, device, or any combination, used, or intended to be used, in commerce with 
the owner’s permission by someone other than its owner, to certify regional or other 
geographic origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other 
characteristics of someone’s goods or services, or that the work or labor on the goods 
or services was performed by members of a union or other organization” (United 
State Patent and Trademark office, 2010). The certification marks cannot be sold as 
brands. But, through registration with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 
GI products can obtain full protection from trademark infringement.  
 
Florida citrus, protected as a certification mark is very famous in the U.S. But, citrus 
trees are not native to Florida. The first time they were farmed commercially in 
Florida was in the mid-1800s. Since then, Florida’s unique sandy soil and subtropical 
climate have proved to be ideal for growing citrus trees. According to the 2007-08 
Florida Agriculture Statistics Services (FASS) Citrus Summary, more than 74 million 
citrus trees, which produce around 70% (203.8 million boxes of citrus) of the total 
U.S. citrus production, are grown on nearly 569,000 acres in Florida. Today, Florida 
citrus is a $9 billion industry. It employs over 76,000 people working in the citrus 
industry or related businesses, and produces more citrus than any other region of the 
world, except Brazil. (Florida Department of Citrus, 2008a; Florida Citrus Mutual, 
2009) 
 
In 1935, with the legislative passing of the Florida Citrus Code, the Florida Citrus 
Commission was established by State Legislature. The Florida Citrus Commission is a 
12-member board, made up of citrus growers, processors, shippers and packers. The 
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Commission conducts a wide variety of programmes involving industry regulation, 
including scientific, market and economic research, advertising, merchandising, and 
public and industry relations. To carry out commission policies, the Commission 
eventually led to the establishment of the Florida Department of Citrus (FDOC), 
which is an executive agency of the Florida government. Under the direction of the 
Commission, the regulatory responsibilities of the FDOC cover every aspect of the 
industry in every detail, including research, production, fertilising, maturity standards, 
harvesting, licensing, transportation, labling, packing and processing. For example, 
the FDOC asks grove managers to take representative samples of citrus from a 
particular block of trees, about 40 pieces of fruit for a 40-acre block and test the juice 
which is squeezed from the sample fruit for two main attributes: brix and acid, both of 
which are vital in determining the flavour of the juice. If samples cannot pass the test, 
all citrus in the block where samples come from cannot be picked. (Florida 
Department of Citrus, 2008b, c) 
 
Scientific and social research has always been a primary pursuit of the Florida citrus 
industry because it is believed that they can improve and promote quality and thus 
help obtain more economic rewards. For example, numerous varieties of citrus were 
introduced to local farmers through scientific research programmes to offer citrus 
with different quality characteristics to meet consumers’ various requirements and 
encourage smooth productivity around the whole year. Market research projects are 
underway as well, such as the programme to generate consumers’ quality perceptions 
of the market. Much of the research is supported by the Commission, takes place at 
the University of Florida’s Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) and 
Citrus Research and Education Center (CREC), and promoted by the FDOC. (Florida 
Department of Citrus, 2010) 
 
Many other non-governmental co-operatives also exist in the network but with 
minimal ability to regulate their members’ production activities. Examples of this 
include Florida Citrus Mutual formed in 1948 and focuses on helping Florida citrus 
growers produce and market their crops at a profit (Florida Citrus Mutual, 2007) and 





 (Florida’s Natural Growers, 2010).  
 
Significant divergences exist amongst the three sample GI networks in relation to 
quality “characteristics” and production regulatory system (Table 2.3). With a lot of 
valuable, historical, and well-known agricultural products, in face of fragmented farm 
lands and a large amount of small-scale farmers and businesses, the governments of 
France and Italy adopted very strict production codes set by producer co-operatives to 
ensure traditional ways are adopted in the production process because it is believed 
that the image of “traditional quality” is essential in generating higher profit (Gamble 
and Taddei, 2007). Also, the specific legislative systems were built to manage the GI 
sectors. In America, Florida citrus is protected as a certification mark by the 
trademark law. It relies on local specific natural conditions, detailed regulations and 
scientific and marketing programmes, to produce a huge quantity citrus with a 
“scientific quality” image into the market. Producers try to obtain a high economic 
reward by meeting segmented market demands through large-scale and low-cost 
production activities. But, although differences between these three samples can be 
found, similar structures are adopted in three networks to secure the “quality” of GI 
products. For example, legitimate quality criteria and production rules are proposed 
by producer co-operatives and confirmed by the government legislative system. And 
it is always the government department and/or the independent third party to inspect 
production processes, guarantee the conformity of actors to official norms, eliminate 
conflict over the use of the GI, and protect the GI against fraud. Quality is thus greatly 










                                                        
15 Around 90 percent of Florida citrus were processed into juice and the remainder was sold as fresh fruit 
(Florida’s Natural Growers, 2010) 
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Table 2. 3: The differences between the Cassis wine network, the Parma ham network and the 
Florida citrus network 
 
2.6 Chapter summary 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of GIs in terms of developing agrifood quality, this 
chapter introduced the concept of GIs, established a conceptual framework for 
analysing agrifood quality, reviewed shifting quality meanings and accompanying 
power relationships in the world agrifood sector. Furthermore, it also explored the role 
of GIs in constructing agrifood quality in a diverse range of geographical contexts.  
 
Based on the literature, agrifood quality has been realised very difficult to define but 
can be understood and analysed through examining power relationships (threads) 
between different actors (nodes) within certain political, social and economic 
environments. This conceptual framework indicates, with different networks, the 
quality characteristics presented into the market may vary even for similar agrifood 
products due to dissimilar power relationships formed under various contexts. 
Therefore, the power relationships involved in the quality forming process in the 
industrial agrifood system, AAFNs and GI networks were examined to review shifting 
meanings of agrifood quality. Also, to gain a systematically understanding of the 
quality construction process in GI metworks and influence of GI schemes on quality, 
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three samples were explored. The findings show, although the “local” information is 
the critical aspect to form the quality image in all GI networks, the quality meanings 
and the influence of GI schemes on quality may be different between GI networks 
with different power relationships based on dissimilar contexts. As the context is 
essential to analyse agrifood quality, the political, economic and social environments 






























Chapter 3 The Development of Chinese GI Schemes 
 
 “Before 1978, China was one of the poorest countries in the world with 60 
percent of the one billion people living below poverty, earning less than $1 per day. 
Almost all of the poor were in the agricultural sector, which provided livelihoods to 
nearly 75 percent of the total population. Since 1978, the world has seen a different 
China— a China with an economy growing consistently at red-hot speed. The growth 
started in 1978 with the implementation of the household responsibility system ... 
Agriculture, however, which was a clear leader in reform, is now lagging behind other 
sectors. China’s rural economy faces many serious challenges. The gains of economic 
growth have not been fairly shared between urban and rural residents. Many parts of 
the agricultural and rural sector remain underdeveloped. ... Land holdings are so 
small that farming cannot raise enough income for most rural households. The 
improvement of agricultural productivity is further hindered by the lack of 
well-functioning credit, land rental, and insurance markets”  




The previous chapter highlighted the conceptual framework for analysing agrifood 
quality. It illustrated that the quality of agrifood products is difficult to define but can 
be understood and analysed through examining power relationships between diverse 
actors based on certain political, social and economic environments. Therefore, 
evaluating the effectiveness of GIs in improving Chinese agrifood quality requires a 
detailed examination of political, social and economic environments involved in the 
Chinese GI system.  
  
According to the conceptual framework, the rest of this chapter is organised into two 
main themes. One focuses on outlining the driving force of Chinese governments to 
develop the GI system through social and economic considerations. The other one 
concentrates on exploring the political context within the Chinese GI system by 
analysing the political enforcement on general agrifood quality forming processes and 




3.2 The driving force of the Chinese government in developing the GI 
system 
 
3.2.1 Rapid growth of Chinese economy and the relative decline in farm incomes 
 
Year China’s GDP Total Rural Incomes 
1978 364.52 Billion RMB 105.56 Billion RMB (28.96% of GDP) 
1990 1866.78 Billion RMB 557.44 Billion RMB (29.78% of GDP) 
2000 9921.46 Billion RMB 1821.58 Billion RMB (18.59% of GDP) 
2010 40120.2 Billion RMB 3972.42 Billion RMB (9.9% of GDP) 
Table 3. 1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China compares with total rural incomes (rural 
average income * total rural population) 1978-2010 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011 
 
Since 1978, China has been moving from an inefficient, Soviet-style centrally planned 
economy to a more market-oriented system, and its economy has been growing 
rapidly. The average annual growth rate of its GDP was 8.5% for the period 
1979–1984, 9.7% for 1985–1995, 8.2% for 1996–2000, and 15.57% for 2001-2010 
(Figure 3.1). In 2010, China’s GDP was more than 110 times that of 1978 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). Data released by the World Bank shows that 
China’s GDP ranked No.2 in the world in 2010 (World Bank, 2011b).  
 
 
Figure 3. 1: GDP of China 1978-2010 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011                       
 
With the fast growth in the Chinese economy, the past three decades have seen a rapid 
increase in both income and food consumption. In urban areas, the disposable annual 
income per capita increased from 343.4 RMB in 1978 to 1510.2 RMB in 1990, and up 
to 19109.4 RMB in 2010. In rural areas, the annual income per capita increased from 
133.6 RMB in 1978 to 686.3 RMB in 1990, to 5919.0 RMB in 2010. Engel’s Law 
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predicts that the share of food in total expenditure should decrease as income 
increases. China is no exception. In 1978, Engel coefficients were 57.5% in urban 
areas and 67.7% in rural areas. In 1990, they were 54.2% and 58.8%. By 2010, they 
had fallen to 35.7% in urban areas and 41.1% in rural areas. However, with the rapid 
increasing personal income, total expenditure for food is still rising in the China 
market. In 2010, the annual consumption expenditure per capita on food in urban 
areas was 4804.7 RMB
16
, and in rural areas it was 1800.7 RMB, much higher than 
1766.0 RMB and 768.2 RMB in 1995. In order to meet the rapidly rising food 
demand, Chinese farmers produced huge amounts of agricultural products for the 
market with high growth rates for agricultural productivity. For example, in 1978, 
China produced only 304.8 million tonnes of grain and 6.6 million tonnes of fruit for 
the market, and the gross output value of all agriculture products was 139.7 billion 
RMB. In 1990, the numbers rose to 446.2 million tonnes, 18.7 million tonnes, and 
766.2 billion RMB. In 2010, they rose dramatically to 546.5 million tonnes, 214.0 




Figure 3. 2: Gross output value of Chinese agriculture products 1990-2010 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011 
 
Before the end of the 1990s, the key factor underlying increasing agricultural output 
was specific government policy. In 1978, the Chinese government introduced the 
Household Production Responsibility System, whereby every household received an 
individual piece of land to farm and where they were allowed to retain leftover 
produce after selling a fixed proportion to the state at a state-determined price, or by 
simply paying a tax in cash. This policy allowed farmers to have a degree of freedom 
                                                        




in planting crops by partly transferring control of land from collectives back to 
individual families, and had been proved very effective in stimulating farmers to 
mobilise rural resources and improve productivity (McMillan et al., 1989). With 
increasing agricultural production, the income per head in the countryside rose more 
than 17 folds from 1978 to 1999 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). 
However, the growth rate in income slowed in the late 1990s and the beginning of 
2000s to 2.23% in 1999 and 1.95% in 2000 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2011). Many researchers (e.g. Keidel, 2007; Hu, 2008) believe the reduction in 
growth was caused by over production. For example, 512.3 million tonnes of grain 
was produced in 1998, which is significantly more than 304.8 million tonnes in 1978 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010). In a saturated market, grain production 
volume could no longer be expanded at the same rate given that the price of grain had 
reduced 42% from 1996 to 2002 (Hu, 2008). After two decades of reform, the energy 
of the Household Production Responsibility System in increasing farm incomes 
through improving productivity appeared to be exhausted.  
 
At that time, the government realised Chinese consumers’ dietary patterns had shifted 
with their increasing income (Fuller et al., 2002). The consumption of grain decreased 
but that of income elastic agrifood products, such as meat, fresh fruits and vegetables 
had increased. To continue support for increasing farm incomes, many policies were 
issued by the Chinese government to encourage farmers to produce high income 
elastic agricultural products, such as fruit, tea, pork, and beef. The results were the 
land used for fruits increased from 8.5 million ha to 11.5 million ha between 1998 and 
2010, and output increased from 54.5 million tonnes in 1998 to 214.0 million tonnes 
in 2010. In contrast, grain production over the same period decreased from 113.8 
million ha in 1998 to 109.9 million ha in 2010 although the harvest increased slightly 
from 512.3 million tonnes in 1998 to 546.5 million tonnes in 2010 as a consequence 
of the application of modern technologies (Figure 3.3). (National Bureau of Statistics 





Figure 3. 3: The total output of fruits and grain 1998-2010 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011 
 
However, it is not easy to continue to increase farm incomes by simply producing 
higher volumes of income elastic agrifood products in China. First of all, reducing the 
land used for grain is not a wise idea to improve farm incomes for a country filled 
with 1.4 billion people. Lacking grain supply in the market may become a big 
political problem. Secondly, China is a country with a large area of mountains and 
hills and most Chinese farmers still need their own small lands to meet their daily 
needs. A significant increase in the scale of production through modern industrial 
agrifood system is thus difficult to achieve because of the fragmentation of land 
holding in contemporary China (Wan and Cheng, 2000). Thirdly, post-1978 agrifood 
output growth in China was not only driven by policies, but also pushed by 
technological factors, for example, progress in biotechnology and increasing use of 
agricultural chemicals, including a remarkable acceleration in the use of chemical 
fertilisers (Edmonds, 2006). The U.S. Department of Agriculture even reported that 
China ranked among the highest users of fertiliser per ha (Calvin et al., 2006). With 
the rapid increase in fertiliser application over the past three decades, marginal 
outputs have tended to decline (Keidel, 2007). Fourthly, a continual increase in 
production of income elastic agrifood products may decrease the market price and 
thus ironically reduce farm incomes in the future, similar to what happened in the 
grain market. Therefore, besides growing income elastic agrifood products, farmers 
have to find other approaches to improve their incomes.  
 
3.2.2 Urban and rural income disparity 
Data collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011) shows that there 
was some improvement in rural incomes between 2001 and 2010, with the income per 
head rising by 150.1%. However, the growth that occurred in this period was 
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misleading as it is not the result of increased earnings from traditional agricultural 
activities. Under the industrialisation process, a lot of farmers left their farms and 
moved to the city to earn wages which are higher compared to agricultural activities. 
However, farmers’ personal documents
17
 still state their locations as countryside. 
Even though they work in the city, their wages were calculated as rural incomes by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China. In 1990, only 14.0% of farms’ incomes 
were contributed by wages, and the number increased to 22.3% in 2000 and 29.0% in 
2010. With a high percentage contributed by wages, the increasing rate of rural 
incomes contributed by agricultural activities is much lower than 150.1% at the 
beginning of the 21
st
 Century. Compared with the disposable income per capita in 
urban areas which rose by 178.6% in the same period, the gap between rural and 
urban incomes has widened in the last decade (Figure 3.4).  
 
 
Figure 3. 4: Per capita annual disposable income changing in urban areas and per capita annual 
income changing in rural areas 1978-2010 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011 
 
Scholars (e.g. Tocqueville, 2000; Daly et al., 2001; Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Lee and 
Bankston, 1999; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) have indicated that there is a link 
between income inequality and social cohesion, such as shorter life expectancy, 
higher disease rates, homicide, infant mortality, obesity, teenage pregnancies, and 
emotional depression. Research (e.g. Perotti, 1996; Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000; Cornia 
and Court, 2001; Pagano, 2004) has also shown that economic inequality decreases 
innovation and economic growth rates within a society. For example, Perotti (1996) 
argues that inequality is associated with a lower economic growth rate and a higher 
level of fertility. Cornia and Court (2001, p.24) point out that high levels of inequality 
have a negative impact on economic growth due to “incentive traps, erosion of social 
cohesion, social conflicts, and uncertain property rights”. Clearly, if the widening gap 
                                                        
17 like ID cards 
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between rural and urban areas is left unchecked, it “will hinder overall economic 
development and even undermine social stability” (China Daily, 2004). 
 
The agricultural sector (farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and fisheries) forms a 
vital part of the Chinese economy. Around 300 million people accounting for 36.7% 
of the total nationwide employment are involved in this sector even though the 
proportion of agriculture in Chinese GDP reduced to only 10.3% in 2010 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). Since the mid-1990s, developing a productive 
and efficient agriculture system and thus raising rural incomes has become an explicit 
policy objective for the government (Ministry of Agriculture, 1997). In 2007, the 
government announced that consolidating the fundamental role of agriculture in 
economic growth was among the eight major governmental economic tasks (XinHua 
News, 2007b). At the 17th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee 
Meeting (2008), the nation set the goal of doubling the disposable per capita income 
of rural residents by 2020 (China Daily, 2008). 
 
To help increase rural incomes, the government repealed all taxes on agricultural 
products
18
 in 2005 and started to offer subsidies to farmers. But these approaches of 
reducing taxes and distributing subsidies may only marginally benefit farmers. 
Calculations show that the combination of agricultural subsidies and taxes represent 
less than 2% of average rural household incomes (Gale et al., 2005). As large-scale 
modern farming approach is very difficult to develop in rural China, the question of 
how to increase rural incomes, balance development between rural and urban areas, 
and integrate rural areas into the overall growth of the Chinese economy, are 
becoming key policy challenges for the Chinese government.  
 
3.2.3 GIs — improving rural incomes by meeting quality requirements of Chinese 
middle class consumers 
Before the 1990s, as supplies were very limited in China, ration coupons were 
required to purchase basic agrifood products, such as grain, oil, meat and sugar. At 
that time, both the production and consumption of agrifood products were dominated 
by cereals and coarse grains. As consumers had little to spend and there was not much 
                                                        
18 Except for tobacco 
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to choose, people’s consumption behaviours and patterns were basically identical. 
Until 1984, the grain output just met Chinese basic consumption needs, achieving 
around 400 kg per capita for the first time (Ash, 2006). This situation changed in the 
1990s with massively increased agrifood production. In the last two decades, Chinese 
residents, especially in the urban area, have experienced a dramatic transformation in 
the agrifood sector. The plentiful supplies, the improved transportation and 
distribution systems, and the increasing privatisation of the retail sector, have led to a 
much improved selection of agrifood options for Chinese urban consumers as well as 
offering them a chance to shift their consumption patterns to a more varied diet 
(Veeck, 2003). 
 
A firm economic base for the consumption of quality agrifood products has also been 
established in urban China. Firstly, under the urban-based industrialisation 
development strategy over the last three decades, the average income of urban 
residents is now more than three times that of rural residents (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2011). Secondly, income is not evenly distributed in urban areas. 
From 2001 to 2010, the disposable income for the poorest 10 percent of the urban 
population only doubled to 5948.1 RMB, while the disposable income for the richest 
10 percent more than tripled to 51431.6 RMB (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2011). With the rapid growth of the Chinese economy and the widening income gap 
between rural and urban and the rich and poor, a group of wealthy individuals called 
“middle class” is emerging in urban areas. According to Deng (2005), the size of the 
Chinese middle class may vary, from 3% (35.18 million) to 14% (170 million) of the 
entire country’s population according to different definitions of the term. Based on the 
Chinese official description, in 2007, the middle class was around 80 million people, 
or 6.15% of the population, with “an annual income between 60,000 and 500,000 
RMB” (XinHua News, 2007a). The Boston Consulting group (2010) even declares 
that the Chinese middle class will increase to 400 million by 2020. 
 
For these “middle class” consumers, plenty agrifood supplies and increasing incomes 
have provided them with an opportunity to purchase quality agrifood products instead 
of inferior ones (Gale, 2006). At the same time, the anxieties about unsafe agrifood 
products and the desire to demonstrate a certain social position also encourage these 
consumers to buy quality agrifood products. Along with increasing output and usage 
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of agricultural chemicals, some Chinese consumers have begun to notice the 
deterioration of the agroecosystem (see also MacKenzie, 1990). They start to worry 
about the environment where their food is grown and processed, and if their food is 
poisoned. Also, food scares, such as the infant milk powder scandal, reflect quality 
worries as well. Consumers are becoming increasingly sensitive about the quality of 
the agrifood products they are buying, and so have a strong desire to purchase quality 
agrifood products for health reasons. An IBM telephone survey noted that in response 
to environment problems and agrifood scandals, more than 80 percent of Chinese 
respondents were more and more concerned with food safety issues in their choice of 
what to eat (IBM, 2008). Moreover, agrifood consumption involves the production of 
meanings and identities in Chinese society. After a long period of controlled scarcity, 
the consumption of certain types of agrifood products plays a more significant role in 
Chinese social life. For example, the consumption of fresh milk in the 1960s and 
1970s, imported fruits in the 1980s, and branded agrifood products in the 1990s 
indicates the social status and wealth of a family. In China, agrifood consumption is 
related to tangible and intangible personal success or an individual’s level of public 
respect, and thus has become a specific symbolic character of “high income” 
consumers (Denton and Xia, 1995). For Chinese middle class consumers, agrifood is 
not just an object, it also presents “a way of life”. As Douglas and Isherwood (1980, 
p.62) stress, “the essential function of consumption is its capacity to make sense” in 
society. 
 
Eves and Cheng (2007) argue that “quality” has become the most important influence 
on agrifood purchasing processes for middle class consumers, even though quality is a 
subjective judgement. The agrifood consumption of the Chinese “middle class” has 
improved not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. This quality approach has 
caught producers’ attention in the market as producing quality agrifood products may 
not only respond to consumers’ needs but also improve producers’ incomes by 
enhancing the competitive ability and the market price (see also Kotler and Keller, 
2006).  
 
The Chinese have their particular way of evaluating agrifood quality. They believe 
that health is the consequence of a natural equilibrium, while illness is the outcome of 
some imbalance (Jovchelovitch and Gervais, 1999). Eating natural and healthy foods 
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can help the human body maintain a harmonious relationship with the universe and 
therefore bring health to human beings. It is called Chinese food “therapy” which 
dates back as early as 2000 B.C. (Liu, 2006). For the Chinese, there are two essential 
meanings included in this “therapy”. One is freshness (just picked or killed) with the 
consideration for taste, nutrition, and healthiness (low in additives and preservatives) 
(Reid et al., 2001; Veeck and Burns, 2005). Another one is location. There is a 
Chinese saying “oranges taste different because they grow on different sides of a 
river”. They believe agrifood products planted in certain places have unique natural 
characteristics (ingredients) which are very important in self-medication and disease 
prevention (Reid et al., 2001). Clarifying geographic origin is thus incredibly 
important in the agrifood purchasing process of the Chinese. For example, Ginseng 
produced in the north of China is believed to integrate more healthy ingredients than 
Ginseng grown in the south, and therefore it is sold with a higher price in the market. 
This traditional, old fashioned way still influences how agrifood quality is framed in 
today’s Chinese market.  
 
For helping farmers adopt a quality strategy to gain a high income and also meeting 
Chinese consumers’ quality requirements, GI schemes are supported by the Chinese 
government since the 1990s. The GI system seems very successful in China as the 
price for many GI agrifood products grew rapidly in the last decade. For instance, 
between 2001 and 2009, the price of Longjin tea rose 50% (China Quality Daily, 
2009). But, the ability of GIs to charge a high price in the market is mainly based on 
consumers’ confidence on GIs which appear to “guarantee” that certified agrifood 
products have been checked against published GI standards and “make food supply 
chains legible, traceable, and perhaps less risky” (Guthman, 2004 p.512). The 
certification procedure of GIs thus need be managed and monitored carefully to 
prevent unscrupulous farmers or producers taking advantage. If monitoring is weak, it 
may be very difficult for producers to receive a high economic reward through the GIs 
for a long time. Unfortunately, the Chinese general food quality inspection system has 
been proved ineffective by many researchers (e.g. Tam and Yang, 2005; Calvin et al., 





3.3 The Chinese food safety regulatory system 
 
Safety is an important aspect of quality. A “quality” agrifood product has to be “safe” 
to eat. The government always focuses on measurable safety standards to control food 
quality (see also Section 2.3.2) as health issues in the food industry have been driven 
to the top of the political agenda by food scares. But, the structure and the 
effectiveness of the food safety regulatory system vary between countries. The U.K. 
food safety regulatory system is taken as an example here to compare with the 
Chinese system. 
 
In the U.K., governmental food safety control and management must conform to the 
Food Safety Act 1990 and secondary regulations and directives issued by the 
European Union
19
 to protect the health of consumers and to prevent fraud (Mensah 
and Julien, 2011). To ensure food is safe to eat, an independent government 
department — the Food Standards Agency (FSA) was set up under an Act of 
Parliament in 2000 and is responsible for setting detailed food safety and hygiene 
standards and regulations and “work(s) with local authorities to enforce food safety 
rules and have staff who work in UK meat plants to check that the requirements of the 
regulations are being met” (Food Standards Agency, 2011; Harvey, 2004). Based on 
the management of the FSA, the local authority food law enforcement officers, such 
as Environment Health Officers and Trading Standards Officers, are responsible for 
making sure food laws or regulations are applied in the food producing and 
processing process (Atkins and Bowler, 2001). Beside the government agencies, 
many third party inspectors also play a very important role in the food safety 
regulatory system in the U.K. According to the Food Safety Act 1990, food 
companies have an obligation to exercise “due diligence” to assure food safety 
(Atkins and Bowler, 2001). This “due diligence” defense shields food producers in the 
event of crises, if they have taken all reasonable precaution and exercised all due 
diligence to avoid committing the offence (Mensah and Julien, 2011). As if producers 
have exercised “due diligence” then their responsibility to food crises can be limited, 
this has been the driving force of the appearance of third party inspectors who inspect 
food safety based on common standards and thus provide ‘due diligence’ defense for 
                                                        
19 Such as, The General Food Law Regulation (EC) 178/2002 and The General Food Regulations 2004 
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producers. The laws, the independent government departments (FSA), the local 
authority food law enforcement officers, and third party inspectors co-operate to 




Compared with the U.K., the Chinese food quality regulatory system is relatively 
complicated. Firstly, the government has launched a series of laws to ensure food 
safety over the past two decades, such as the Product Quality Law of the P.R.C., the 
Food Safety Law of the P.R.C., and Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law of the 
P.R.C. 
 
Secondly, based on these laws, four ministries and agencies
21
 are critically 
empowered to manage the enforcement of these laws. (Table 3.2) 
Ministry/Agency Law  Responsibilities on ensuring food safety 





Safety Law of 
the P.R.C. 
Formulating and enforcing quality standards 
of agricultural inputs and farm products; 
organising the supervision and certification 













Safety Law of 
the P.R.C. 
Formulating and enforcing quality standards 
of food manufacturing, packaging, and 
labling; issuing production permits for food 
processors and producers; supervising 
licensed food enterprises for compliance 
with regulations and standards concerning 
food manufacturing, packaging, and labling. 
The Ministry of 
Health (MoH) 
Food Safety 
Law of the 
P.R.C. 
Formulating and enforcing quality standards 
of food safety; issuing hygiene licenses to 
businesses engaged in food production, 
marketing or sales; monitoring, inspecting, 
and providing technical guidance on foods 
hygiene; appraising and publicising the 
status of food hygiene; investigating and 








Law of the 
P.R.C.; Food 
Safety Law of 
the P.R.C. 
Issuing business licenses; regulating product 
quality and food safety in the market. 
Table 3. 2: The responsibilities of the MoA, the AQSIQ, the MoH, the SAIC on ensuring food 
                                                        
20 Beside the FSA, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) focuses on offering 
support to agri-environment and rural development, also takes part of responsibility to ensure food safety in 
farming level, such as the usage of pesticides. 
21 The National People's Congress (NPC) ranks the highest in the administrative system pyramid and the State 
Council is the chief administrative authority. These four ministries and agencies lie directly under the State Council. 




Source: Tam and Yang, 2005; Ministry of Agriculture, 2010; General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, 2010; Ministry of Health, 2010; State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce of P.R.C., 2010 
 
From an administrative point of view, responsibilities between these four ministries 
and agencies are confusing and often overlap. Therefore, as part of the simplifying 
programmes, the right to control food safety was proposed to the State Food and Drug 
Administration (SFDA) in 2003, which is authorised to exercise comprehensive 
supervision over the safety of food, health products, and cosmetics. Two of the 
SFDA’s five specialised departments
22
 are dedicated to food safety control: the 
Department of Food License and the Department of Food Safety Supervision. 
However, instead of the simplifying purpose proposed initially, these two departments 
focus on coordinating with other ministries and agencies to set unified food safety 
standards, investigate food safety incidents, issue food hygiene licenses, and supervise 
the implementation of food safety regulations at consumption stage in practice (State 
Food and Drag Administration, P.R.C., 2012b). In other words, the SFDA only 
concentrates its authority on the coordination and strengthening of law enforcement 
whilst the regulatory authority over food safety still remains divided among different 
government ministries and agencies
23
 (Roth et al., 2008). (Figure 3.5) 
 
 
Figure 3. 5: The responsibilities of the five departments involved in control food safety in China 
                                                        
22 Five specialised departments are: the Department of Food License, the Department of Food Safety Supervision, 
the Department of Drug Registration, the Department of Medical Device Supercision, and the Department of Drug 
Safety & Inspection (State Food and Drag Administration, P.R.C., 2012a) 
23 Beside these five ministries and agencies, other bureaucratic ministries and agencies also involve in the food 
safety control system are: the Ministry of Commerce, the State Environment Protection Administration, the China 




The fragmentation of responsibility and regulatory authority for food safety among 
those government ministries and agencies has a negative impact upon the 
effectiveness and efficiency of food safety control, because “[I]n certain aspects, 
there may be excessive enforcement; in others, shirking of responsibility may be the 
outcome” (Tam and Yang, 2005 p.14). The incongruity among the regulations and 
standards adopted by the different ministries and agencies and overlapping and 
unclear functions of regulatory authorities, provide some food producers with an 
opportunity to make and market sub-standard unsafe food products. A “Lemon 
Market” with “bad” driving out “good” and described at the beginning of this thesis 
may thus appear (see also Akerlof, 1970).  
 
Thirdly, building an effective food safety control system to govern production and 
marketing activities is still work in progress in China (Tam and Yang, 2005; Roth et 
al., 2008). Marketing research has uncovered that many of the food problems can be 
traced back to farms where safety is almost uncontrollable at farm level in China 
(World Bank, 2006). Roberts and Engardio (2006) indicate that obtaining a high profit 
is difficult in the contemporary competitive Chinese food market because most traders 
often go to the cheapest supplier. So, food producers would like to cut “useless” costs 
which may break some rules. For example, in order to decrease the cost, Chinese 
farmers rely heavily on the use of chemical inputs to increase production and deal 
with pest pressures (Williams, 2005). However, with a low education level in the use 
of chemicals, many farmers believe the more chemicals they use, the better their 
products are (Brogaard and Zhao, 2002; Williams, 2005). Over or wrong usage may 
thus occur, such as many farmers may fail to wait the prescribed number of days 
between the last application of a pesticide and the harvest, resulting in excessive 
residues in the harvested product (Calvin et al., 2006). As rural China is filled with 
millions of small-scale farms which normally less than 0.8 ha
24
 (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2011), how to secure the safety level of agrifood products through 
a relatively few number of government inspectors is still a problem. Meanwhile, 
millions of small-scale food traders, who dominate most of the food trade in the 
market, often handle small volumes of products and operate on a cash basis with no 
                                                        
24 (the sown area + the tea plantation area + the orchards area)/(population in rural areas/average family household 





 (Calvin et al., 2006; Roth et al., 2008). It is almost impossible for 
government officers to trace and recall unsafe food products from the market. With no 
inspection and stimulated by profit maximisation, producing and trading unsafe 
agrifood products seems an unavoidable consequence in today’s Chinese food market. 
As Roberts and Engardio (2006) argue, the pursuit of profit is not a problem by itself 
but problems arise when that pursuit takes a short-term orientation and is not kept in 
check by market or regulatory forces.  
 
Fourthly, in order to increase government tax income and employment opportunities, 
local governments may protect counterfeiting businesses by laxly enforcing 
regulations over food safety. As Luo Yunbo, Dean of the Food and Nutrition College 
of China Agricultural University, asserts, “if local governments close all the 
companies that violate food regulations, a lot of workers will lose their jobs’’ 
(Engardio et al., 2007 p.42). There are cases where some food producers are able to 
obtain legal licenses in spite of poor production conditions. Guanshengyuan, a famous 
food company in China, was reported making moon-cakes using expired materials in 
2001, and Jijihong, a big franchised catering company, was discovered using unsafe 
additives in food processing in 2010.  
 
The combination of too many laws, a fragmented regulatory system, an ineffective 
production and marketing monitoring system, and counterfeiting businesses present a 
challenge to the government and its regulators to secure food safety in China. 
According to the results of an inspection program run by the MoA to check vegetable 
pesticide residue level, the noncompliance rates with governmental standards in 2006 
was 22.1% in urban markets (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2007). As it is difficult to ensure food safety by contemporary 
Chinese food safety regulatory system (see also Bristow, 2007), a topical question 
appears, can the Chinese GI system offer extra guarantee on food quality?   
 
3.4 The legislative system of GIs in China 
 
With numerous traditional and typical agricultural products, geographical names have 
                                                        
25 Traditional food supply system dominates the food sector in China rather than the industrial food system 
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been used for thousands of years to distinguish similar products by Chinese producers. 
However, China did not establish any regulation to protect and promote geographical 
origins until the 1980s when China became one of the signatories to the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, in 1985. Nowadays, three 
parallel legislative frameworks, which are established by the SAIC, the AQSIQ and 
the MoA based on different laws or regulations, are in place to manage the Chinese GI 
system.  
 
The SAIC founds the first GI framework based on the Trademark Law. In 1993, the 
Trademark Law was amended by the SAIC to define GIs as collective marks and 
certification marks. On 27 October 2001, the Trademark Law was amended again to 
meet the requirements of the WTO. Article 3 of the 2001 Trademark Law points out 
that “collective marks” mean “signs which are registered in the name of bodies, 
associations or other organizations to be used by the members thereof in their 
commercial activities to indicate their membership of the organizations”, and 
“certification marks” mean “signs which are controlled by organizations capable of 
supervising some goods or services and used by entities or individual persons outside 
the organization for their goods or services to certify the origin, material, mode of 
manufacture, quality or other characteristics of the goods or services”. And, article 
16(2) defines GI as identifying “a particular good as originating in a region, where a 
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the goods is essentially attributable 
to its natural or human factors”. This definition is broadly similar but not identical to 
TRIPS, as TRIPS refers to “essentially attributable to its geographical origin” and 
the 2001 Trademark Law specifies “essentially attributable to its natural or human 
factors” which is more specific. (Trademark office, 2003; World Trade Organization, 
2009) 
 
Alongside the Trademark law, a regulation entitled “Measures for the Registration 
and Administration of Collective Marks and Certification Marks” provides some 
specific rules and explanations to manage GIs. According to the regulation, the 
applicants for the registration of GIs can only be societies, associations or 
organisations and the applications must be made to the Trademark Office. Article 7 of 
this regulation indicates that any party applying for the registration of a GI as a 
collective mark or a certification mark must present the following information 
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regarding “the special quality, reputation or other characteristics of the commodity 
branded with the geographical indication; the relation between the natural and 
cultural factors of the region indicated by the geographical indication and the special 
quality, reputation or other characteristics of the commodity; and the scope of the 
region indicated by the geographical indication”. And, articles 17 and 18 note that 
“the collective members of the registrant of a collective trademark may use the 
collective trademark upon carrying out the procedures stipulated in the rules for 
administration of the use of the collective trademark; Collective trademarks may not 
be used by non-collective members” and “[P]arties that meet the requirements 
specified in the rules for administration of the use of a certification trademark may 
use such trademarks upon carrying out the procedures specified in the rules for 
administration of the use of the certification trademark, and the registrant may not 
refuse to carry out the procedures”. Beside the regulation, a specific GI label was also 
issed by the SAIC to show the product has been registered as a GI product (Figure 
3.6). (State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C., 2007) 
 
 
Figure 3. 6: The GI label issued by the SAIC 
 
The second GI framework is established by the former State Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision according to the “Provisions on Protection of Designations of 
Origin Products”, which is the first sui generis protection regulation for GIs in China 
and was issued in 1999. By the year 2001, two government Bureaus, the former State 
Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision and the former State Administration for 
Entry–Exit Inspection and Quarantine, merged into the AQSIQ. On July 15, 2005, the 
AQSIQ repealed the “Provisions on Protection of Designations of Origin Products” 
and issued “Provisions on Protection of GI Products” and the specific GI label 
(Figure 3.7). GI products are referred in Article 2 of the later Provisions as “products 
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that originate from a particular geographical region with the quality, reputation or 
other characteristics substantially attributable to the natural and human factors of the 
region, and denominated with the name of the region upon examination and 
approval”. The GI products include, “those grown or cultivated in the region; and 
those made, wholly or partially, of the raw materials from the region and produced or 
processed with the particular techniques in the region”. According to Article 10, to 
register a GI, the applicant should submit the following documents: “local 
government’s proposal for the defined limits of the place of origin of the product of a 
geographical indication; local government’s document establishing the application 
organisation or designating an association or enterprise as an applicant; 
documentary material proving the product of geographical indication”. Also, Article 
8 indicates the application documents should be submitted by “an organization 
designated for the application for the protection of the products of the geographical 
indication by the people’s government at or above the county level or by an 
association or enterprise appointed by the people’s government (hereinafter referred 
to as the applicant) upon consultation with the departments concerned”. Clearly, the 
conditions of applicants here are stricter, and the documents that should be submitted 
are more complex than the requirements of SAIC framework. In order to use the GI, 
the manufacturer located in the territory has to file an application to the local AQSIQ 
and submit the following documents: “an application for use of the exclusive 
indication of the products of geographical indication; a certificate issued by the 
competent authorities of the local government proving that the products concerned 
originates from the particular area; and an inspection report issued by the relevant 
product quality inspection department” (article 20). As a supervisory department, the 
AQSIQ still has the right to monitor and supervise production processes of GI 
products, even after registration. (General Administration for Quality, Supervision, 





Figure 3. 7: The GI label issued by the AQSIQ 
 
The third GI framework is set up by the MoA through issuing “Measures for the 
Administration of Geographical Indications of Agricultural Products”
26
 and the 
relevant GI label (Figure 3.8) at the end of 2007. In the Measures, GIs are defined as 
“special agricultural product indications which are named by territorial names and 
are meant to tell that the indicated agricultural products are from a specific area and 
that the quality and major characteristics of the products mainly lie in the natural and 
ecological environment as well as cultural and historical factors of the area” (article 
2). And, the applicants applying for the registration of GIs for agricultural products 
should be “excellent professional co-operative economic organizations of farmers 
and industrial associations determined by the local people’s government at or above 
the county level” (article 8). Article 9 indicates the documents must be offered to 
apply for a GI are, “a registration application form; a certificate on the qualification 
of the applicant; a description on the typical characteristics of the product and a 
corresponding product quality appraisal report; the environmental conditions of the 
producing area of the product, the technical norms for production and the technical 
norms for product quality safety; a document determining the territorial scope, and a 
distribution map of its producing area; a straight sample or a sample picture of the 
product; and other necessary descriptive or evidentiary material”. In the registered 
territorial scope, an entity or individual may apply to the certificate holder to use the 
registered GI after supplying the following documents: “the agricultural product 
produced or traded by it/him originates from the territorial scope indicated in the 
registration certificate; it/he has obtained the corresponding qualification for 
producing or trading the agricultural product concerned; it/he is capable of 
                                                        
26 The Measures have been in force since 1 February 2008 
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conducting producing and trading activities in strict accordance with the prescribed 
quality and technical norms; and it/he has the capacity for the market development 
and operation of the agricultural product concerned” (article 15). And, the 
administrative department of agriculture under the people’s government at or above 
the county level holds the right to supervise and examine the usage of GIs on a regular 
basis by the Measures. (The Center for Agri-food Quality & Safety, The ministry of 
Agriculture, P.R.C., 2008) 
 
 
Figure 3. 8: The GI label issued by the MoA 
 
These three government departments established three parallel GI frameworks 
according to different laws or regulations (Table 3.3). Although the quality 
characteristics (including the safety aspect) of GI products can theoretically be 
secured by the certification process, the overlapping areas of responsibility (such as 
all three departments have the authority to issue GIs and inspect the quality GI 
products) and potential conflicts (such as GI products sold in the market may be 
produced according to different GI standards) between three GI frameworks still give 
producers the opportunity to produce sub-standard or fake agrifood products with GIs 
into the market (see also State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C., 2011). The 
effectiveness of Chinese GI schemes on securing “pre-set” quality characteristics of 
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indication and the 
special quality, 
reputation or other 
characteristics of 
the commodity;  
3. The scope of the 
1. Local government’s 
proposal for the defined 
limits of the place of 
origin of the product of 
a geographical 
indication;  






enterprise as an 
applicant;  
3: Documentary 
material proving the 
product of geographical 
indication. 
1. A registration 
application form; a 
certificate on the 
qualification of the 
applicant; 
2. A description on 
the typical 
characteristics of the 




3. The environment 
conditions of the 
producing area of the 
product, the technical 
norms for production 
and the technical 
norms for product 
quality safety;  









territorial scope, and 
a distribution map of 
its producing area;  
5. A straight sample 









Carrying out the 
procedures 








specified in the 
rules; carrying out 
the procedures 
specified in the 
rules 
User: A manufacturer 
locates in the GI’s 
territory Condition: An 
application for use of 
the exclusive indication 
of the products of 
geographical 
indication; a certificate 
issued by the 
competent authorities 
of the local government 
proving that the 
products concerned 
originates from the 
particular area; an 
inspection report issued 






agreement on the use 
of geographical 
indication with the 
registration certificate 
holder of the 
indication on the 
basis of production 
and operation year 
(the agreement shall 
bear the quantity and 
scope of use as well 




Table 3. 3: Three GI legislative frameworks in China 
 
3.5 Chapter summary  
 
Through highlighting GIs as a solution to overcoming information problems in the 
market and thus improving farm and rural incomes, this chapter examined the 
development of the Chinese agrifood sector, the widening income gap between urban 
and rural areas, increasing middle class consumers’ concerns on food quality, the food 
safety regulatory system, and the GI legislative system. The findings indicate three 
main issues.  
 
Firstly, Chinese GI systems are promoted by the government not only to meet 
consumers’ quality requirements but more importantly to improve farm and rural 
incomes and retain social stability. Secondly, too many laws, a fragmented regulatory 
system, an ineffective production and marketing monitoring system, and flourishing 
counterfeiting businesses are the essential reasons causing food scandals in the 
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contemporary Chinese agrifood market. Thirdly, although an important distinction 
between GI and normal agrifood products is supposed to be “quality”, the ability of 
complex Chinese GI schemes to guarantee “pre-set” quality characteristics of GI 
agrifood products is still questionable as three GI frameworks are involved.  
 
According to the conceptual framework of agrifood quality presented in Chapter 2 
(Page 22), the quality characteristics of agrifood products may vary based on different 
networks. Theoretically, the inherent quality of GI products can be secured by the 
certification process based on strict GI standards under effective government 
inspection. But, after examining general political, social and economic environments, 
the ability of the Chinese GI system to secure quality GI products by developing strict 
GI standards, effective certification processes and effective government quality 
inspection programmes can be questioned.  
 
There is one further but notable finding, namely there has been a lack of research 
conducted by Chinese scholars in this field, something which this thesis intends to 
redress. Nowhere, to the author’s knowledge, has there been any refereed academic 
journal articles published by Chinese academics working in the field in China. Such a 
gap in the stock of knowledge needs to be addressed. Therefore, the next chapter will 
review the available research methodologies before selecting an appropriate research 
methodology to enable empirical analysis to be conducted with respect to the Chinese 
GI sector and thereby meeting the aim of this thesis, namely evaluating the 














Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
 
“According to Herbert Blumer (1969), methodology refers to the ‘entire scientific 
quest’ that has to fit the ‘obdurate character of the social world under study’. Thus 
methodology is not some super-ordained set of logical procedures that can be applied 
haphazardly to any empirical problem. In short methodology constitutes a whole 
range of strategies and procedures that include: developing a picture of an empirical 
world; asking questions about the world and turning these into researchable problems; 
finding the best means of doing so — that involve choices about methods and the data 
to be sought, the development and use of concepts, and the interpretation of findings 
(Blumer 169:23). Methods per se are therefore only one small part of the 
methodological endeavor” 
(Alasuutari et al., 2009 p.1) 
 
 ‘‘The word qualitative implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on 
processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured (if 
measured at all) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency. Qualitative 
researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship 
between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape 
inquiry. Such researchers emphasise the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek 
answers to the questions that stress how social experience is created and given 
meaning. In contrast, quantitative studies emphasise the measurement and analysis of 
causal relationships between variables, not processes. Proponents of such studies 
claim that their work is done from within a value-free framework.’’ 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005a p. 10) 
 
 “Some consider “the case” an object of study (Stake, 1995), and others consider 
it a methodology (e.g., Merriam, 1988). In either situation, case study is an 
exploration of a “bounded system” or a case (or multiple cases), over time, through 
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information and rich 
in context” 






After reviewing the socio-economic theory, the network approach and power 
relationships to support this research theoretically in Chapter 2 and examining 
political, social and economic environments involved in the Chinese GI system in 
Chapter 3, the objective of Chapter 4 is to develop a methodological approach that 
enables empirical analysis to be conducted of power relationships involved in quality 
construction processes in Chinese GI networks.  
 
However, developing a methodological approach is not a straightforward task which 
not only asks for clarifying the approaches to collect and analyse data but also explain 
the paradigm and methodology supporting the logic of the research. Therefore, the 
rest of this chapter is organised into two main themes. One discusses research 
paradigms, quantitative and qualitative research methodologies, and various 
qualitative research strategies. The other one concentrates on designing the data 
collection and analysis procedure.  
 
4.2 The philosophical foundation: selecting a paradigm and theoretical 
framework 
 
All research is based on some underlying assumptions about what constitutes “valid” 
research. In order to identify an appropriate research methodology, it is important to 
know what those assumptions are, and which one(s) should be selected to undertake 
this study. 
 
The foundations of social researchers’ works are their ontology and epistemology, after 
which the methodological positions logically follow. Blaikie (2000, p.8) defines ontology 
as “claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, claims 
about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units 
interact with each other. In short, ontological assumptions are concerned with what 
we believe constitutes social reality”. Snape and Spencer (2003, p.1) point out that 
ontology are researchers’ beliefs “about the nature of the social world and what can 
be known about it”. In other words, a researcher’s ontological position is his/her 
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answer to the question “whether or not social reality exists independently of human 
conceptions and interpretations; whether there is a common, shared, social reality or 
just multiple context-specific realities; and whether or not social behaviour is 
governed by ‘laws’ that can be seen as immutable or generalisable” (p.11). It is only 
after these questions have been asked and answered, that social researchers can 
discuss epistemology which focuses on explaining “the nature of knowledge” 
(Blaikie, 2000 p.1), and answering the question “how it (knowledge) can be 
acquired” and “how can we know about reality and what is the basis of our 
knowledge” (p.13). Within social research, based on the underlying research ontology 
and epistemology, Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) suggest three categories: positivist, 
interpretive and critical; Guba and Lincoln (2005) highlight four underlying 
“paradigms”: positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, and constructivism; Denzin 
and Lincoln (2005b) posit four “paradigms”: positivist and post-positivist, 
constructivist-interpretive, critical (Marxist, emancipator), and feminist-poststructural. 
With these diversifications, three repeating common paradigm categories appear on a 
regular basis, namely positivism, interpretivist, and critical theory (see also 
Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Myers, 1997) (Figure 4.1).  
 
 
Figure 4. 1: Three common paradigm categories of social research 
 
With reference to ontology and epistemology, positivism believes there is a “real” 
world out there independent of our knowledge of it. Observers can observe “real” and 
“objective” relationships between social phenomena (Sarantakos, 2005; Myers, 1997). 
And this reality can be described by measurable properties which are independent of 
the researcher and his/her instruments. Positivism seeks an explanation for social 
phenomena and causality, expects to find regularities in the social world for prediction, 
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and emphasises quantitative analysis and empirical assumptions (Smith, 1996; 
Sarantakos, 2005). But the goals of positivism – explanation, prediction, and control – 
are incomplete since they may lack any understanding of society (Guba and Lincoln, 
2005). For example, every venture has a fundamental reliance on human inputs. If the 
aim is to create a quality product, it is vital that all involved actors are committed to 
that aim. Based on positivism, unitary quality can be achieved because individual 
activities would be able to be controlled and all human beings can be governed as 
simple cogs in a machine. But, it is not possible in the real world. Therefore, within 
social research, positivism studies are generally used to test theories, in an attempt to 
increase the predictive understanding of phenomena (Myers, 1997). 
 
Whereas positivism emphasises the explanation and prediction of social phenomena, 
the interpretivist paradigm seeks an understanding of social phenomena and the 
meanings actions have for actors. An interpretivist paradigm starts from an 
ontological position of rejecting the notion that there is a “real” world out there 
beyond our knowledge of it, and believes that reality does not exist independently of 
the observer and the social milieu is entirely socially constructed by personal inputs 
(Sarantakos, 2005). In other words, the world cannot be observed or measured except 
in our own subjective understanding (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). As social 
phenomena only exist in the minds of actors and observers, an interpretivist paradigm 
does not predefine dependent and independent variables but seeks to understand 
social phenomena and the meanings social phenomena assign to people (Kaplan and 
Maxwell, 1994). Quantitative methods are therefore rejected here, and qualitative 
methods are more appropriate to unpack the relevant meanings and approach an 
understanding of the deep structures of society and how discourse surrounding social 
phenomena socially constructs “truth” (Moore, 2010). 
 
The non-positivist tradition continues in the establishment of critical theory. Critical 
researchers assume that “social reality is historically constituted and that it is 
produced and reproduced by people” (Myers, 1997 p.242). Based on ontology of 
historical realism, and a transactional epistemology, critical researchers believe people 
can consciously act to change their social and economic circumstances, but their 
ability to do so is constrained by various forms of social, cultural and political 
domination (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). Critical research focuses on the oppositions, 
 
 88 
conflicts and contradictions in contemporary society, and aims to decrease domination 
and increase freedom in all forms
27
. Because critical theory tries to explain and offer 
suggestions to transform all the circumstances that enslave human beings, it holds the 
hope that research could lead to emancipation rather than knowledge acquisition. In 
other words, the purpose of critical research is implementing the findings to change 
social reality by empowering people. This purpose leads the methodology used with 
critical theory to be qualitative or quantitative or both (Sarantakos, 2005). 
 
As this thesis is dedicated to evaluating the effectiveness of GIs in terms of 
developing agrifood quality in contemporary China, the interpretivist paradigm is 
clearly more suited to underpin this research. But many researchers still hold different 
opinions on how the social phenomenon can be interpreted. Some sub-group of 
philosophies within the interpretivist paradigm have thus appeared. Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) consider four distinct but related categories: solipsism, 
phenomenology, phenomenological sociology and hermeneutics. Schwandt (2000) 
presents three sub-groups: social constructionism, hermeneutics and interpretivism 
(Figure 4.2). To draw a clear theoretical framework, for simplicity, Schwandt’s idea 
will be analysed here.  
 
Figure 4. 2: Three sub-groups of the interpretivist paradigm 
Source: Schwandt, 2000 
 
The researchers of social constructionism believe, “there is in practice neither 
objective reality nor objective truth”. Reality is constructed “based on culturally 
defined and historically situated interpretations and personal experiences” 
                                                        




(Sarantakos, 2005 p.37). In other words, what people perceive is not “the reality”, but 
what they have constructed through experiences and interpretations. As there are no 
absolute truths, all researchers can do is to reconstruct reality. Social constructionism 
points out that the meaning of any social phenomenon is not fixed and ready to be 
discovered but emerges when the interaction between people and the world exists. 
This philosophy is thus “oriented to the production of reconstructed understandings 
of the social world” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005b p.184). The researchers do not 
discover knowledge but construct it. Because this philosophy “refers to constructing 
knowledge about reality, not constructing reality itself” (Shadish, 1995 p.67), the 
results of the research may reflect personal bias and become an 
individual’s/researcher’s interpretation of facts (Denscombe, 2002).  
 
Different from social constructionism, hermeneutics focuses on the problem of 
interpretation and provides “a theoretical framework for interpretive understanding, 
or meaning, with special attention to context and original purpose” (Patton, 2002, 
p.114). It holds the opinion that, “what something means depends on the cultural 
context in which it was originally created as well as the cultural context within which 
it is subsequently interpreted” (Patton, 2002 p.113). Traditional hermeneutics refers to 
the study of interpretation of written texts, such as stories, biblical and legal texts, and 
to understand intended meaning by placing documents in a historical and cultural 
context (Kneller, 1984). In modern usage, it involves not only the written text, but any 
products of the human mind, such as human actions, products, and institutions, which 
characterise the social and cultural world. A hermeneutic interpretation requires the 
individual to understand and sympathies with another’s point of view, and stress 
human meaning and intentionality within a context.  
 
In one sense, interpretivism can be characterised as hermeneutic as they both believe 
understanding particular social action requires a grasp of the situation that human 
action creates. Schwandt (2000) indicates that human (social) action is inherently 
meaningful and a particular social action “can be grasped only in terms of the system 
of meanings to which it belongs” (p.191). But in another aspect, how to find the 
meaning of an action still requires researchers to interpret what the actors are doing. 
As different researchers may interpret an action in various ways, the difference 
between interpretivism and hermeneutics appear (Schwandt, 2000). Within 
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interpretivism, it is believed that a researcher’s bias can be removed and unbiased 
description and understanding can be reached. For example, Denscombe (1998) 
presents a suggestion that, the best an interpretivist researcher can do is presenting a 
snapshot of the time and place because the complex social life is arguably impossible 
to control or replicate. However, hermeneutics researchers argue that investigators 
cannot be free or distance themselves from the research (Patton, 2002; Schwandt, 
2000) and thus unbiased description cannot be achieved. 
 
Interpretivism “looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of 
the social life world” (Crotty, 1998 p.67), and often “goes beyond identifying the 
subjective meaning and explores the processes of constructing social situations and 
everyday structures that guide and explain personal views and opinions, and focuses 
on the mode of production of social structures” (Sarantakos, 2005 p.40). As this thesis 
tries to explore power relationships involved in quality construction processes through 
examining different actors’ actions under the certain contexts, and that the impact of 
investigators is believed can be minimised by well designed research methods, the 
interpretivism theoretical philosophy is more appropriate to underpin this research. 
  
4.3 Qualitative methodology and case study strategy 
 
The paradigm not only provides the foundation from which the logic and structure of 
research is established but also informs the methodology (Sarantakos, 2005). 
Compared with paradigms, which are sets of propositions that explain how the world 
exists and is perceived, methodologies are “a bundle of skills, assumptions, and 
practices that the researcher employs as he or she moves from paradigm to the 
empirical world” (p.25). Two research methodologies can be adopted in the social 
research. The one is quantitative methodology which concentrates on testing 
hypotheses using a variety of sampling techniques and has been described as “a tool 
for studying social events and learning about them and their interconnections so that 
general causal laws (which allow society to control events and to predict their 
occurrence and outcomes) can be discovered, explained and documented” (p.33). The 
other one is qualitative methodology, which seeks to construct knowledge (Stake, 





In agrifood networks, quality is not only impacted by the context but also constructed 
under power relationships between different actors. Within the interpretivist paradigm, 
qualitative research methodology that “explores the processes of constructing social 
situations” (Sarantakos, 2005 p.40), helps “the investigators to interpret and 
understand, first, the actors’ reasons for social action, second, the way they construct 
their lives and the meanings they attach to them, and third, the social context of social 
action” (p.42), and “born(s) out of concern to understand the ‘other’ ” (Vidich and 
Lyman, 2000 p.24), provides a better opportunity than quantitative methodology to 
meet the aim of this thesis — exploring effectiveness of GIs on improving quality, 
through an in-depth understanding of actors’ quality development activities and the 
reasons that govern such activities.  
 
But, qualitative methodology is diverse. There is not one, but many qualitative 
research strategies, such as grounded theory, field research and case study. Grounded 
theory concentrates on developing theory grounded in data systematically gathered 
and analysed (Myers, 1997). Martin and Turner (1986, p.141) define grounded theory 
as “an inductive, theory discovery methodology that allows the researcher to develop 
a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously 
grounding the account in empirical observations or data”. Field research is “the 
systematic study of ordinary events and activities as they occur in real-life situations” 
(Sarantakos, 2005 p.202). It takes place in a “natural field”, which is not constructed 
for the purpose of conducting research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The advantage of 
field research can be that researchers may have a closer position to the real world by 
observing real life situations through the eyes of and from the perspective of those 
living in the field but the disadvantages are it takes a very long time to do the research 
and the number of samples is normally very small due to the high costs and the time it 
takes. Contrasted with field research, the case study strategy is less time intensive but 
may achieve a holistic understanding of interrelated activities of a social phenomenon 
(Tellis, 1997; Fisher, 2007). Yin (2009, p.18) defines the case study strategy as “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident”. Denzin and Lincoln (2005a) believe the case study strategy 
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is most likely to answer “why” and “how” questions and to investigate why and how 
certain outcomes are achieved. As this thesis tries to explore the influence of GIs on 
agrifood quality through examining power relationships involved in quality 
construction processes between different actors (a “how” question) and the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident in GI networks (such as the 
weak government enforcement on securing agrifood safety is a phenomenon and also 
a context), the case study strategy is most suitable for this thesis with limited research 
time. In fact, the case study strategy has been widely used in food quality and AAFNs 
studies by many researchers and proved very successful in these research areas (Table 
4.1). 
 




case study (one 
case) 
Examine how producers of regional speciality 





Case study (two 
cases) 




Case study (one 
case)  
Examine the effectiveness of the message 
carried in certain beef products in decreasing 
consumers’ perceived “risk” 
Mansfield 
(2003a)  
Case study (one 
case) 




Case study (four 
cases) 
Study the influence of farmers’ market on 
consumers’ quality perspectives 
Lockie and 
Halpin (2005) 
Case study (one 
case) 
Examine the interrelationships between 




Case study (two 
cases) 




Case study (one 
case) 
Analyse responses to market forces in the 






Case study (six 
cases) 
Analyse the activities of food producers and 
consumers in alternative food networks 
Danold (2009) Case study (two 
cases) 
Examine how different notions of “quality” 
are used to shape food and wine cluster 
Table 4. 1: Some studies of agrifood quality and AAFNs adopting the case study strategy 
 
The case study strategy is not uniform. Stake (1995) refers to three types of case study. 
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The intrinsic (single and in-depth) case study tries to learn about a single unique case 
only; the instrumental case study is used to provide insight into a general issue or 
refine a theory using a particular case; the collective case study is adopted when there 
is less interest in one particular case but in investigating a social issue, phenomenon, 
group or condition. The disadvantage of the first two types which focus on the 
uniqueness of individual cases is they may lack capability of providing a generalised 
conclusion. Hamel et al. (1993) and Yin (2009) also point out that it is not a wise 
choice to carry out research on a particular phenomenon and assume that the group is 
self-evident. If researchers would like to understand a general phenomenon, they 
should choose more than one case to study (Stake, 2005). The more cases studied, a 
more reliable general picture can be uncovered. As Tellis (1997) explains, by 
providing detailed descriptions of each case, then presenting the themes within each 
case (within case analysis), followed by thematic analysis across cases (cross case 
analysis), and reporting the lessons learned from the investigation and comparison in 
the final interpretative section, multiple cases could generate a holistic understanding 
of a social issue or phenomenon and strengthen the results by replicating the 
pattern-matching. As this thesis focuses on a generalised topic – the Chinese GI 
system, it is better to examine several different GI networks containing different 
actors and operating under various socio-economic contexts to gain more reliable 
results. 
 
How many cases should be chosen to do this research is another question following 
the choice of “the collective case study”. Tellis (1997) and Venn et al (2006) indicate 
that the collective study normally chooses a maximum of three cases to analyse. Yin 
(2009) also points out, if similar results can be predicted, a few cases (two or three) 
would be appropriate. As many previous researches of quality and AAFNs (see table 
4.1) also limited their case studies to one to four cases, this thesis will choose three 
cases to examine. 
 
4.4 Collecting empirical materials  
 
4.4.1 Case selection 
After identifying the research paradigm, methodology and strategy, the methods for 




Vaughan (1992) emphasises the greatest understanding of phenomenon or general 
condition may be achieved by the careful selection of the case. It is very important to 
choose the right cases to do the research as the cases are expected to represent a 
population of cases. Stake (2005, p.451) also declares that the selection offers the 
opportunity to maximise what can be learned, and the researchers should choose cases 
“they feel that can learn the most”, such as the one most accessible or the one they 
can spend the most time with. Therefore, based on the social relationships of the 
researcher, the time restriction and the distribution of GI numbers in China, all three 
sample cases were chosen from Jiangxi province, China where the researcher lives 
and is familiar with. 
 
According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2011), Jiangxi 
province is located in the south east of 
China (Figure 4.3), and is situated in the 
middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze 
River. It is landlocked and surrounded by 
six provinces, Anhui on the north, 
Zhejiang on the northeast, Fujian on the 
east, Guangdong on the south, Hunan on 
the west, and Hubei on the northwest. 
Mountains surround Jiangxi on three 
sides, west, east and south.  
 
The ecology condition of Jiangxi 
province is very good with plenty of 
sunshine and rain, fertile soil, and mild climate. In some areas, the growing season 
even lasts 11 months per year. According to government data, almost 9 million people 
are dedicated to agrifood production (35.6% of total employers in Jiangxi province, 
3.2% of total agriculture employers in China) in Jiangxi province. With 2.8 million ha 
of cultivated land (2.3% of total Chinese cultivated land) and 0.4 million ha 
freshwater surface (2.3% of total Chinese freshwater surface), Jiangxi province 
produces 19.6 million tonnes of grain (3.6% of total Chinese grain output), 2.2 million 
 




tonnes of fish (8.4% of total Chinese freshwater aquatic output), 1.1 million tonnes of 
oil-bearing crops (rapeseed, sesame, soybeans, and peanuts) (3.3% of total Chinese 
oil-bearing crops), and 2.7 million tonnes of oranges (10.2% of total Chinese orange 
output) in 2010. With a high agricultural output, Jiangxi province is described as an 
“agricultural” province in China. However, the total agrifood output value of Jiangxi 
province is relatively low — it was only 190.1 billion RMB in 2010 (2.7% of total 
Chinese agrifood output value compared with 3.2% of total Chinese agricultural 
employees). To improve rural incomes, based on the suggestion of the MoA, in face 
of self-owned resource advantages, the Department of Commerce of Jiangxi province 
(2003) started to promote a “quality” strategy in the agricultural sector onwards from 
2003, encouraging organisations, associations and county governments to register 
local agrifood products with the GI system or other certification systems (such as the 
China Green Food System), with the hope that farmers can obtain a higher economic 
reward by selling “certificated” agrifood products. (Statistic Bureau of Jiangxi and 
Jiangxi investigation team of National Statistic Bureau, 2011; National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2011) 
 
Throughout China by the end of 2010, 1,949 products (94.9% of them are agrifood 
products) have been registered with three Chinese GI legislative frameworks. Some of 
them are registered with one framework, some of them registered with two 




Figure 4. 4 The registration situation in three Chinese GI frameworks 




Within these 1,949 GI products, 67 of them are from Jiangxi province which is a little 
bit higher than the average number of 64 per province/autonomous 
regions/municipality
28
 and 34% higher than the median number of 50 per 
province/autonomous regions/municipality. If ranked by the output value of GI 
products, Jiangxi province ranked 10
th
 in China with 34.98 billion RMB in 2008. 
Compared with the 168.05 billion RMB — the total output value of agrifood products 
in Jiangxi province in the same year, GI products have become a vital part of the 
Jiangxi agrifood sector. (Statistic Bureau of Jiangxi and Jiangxi investigation team of 
National Statistic Bureau, 2011; BeiJing ZhongJunShiJi GIs Researching Team, 2011) 
 
Renting et al. (2003) point out that case studies should be designed to uncover the 
mechanisms that generate patterns in more extensive studies. It shows that the sample 
cases should be judged not only by their degree of representiveness but also by the 
quality and logic of their theoretical reasoning. Therefore, the variation of actors and 
socio-economic environments are considered as critical criteria when choosing 
sample cases in Jiangxi province because the conceptual framework presented in 
Chapter 2 has indicated the agrifood quality is constructed under complex power 
relationships between different actors within specific political, social and economic 
environments. Firstly, based on the knowledge generated by Cassis wine, Parma ham 
and Florida citrus networks, both history and the average farm size have great 
influences on quality meaning and production codes. However, under the impact of 
the Household Production Responsibility System that allows every household to have 
a piece of land to farm and forbids private farm land trading activities, Chinese 
farming is highly fragmented. So, rather than average farm size, history is becoming 
the first critical criterion to choose sample cases. Secondly, three parallel legislative 
frameworks co-exist in the Chinese GI system. As different frameworks may have 
different requirements and influences on the quality aspect, how many frameworks 
the GI network involved becomes the second criterion to choose sample cases. Thirdly, 
the varieties of actors in the GI network are also an important criterion, because some 
agrifood products may not need to be processed whilst others do and big processing 
companies always have certain advantages in defining and regulating production 
activities. Furthermore, consumers’ judgement on the quality of GI products is also 
                                                        
28 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities exist in China (exclude HongKong, Macro, and Taiwan). 
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considered as a standard to choose sample cases as consumers are also critical actors 
involved in the quality forming process (see also Storper, 1997; Morgan and Murdoch, 
2000; Goodman, 2003). Their different attitudes on the quality of various GI agrifood 
products can help to choose suitable sample cases to analyse. (Table 4.2) 
 
To choose suitable sample cases to do the research, a pilot study with experts and 
consumers was conducted in early 2010. 4 agricultural researchers from Jiangxi 
University of Financial and Economics and Jiangxi Agricultural University and 12 GI 
agrifood consumers were involved. The aim of meetings and survey was to provide 
information on: 
 The choice of sample cases; 
 Gathering useful sources of information, including potential interviewees for 
future interviews. 
 
The meeting with experts began with introducing this thesis in terms of the aim, 
objectives and the conceptual framework for agrifood quality. The experts’ 
suggestions were particularly helpful in choosing sample cases and selecting future 
interviewees. They indicated that it was better to choose well know GI products 
because they are “valuable” (with high value of output), “accessible” (many potential 
interviewees and a large amount of secondary data are available), and “typical” (some 
small-scale GI networks may be managed by one or two companies). They noted that 
it was important to contact local government officers at first because GI networks are 
always supported by the local government (it means, some useful data can only be 
obtained through the local government officers) and many actors (such as factory 
managers and drafters of GI standards) may refuse to answer questions without such 
references. They also predicted the results that the quality construction process of GI 
agrifood products might be mainly governed by the economic relationships rather 
than influenced by GI schemes due to a short term view of the county government
29
 
and a small number of government quality inspectors.  
 
The survey with 12 consumers was very useful in choosing well known GI agrifood 
products with different quality “reputations”. The respondents were 8 GI agrifood 
                                                        
29 The promotion of government officials is most often linked to the growth of GDP in China 
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consumers picked in a big supermarket with different ages (21-30, 31-40, 41-50, and 
51-60) and gender (4 male and 4 female) and 4 government officers from the 
provincial agricultural department who not only consume GI agrifood products 
regularly but also can justify their opinions by objective data. These consumers were 
asked to list at least 5 well known GI agrifood products located in Jiangxi province 
and present their personal judgement of the quality “reputation” of these 5 GI 
products. After 16 GI products in total were mentioned as possible cases by 12 
consumers interviewed, based on the secondary data and according to the criteria 
presented before (history, the number of GI frameworks involved, processor involved, 
and market reputation), three GI products, namely “Gannan navel orange”, “Nanfeng 
mandarin”, and “Wuyuan Green Tea” were selected. The reason to choose two similar 
products (“Gannan navel orange” and “Nanfeng mandarin”) was to enable a 
comparison to be made between two similar products but with different “quality 
reputations”.  
 
 Gannan navel 
orange  



















Register with the 
SAIC and the 
AQSIQ 
Register with the 
SAIC, the AQSIQ, 
and the MoA 
Register with the 
SAIC, the AQSIQ, 
and the MoA 
The existence 
of processors 
No No Yes 
Quality 
reputation 
Stable Decreasing Increasing 
Table 4. 2: The key criteria for choosing the three sample cases and the differences between them 
 
4.4.2 Data collection 
4.4.2.1 Documenting research and semi-structured interviewing 
The choice of research strategy influences the way in which the researcher collects 
data. Tellis (1997), Yin (2003) and Fisher (2007) indicate the case study strategy 
includes observing, interviewing, and documenting research methods. They specify 
that more than one method can be used in a case study to produce more valid and 




Observation method can study all observable social phenomena. It is one of the oldest 
methods to collect data within social research, especially with respect to field research. 
However, even though this method is conducted in a natural setting and can offer data 
that normally respondents are unable or unwilling to present, adopting this method 
needs plenty of time and may have ethical issues, because observation often takes 
place “without the subjects being aware of it” (Sarantakos, 2005 p.233). Ignoring 
ethical issues is not acceptable. Observers should be honest with their intentions. But, 
“honesty” may bring another problem that researchers may face collecting false data. 
For example, respondents may change their behaviour when they notice that they are 
under observation for research. Therefore, in face of time limitations, high ethical 
risks, and the potential that bias data may be gathered, the observation method is not 
used in this research.  
 
Interviewing is one of the most popular methods to collect data in social research. The 
interviewing process “attempts to understand the world from the subject’s points of 
view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover their lived world prior 
to scientific explanations” (Kvale, 1996 p.1). Interviews are an important source of 
information when doing a case study research (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2009). Foddy (1993) 
even believes it is sometimes the only way to collect information about behaviour and 
experiences, motives, beliefs, values and attitudes of people. Interviewing includes a 









 and so on. Compared with 
Delphi interview and telephone surveys, more details can be gathered by individual, 
face-to-face verbal interview and face-to-face group interview (Tellis, 1997). In this 
research, because it is difficult to gather respondents (such as government officers) 
together and respondents may be fearful of expressing their opinions about the 
disadvantages of Chinese GI system within the group which is filled with persons 
he/she is not familiar with (see also Nichols, 1991), individual, face-to-face verbal 
interview is adopted to undertake this investigation. 
                                                        
30 Only one respondent is interviewed at one time 
31 Several respondents are interviewed at one time 
32 Expert respondents are asked to offer information, pass judgements on the issue of question and make relevant 
predictions. Then the researcher summarises this information and offers a written summary to expert respondents. 
After receiving a summary, the information is considered again by those respondents, and the new judgement will 
be sent to the researcher again. This process is continued until the deviation between those respondents is reduced 
significantly 




The strengths of the interviewing method are targeted and insightful (Yin, 2003). But 
the other side of the coin is the risk that both researcher and respondent are biased if 
the questions are constructed inappropriately. So, even though interviews can be 
adopted as the main data collection method in the case study strategy, interviewing 
still needs to be organised carefully. Normally, interviewing is differentiated by the 
degree of structure imposed upon its format (Healey and Rawlinson, 1993). Fontana 
and Frey (2003) identify three types of interviews in social science research: the 
structured interviewing, the semi-structured interviewing, and the unstructured 
interviewing. In structured interviewing, all the questions are prepared in advance. 
The interviewer asks all respondents the same pre-established questions in the same 
order and often with given alternatives for the respondent to choose. It generates little 
room for variation in response, except where open-ended questions may be used. 
Nothing is left to chance. Sarantakos (2005, p.268) thus argues, even though this 
approach “reduce(s) interviewer bias to a minimum and achieve(s) the highest degree 
of objectivity and uniformity in procedure”, it is very difficult for interviewers to 
gather in-depth information and is more suitable to use in quantitative research. 
Conversely, the advantage of unstructured interviewing is great breadth, open-ended, 
and in-depth. Interviewers can answer questions asked by the respondents, and can 
also ask different questions dependent upon different situations to gather useful 
information. But, this sort of interviewing still has to be structured in a flexible 
manner in advance or appropriate respondents may not be found and certain 
information may not be gathered (Yin, 2003). For example, without an interview 
guide before interviewing, a grouping of “topics and questions that the interviewer 
can ask in different ways for different participants” (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002 p.195), 
the researcher’s attention may not focus on a given issue (which may cause less 
details on general concepts and objects) and keeping “an unbiased manner” to ask 
questions may be difficult. To control the interviewing process and gather useful 
in-depth information, semi-structured interviewing appears to lie somewhere between 
the structured and unstructured approaches. Yin (2009) indicates the semi-structured 
interviewing is like a guided conversation instead of a well-structured interview. 
Fisher (2007) defines the semi-structured interviewing as the interviewer having a 
schedule to follow to remember the main topics, but with the respondent still 
answering freely to the unstructured interview. Some aspects of semi-structured 
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interviews, such as the research topic, purpose, the selection of respondents, and time 
organisation, are closer to structured interviews. And some aspects, such as new 
questions being introduced and the evolving communication during the interview, are 
similar with unstructured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are very popular 
within qualitative research. They are believed not only to produce details of different 
actors’ opinion and behaviours and to gather relative information that is not yet know, 
but also to make sure that certain information can be collected within certain time 
limits (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). As the semi-structured interviewing method is well 
suited to research with a framework of themes to be explored but without detailed 
information (Yin, 2009), it is used as the main research method in this thesis to 
examine quality development processes in Chinese GI networks.  
 
Nevertheless, combined with structure and purpose, the semi-structured interview is a 
conversation and involves the art of asking questions and listening. It is influenced by 
the personal characteristics of the interviewer and respondent, and bounded by 
historical, political, and contextual conditions (Scheurich, 1995). Kvale (1996) thus 
criticises qualitative interviews and states that they are too subjective, 
person-dependent and not objective. In order to minimise the subjective weakness as 
much as possible to make empirical data more objective and less subjective, and 
secure an in-depth understanding of Chinese GI networks, documenting research is 
also used as another method to collect data in this research. Different from 
interviewing, which is the empirical study of human activity and the result mixed with 
description and interpretation, opinion and feeling, documenting analysis and 
comparison, as reporting from other articles, are credible ways to gain reliability and 
may help researchers build more objective knowledge. Like Stake (2005, p.457) 
declares, “[A] researcher will report his or her case as a case, knowing it will be 
compared to others”.  
 
Interviewing and documenting research methods are adopted in this research, because 
the case study strategy is a process of using multiple perceptions to identify different 
ways to examine the case (Flick, 1998). Indeed, both methods are also mentioned by 
Latour (1987) when identifying research methods within case studies in network 
analysis, as researchers should not only “follow the actor” via interviews but also 
examine inscriptions, such as texts including published local government data, journal 
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articles, conference papers, presentations, and so on. 
 
4.4.2.2 Collecting primary and secondary data 
Based on the documenting method, secondary data is collected at first to build a 
context for the case study.  
 
Atkinson and Coffey (1997) believe much of social life in contemporary society is 
mediated by different kind of written texts and documents. For example, GI networks 
may not exist without the relevant pre-defined standards. Various documents provide 
a material foundation and documenting thus play a vital role in any data collection in 
doing case studies (Yin, 2009). However, it has been found not easy to collect useful 
secondary data of the three sample cases by reading books and articles. Published 
book concentrating on Chinese GI agrifood products are difficult to find and most 
articles only focus on the legislative aspect of Chinese GI schemes (e.g. Xiao and Hu, 
2005; Wang and Kireeva, 2007). Although a few social researchers dedicate to 
explore the quality of GI products, almost all of them only present their own opinions 
without any reference and investigation to the actors, a key difference of research 
between the West and China. So, the secondary data used in this research is mainly 
collected through government publications, the internet and personal solicitation. 
Firstly, the statistical year book published by the government every year. The 
information contained in these books is very useful to provide a “grounded 
foundation” for the three cases. And, relevant GI standards and regulations published 
by the government are also vital to understand quality forming procedure of GI 
products. Secondly, nowadays, secondary data can also be gathered through websites. 
For example, the notices of quality inspection programmes are listed on the 
government websites and provide useful data about quality criteria adopted by the 
government. Thirdly, because a large amount of information, such as the market 
average price and the number and size of middlemen in specific GI networks, cannot 
be found in published materials and websites, preliminary research was conducted 
with local government officers who were asked to provide relevant secondary data in 
Nanfeng county in January 2010, in the Ganzhou area in July 2010, and in Wuyuan 
county in October 2010. Based on the secondary data collected in these ways, 




Before collecting primary data, the specific interviewees have to be confirmed as it is 
impossible to interview all persons involved in the three GI networks. Some kind of 
selection method has to be adopted. Within the case study strategy, the main sampling 
procedure is non-probability sampling, which is also called purposeful sampling 
because it is about finding a sample from which as much as possible can be learned 
(Yin, 2009). Sarantakos (2005) lists different types of non-probability sampling, such 
as accidental sampling, purposive sampling, quota sampling and snowball sampling. 
Accidental sampling involves samples chosen from part of the population that are 
readily available and convenient. For example, the researcher may stand at a shopping 
centre and ask a number of people passing by to participate in the research. But, this 
technique may not be possible to make scientific generalisations about the total 
population as the sample chosen in this way may not be representative enough. 
Purposive sampling technique is choosing samples in a subjective way. The choice of 
respondents is made by the judgement of the researcher. Adopting this technique thus 
requires a great deal of knowledge and experience. Quota sampling is a procedure in 
which the population is first segmented into exclusive sub-groups, and then the choice 
of actual respondents is left to the researcher. Even though this technique selects 
non-random samples, which is often found to be unreliable, quota sampling is a very 
popular way to choose samples, as which minimises the cost of research work and 
does not require detailed sampling frames. Snowball sampling refers to the researcher 
choosing a few respondents, and then asking them to recommend other people who 
meet the criteria of the research and who may be willing to be recruited for the 
propose of research. This procedure is very useful to locate people of a specific 
population when they are difficult to locate. As this research involves some 
respondents who may be difficult to have a meeting with, such as government officers, 
processing firms’ managers, and drafters of the GI standard, snowball sampling is 
believed more suitable for this investigation. Initially, at least three government 
officers within each GI network were recommended by four scholars (from Jiangxi 
University of Financial and Economics and Jiangxi Agricultural University) and four 
agricultural department officers (who were also interviewed as consumers). Then, 
these government officers were contacted by telephone and asked if they would like 
to participate in this research and whether they were able to contact other actors, such 
as technicians, farmers and middlemen. After obtaining positive answers, the 
investigation was conducted. In fact, not only government officers but every 
 
 104 
respondent was required to introduce more possible participants
34
. Most of the time, 
with the recommendation of local persons, respondents contacted appeared to talk 
openly about their experience and were happy to recommended more possible 
interviewees, even though all interviewees only allowed the interview to be recorded 
on paper rather than by Dictaphone. The detailed information of selected respondents 
in each case will be presented in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Semi-structured interviewing has been identified as the method to collect primary data 
in this research. As semi-structured interviews are “conventions with a purpose” 
(Cloke et al., 2004), an interview guide that includes 20 general questions
35
 was 
designed in advance although the respondents were encouraged to engage in a more 
open and interactive discussion. Before the interview, every respondent was contacted 
by telephone and asked whether they would like to participate in the research. Within 
the interview, at the beginning, the respondent was informed that he/she had the right 
not to participate in the study, he/she was not required to answer every question asked, 
all the information provided by them would be treated for research purposes only, 
suitable anonymity would be maintained, and interview transcripts would be available 
to him/her for confirmation after the interview. Then, the purpose of the research was 
presented. After that, the semi-structured interview started with the pre-designed 
guide. The questions generated within the conversation process were also discussed to 
collect more detailed and reliable data. Each interview resulted in a large volume of 
qualitative data and all answers were rechecked by the respondent after each interview. 
But, due to the relatively low education levels, it was not easy for several farmers to 
understand some questions and words, such as “market technique” and “GIs”. A large 
amount of time thus was spent in the interviewing process with these farmers until 
they understood these words and questions.  
 
4.4.2.3 Validity, triangulation and reliability 
An effective research design is supposed to offer a logical set of statements (Yin, 
2009). To ensure true or credible findings, validity has to be integral to the research 
design process. Guion (2002) indicates, “Validity, in qualitative research, relates to 
                                                        
34 Individual consumers were not investigated as actors in this research as their quality judgement may be very 
subjective and thus may not be representative enough. Instead, middlemen were interviewed as agencies of 
consumers because they know consumers/market requirements very well.  
35 A copy of the interview questions is shown in Appendix 1. 
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whether the findings of your study are true and certain”, and points out, “true” 
means the “findings accurately reflecting the real situation” and “certain” means 
“there are no good grounds for doubting the results”. Validity is a vital part of 
qualitative research because researchers have to be confident with their research 
which “frees data from interference and contamination, control or variable 
manipulation” (Sarantakos, 2005 p.86). To guarantee validity of the research, a 
number of measures are presented in qualitative research. Sarantakos (2005) lists four 
types of measurements: 
 Cumulative validation: a study can be entrusted if its findings are supported by 
other studies. It means the researcher can compare his/her findings with other 
researchers and make a judgement of the validity. 
 Communicative validation: authenticity can be confirmed by checking accuracy 
of data, evaluation of project process, change of goals etc. through the Delphi 
format, or by employing expert external gatekeepers, or by using triangulation.  
 Argumentative validation: the validity can be measured by presentation of the 
finding in such a way that conclusions can be followed and tested. 
 Ecological validation: a study can be valid if carried out in the natural 
environment of the subjects, using suitable methods and taking into consideration 
the life and conditions of the researched.  
 
To enhance the validity of this research, relevant articles and data (published and 
unpublished) are used to compare the findings, even though relevant research is 
difficult to find, especially with respect the Nanfeng mandarin case and the Wuyuan 
green tea case. Also, the ecological validation is considered in the methodological 
framework development process. For example, respondents are carefully chosen 
based on snowball method and the interviewing process is not recorded by 
Dictaphone due to respondents’ requirements. Furthermore, as triangulation method is 
believed a useful way to increase validity, it is used in this research as well. 
 
Triangulation is a practice which employs several research tools within the same 
research design to “be thorough in addressing all possible aspects of the topic; 
increase the amount of research data, and hence increase knowledge; enrich the 
nature of research data; facilitate a study, where one producer serves as a 
stepping-stone for the other; allow comparisons (e.g. in longitudinal studies); achieve 
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a higher degree of validity, credibility and research utility; to overcome the 
deficiencies of single-method studies” (Sarantakos, 2005 p.146). Guion (2002) 
indicates five types of triangulation methods: data triangulation, investigator 
triangulation, theory triangulation, methodological triangulation, and environmental 
triangulation. Sarantakos (2005) presents five other types triangulation methods: 
method triangulation, time triangulation, paradigm triangulation, investigator 
triangulation, and sampling triangulation. With different opinions, Yin (2009) 
identifies four types of triangulation methods by adopting the opinion of Patton 
(2002): data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and 
methodological triangulation. Within this research, data triangulation and sampling 
triangulation are adopted.  
 
First of all, according to different researchers, data triangulation means examining the 
fact or phenomenon by the data collected from multiple sources (Yin, 2009) or by 
evaluating or comparing the information offered by “each group or type of 
stakeholder for the program” (Guion, 2002). Within this research, not only the data 
collected by the semi-structured interviews are triangulated with secondary data but 
also the data generated by different interviewees are compared to gain “a true 
outcome” (Guion, 2002). It is believed that if every interviewee has the same opinion 
from a different point of view for a certain issue, the finding drawn from that issue is 
more trustworthy. Secondly, sampling triangulation which employs two or more 
samples (cases) within the same project (Sarantakos, 2005) is practiced. In this thesis, 
three sample cases are examined as individual cases. After that, the cross-cases 
evaluation stage takes all data collected as one case to analyse. The findings generated 
from cross-case evaluation are also compared to the findings from individual case 
studies to enhance validity. 
 
At the same time, reliability is also important to consider in the research design 
processes. Lewis and Ritchie (2003, p.270) indicate reliability concerns “replicability 
of research findings and whether or not they would be repeated”. Yin (2009, p.45) 
explains that reliability means, “if a later researcher followed the same procedures as 
described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same case study all over again, 
the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions”. But, the 
“replication” in qualitative research may be difficult due to the inevitable impact of 
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contexts and the complexity of phenomena being studied. So, Lewis and Ritchie 
(2003) indicate that ensuring reliability may only require minimising the errors and 
biases in a case study. And, Yin (2009, p.45) notes that the reliability problem can be 
overcome by clarifying as many steps as operational as possible and developing “a 
case study database” under the case study strategy. Therefore, within this thesis, to 
ensure reliability, not only are all the main steps of the research specified, but also all 
documents, primary data and notes are recorded by computer software to form “a 
database”.  
 
4.5 Data analysis 
 
4.5.1 Stages of analysing qualitative data 
Within each case, desk based secondary data analysis is conducted to provide a 
“grounded foundation” and to identify critical actors in the quality forming process. 
Then, after introducing respondents, the varied and complex datasets contributed by 
semi-structured interviews and external materials are analysed and interpreted to 
explore quality development processes.  
 
The data analysis process requires selecting appropriate analytical tools that can deal 
with variety and complex qualitative information and form a reliable “database”. But, 
before selecting suitable tools, critical analysis stages have to be clarified because 
qualitative data are not well defined as quantitative data and analytical tools can only 
deal with the “raw material”. Following Kitchin and Tate (2000), qualitative data 
analysis is preceded in three phases in this thesis, namely transcription, classification, 
and connection.  
1. Transcription concerns the organising of the data in a form that can be interpreted. 
In the interview, responses to questions/prompts are recorded under each 
question/prompt for later categorisation and analysis. Once a face to face 
semi-structured interview is completed, all data are transcribed with description 
(which would be rechecked by the respondent) and observational notes (such as, 
tone of voice, body language, how things were said, like a pause and a 
consideration). As transcription was completed soon after returning from the field, 
it was able to provide an excellent opportunity to “re-live” each interview again. 
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In addition, during the transcription, a notebook is used to recode “ideas” 
generated from the data and “memos” related to the data, which help the 
researcher organise questions/prompts more effectively in the following 
interviews.  
2. Classification takes the transcription a step further to interpret the data, which 
involves breaking the data (both primary and secondary data) up into special 
categories to establish a basis for comparison. 
3. After having a basic understanding of data within specific categories, connection 
tries to identify and understand the relationships and associations between 
different categories. For example, do farmers located in the same area also 
possess other common features (e.g. similar farming activities) and if so why? 
Therefore, connection always involves tracing back through the dataset to see 
what links can be identified with the text which may lead to continual refining or 
revision categories (Nykiel, 2007). Connection also means constantly 
“cross-checking” the conclusions against the original transcripts to ensure an 
accurate and true reflection of the data and to think in terms of possible 
alternative explanations, and compare conclusions with those drawn from other 
similar researches. After the connection stage, by looking for 
similar/differentiated action patterns, the power relationships involved in the 
quality development process of the three sample cases can be clear.  
 
In this thesis, the second and third phases were completed with the help of specifically 
designed software for qualitative data management, called NVivo. It is used to code
36
, 
identify key themes and enable comparison and analysis across the database.  
 
4.5.2 The choice of NVivo 
CAQDAS (computer aided qualitative data analysis software), which is the general 
term for the computer software package, has come into use since the early 1980s 
(Spencer et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2008). When qualitative research is conducted, 
especially when the data collected from different resources in the same study need to 
be compared, managing large volumes of data is becoming a vital problem for 
researchers. According to Lewins and Silver (2007), CAQDAS can increase the 
                                                        
36 Marking the segments of data with symbols, descriptive words, or category names 
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“closeness” and interactivity of researchers to the data as the advantages of CAQDAS 
are speed and rigour (see also Bryman, 2008). The speed means the data can be most 
obvious and thus “the coding and retrieval process (can be) faster and more efficient” 
(Bryman, 2008 p.567). Within the research, many pages of transcriptions may need to 
be coded in a moment. CAQDAS can be very useful in checking data and identifying 
patterns between data sets. Meanwhile, although Bryman and Burgess (1994) notes 
that often there is an unclear data analysis process associated with qualitative data 
analysis, rigour can be reached through CAQDAS which “force(s) researchers to be 
more explicit and reflective about the process of analysis” (Bryman, 2008 p.567). 
However, facing many types packages, researchers should consider how to place their 
data into the “right” package to suit the analytical task as no specific software is 
designed for a particular qualitative analysis and there is “no industry leader” in 
CAQDAS (Spencer et al., 2003; Bryman, 2008).  
 
According to Lewins and Silver (2007), the main packages within CAQDAS are 
ATLAS/ti, MAXqda and NVivo. Although three packages have similar functions in 
organising data (such as coding and retrieval of coded data), many differences still 
can be found between them. Such as ATLAS/ti5 can directly handle a far greater 
range of data type than MAXqda2 or NVivo7 but its external database makes the 
process of saving and moving the data more difficult to manage than the other two 
packages. MAXqda2 has the best memo retrieval systems for team situations but a 
lack of code sets limits its ability in comparison when compared to other packages. 
NVivo 7 has its outstanding ability on coding, such as it offers the most sophisticated 
possibilities for auto coding repeated structures across databases, its ability to add 
sources and codes to the same set is incomparable, and the outcomes from queries is 
always satisfied, although its see also linking tool is always criticised. Because coding 
and retrieving ability are believed as essential abilities for the package to help explore 
power relationships between different actors, NVivo is adopted to do this research 




 works in the data analysis 
Using NVivo8, all primary and secondary data was categorised under the “internal 
                                                        
37 In 2008, NVivo8 was issued to replace NVivo7. 
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resources”, “external resources” and “memos” categories and prepared for coding. 
Coding is “capture what is going on in your data. Bring together similar data 
according to themes, concepts etc.” (Lewins and Silver, 2007 p.9). Criteria for 
selecting codes must be conceptually and empirically grounded (i.e. sensitive to the 
overall aim of the thesis, but with some empirical basis) and interrelated to one 
another (Nykiel, 2007). After studying the primary data, mainly based on the 
conceptual framework for agrifood quality, four main categories emerged: 
 Impact of government enforcement upon quality 
 Impact of organisational influence upon quality  
 Impact of economic relationships upon quality  
 Impact of other factors upon quality 
 
These categories broadly followed the conceptual framework for agrifood quality to 
show that production activities are greatly influenced by power relationships between 
different actors based on given socio-economic environments. The reason why 
environment and power relationships are not categorised in proper order as shown in 
the framework is that the environment/context is difficult to analyse separately from 
the power relationships after examining relevant data. For example, weak government 
enforcement of GI standards on quality is a certain part of the political environment 
but it can only be explored by examining relationships between the government and 
the producers. In other words, the environment does not exist independently of the 
power relationships.  
 
After close reading of the transcripts, many sub nodes are also developed in an 
emergent manner under the four tree nodes (four main categories). For example, after 
reading, the common laws/regulations/standards and the national GI standard — two 
sub-codes appeared in the “impact of government enforcement upon quality” category 
in the Gannan navel orange case
38
. But, coding is only the first stage of the data 
analysis process. The next stage, the connection stage, involves making sense of the 
codes. 
 
The second stage of analysis is related to questioning the data in order to retrieve texts 
                                                        
38 Tree nodes and sub-nodes of the three cases are shown in Appendix 2 
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that might show data connections. For example, why quality standards used in the 
market are different from the national GI standards can be asked to identify links 
between nodes and the nature of those links. The code-and-retrieve capability in 
NVivo8 allows rapid retrieval of transcription and suggests ways in which coded texts 
might be linked. For instance, if a section of text has been coded under two different 
nodes, the software can generate a matrix through “queries” to show the co-coded 
information. 
 
Retrieve coding data is a critical stage in the data analysis process for this thesis. 
Firstly, the links explored can be used to rethink the suitability of previous nodes. If 
the links show that data can be coded in a more suitable way, the data can be recoded 
until satisfied results/codes appear. In fact, qualitative data within this thesis were 
coded three times as the process of retrieving allows the development of a higher level 
of understanding of the data. Secondly, data triangulation can be done through retrieve. 
Such as, different actors’ views (including other researchers’ views) for a certain issue 
can be checked by comparison research. Thirdly, with a high level of understanding of 
the “raw material”, the retrieve capability of NVivo8 allows all data of three sample 
cases to be analysed as one case, cross-case comparisons and evaluation is becoming 
easier. Finally, although the software itself does not attach meaning to the relevant 
data which remains the researcher’s responsibility to make sense of the “raw data” 
and construct new ideas, the coding links generated by retrieve stage makes 
presenting a coherent narrative out of a mass of data relatively simple. 
 
Through coding and retrieving data analysis stages, power relationships between 
different actors within quality forming processes of the three sample cases can be 
clear. Following the data analysing, the final stage is assemble the data to display the 
findings as case studies.  
 
4.5.4 Case studies writing up 
According to White et al. (2003, p.287), the writing up stage presents substantial 
challenges to researchers because there is no prescription in detail about how a case 
should be reported and writing up case studies requires “not only to represent the 
social world that has been researched but also to re-present it in a way which both 
remains grounded in the accounts of research participants and explains its subtleties 
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and its complexities”. Bearing the objectives, the nature of the data collected and the 
likely requirements of the target audiences in mind, the task of writing up is therefore 
becoming “an active construction and representation of the form and nature of the 
phenomena being explored” (p.287) rather than simply an act that records the 
outcomes of the coding and analysis.  
 
Many writers indicate the research outcomes should be presented as the “story” 
(Patton, 2002; Sarantakos, 2005). Sarantakos (2005, p.407) even lists three types of 
stories: realist tales, self-confessional tales and impressionistic tales. Compared with 
self-confessional tales that “entails the researcher being fully involved in and talking 
from the field” and impressionistic tales that highlight personal presentation of 
recalling experiences, realist tales is “a production of objective reality” which 
suggests the author stands as “an uninvolved observer” in the background, using the 
language of the facts and writing in the third person with a realistic style. As the 
interpretivism underpinning this research believes the personal influence of the 
investigator can be minimised and unbiased results can be obtained, realist tales are 
thought to be a suitable way to organise and report the case and their outcomes. Rubin 
and Rubin (1995) suggest two ways to write realist tales: findings can be organised in 
terms of existing theory, and findings can be presented through the logic of the 
research design. Because it can be more sensitive to read a “story” which has the same 
logic as previous parts (Padgett, 2008), the outcomes are intended to be organised 
under the conceptual framework for agrifood products with various power 
relationships categories. Meanwhile, Patton (2002) proposes that a quality report 
should provide sufficient description to allow the reader to understand the basis for an 
interpretation. As writing up qualitative evidence can present findings in an accessible 
form that will satisfy the research objectives and enable the audience to understand 
them (Lewins and Silver, 2007), the evidence is presented alongside the descriptive, 
explanatory and interpretative elements in each case study to help and guide readers 
to know how the tale unfolds and to gain more reliability (White et al., 2003). Just 
like White et al. (2003, p.298) indicate, the researcher is required to “take the rich 
and detailed data that has been collected and present it in a way which effectively 




4.6 Chapter summary 
 
The methodology chapter is a critical chapter in this thesis as it links the theoretical 
framework to practice. To explain how the research methodology was designed and 
the data collection and analysis completed to undertake empirical analysis in the 
Chinese GI system, two main themes were contained in this chapter. Firstly, based on 
the conceptual framework for agrifood quality, after carefully examining different 
paradigms and methodologies involved in social research, the interpretivist paradigm, 
interpretivism philosophy, qualitative methodology and case study strategy were 
indicated more suitable to underpin this research. Secondly, under the consideration of 
obstacles may have in data collection processes and the results of a pilot study, the 
three sample cases were chosen and documenting and semi-structured interviewing 
methods were selected to collect data. For analysing collected data, based on the 
characteristics of qualitative methodology and the feature of this research, 
transcription, classification and connection analysing processes were intended to take 
under the help of NVivo8 to present case studies as realist tales (using the language of 
the facts and writing in the third person with a realistic style). According to such a 
detailed research methodological approach, three sample cases, namely Gannan navel 

















Chapter 5: A GI Case Study: Gannan Navel Orange 
 
“Many economists have called China’s emergence a “positive economic shock,” 
unleashing a consumer base and a workforce of nearly 1.3 billion people into the 
global market. However, China’s rapid growth and development has not occurred 
without setbacks and challenges. A series of globally recognized food safety scandals 
have brought increased awareness to China’s inefficient food certification and 
inspection system” 




Recently there have been numerous articles in both the Chinese and world press about 
food safety in China. For example, Ortega et al. (2011) note that the impact of the 
milk powder crisis in 2008 and the pork scandal in 2011 were significant turning 
points in this debate. As agrifood quality issues often arise from problems of 
asymmetric information between consumers and producers, third-party certifications, 
such as GIs, may bridge such information gaps and reduce market inefficiencies. 
However, the impact of the GI system in enhancing agrifood quality is still 
questionable in Chinese contexts and hence the focus of this thesis. 
 
Building upon the previous theoretical and conceptual chapters, the following three 
chapters concentrate on exploring the effectiveness of GIs in developing the quality of 
specific Chinese agrifood products by providing detailed analysis of the power 
relationships involving quality construction processes in a number of case studies, 
namely “Gannan navel orange”, “Nanfeng mandarin”, and “Wuyuan green tea”. 
Based on secondary data and the perspectives drawn from interviewing a number of 
actors within the GI networks, the cases provide three comparable examples of who 
the key actors are, the influence each actor has, and the challenges and limitations that 
GIs can play on the agrifood quality forming process. 
 
The first case study is “Gannan navel orange” which is based on empirically rich 
qualitative material and divided into two main themes. One provides a background to 
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the product. The main emphasis of this theme is the identification of the main actors 
in the quality construction process based on the documentary research and 
preliminary research which was undertaken in July 2010. The other theme reports the 
findings of a series of semi-structured interviews with 15 respondents. The analysis 
focuses on interviewees’ views regarding the quality development process and the 
motivations for the quality enhancing agenda. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
short summary. 
 
5.2 Historical background 
 
According to the Statistic Bureau of 
Jiangxi and Jiangxi investigation team of 
the National Statistic Bureau (2011), 
Gannan (also called Ganzhou), is a large 
city that governs 15 counties. It is located 
in the southeast of China and covers the 
southern third of Jiangxi province with an 
area of approximately 40,000 square 
kilometers (Figure 5.1). Based on its 
unique natural environment, navel oranges 
produced in the Gannan area are very 
famous in China because of their excellent 
taste. In order to protect and promote navel 
oranges from the Gannan area and thus 
increase local producers’ incomes, under the support of the local government, the 
AQSIQ issued Notice No. 136 in 2004 to confirm that “Gannan navel orange” would 
be protected as a GI product. In 2007, the local government also supported the 
approval of a certification mark for “Gannan navel orange” with the trademark office 
of the SAIC (Figure 5.2).  
 
 





Figure 5. 2: The trademark of “Gannan navel orange” 
 
Navel orange trees (Figure 5.3) are not native to the Gannan area. The first time they 
were farmed commercially in Xinfeng county (located in the Gannan area) was in 
1971, when it was found by the scientists that the local unique climate is ideal for 
growing navel orange trees. Later in 1977, the local government started to export 
navel oranges to the Hong Kong market. Following on an unexpectedly good market 
response and a desire to improve farmers’ incomes and earn hard currency, the 
government was encouraged to establish a further three navel orange exporting bases 
in addition to Xinfeng county. In 1980, to prepare for further expansion, the 
government invited the Southern Mountain Area Expedition Team of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences to analyse the environmental conditions of the whole Gannan 
area. After a year’s investigation, the team finally concluded that with suitable 
longitude (30°N), high annual average temperature (around 19.5°C), high amounts of 
annual rainfall (around 1600mm), medium annual sunshine time (around 1800 hours), 
long frost-free days (around 290 days), and special red soil which contains various 
rare earth elements, all 15 counties within the Gannan area are appropriate sites for 
producing navel oranges. Soon afterwards and supported by the local government, 8 
navel orange varieties, such as Newhall, Bonanza, and Frost, were introduced into the 
Gannan area by Huazhong Agriculture University. After 30 continuous years of 
growing, more than 95% of navel oranges produced today in the Gannan area belong 
to the Newhall variety (Figure 5.4) for the simple reason that the shape and taste are 
more acceptable to consumers than other varieties. Because this variety is better for 
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eating than for juicing
39
, with limited equipment
40
 to keep navel oranges fresh for a 
long time, almost all Gannan navel oranges are sold fresh and marketed between 
October and the following February. (Dong, 2008; Huang et al., 2011) 
 
The development of the Gannan navel orange network is mainly supported by the 
government. In 2002, after the Department of Crop Farming within the MoA 
presented a report entitled, “Gannan: The Vitality of the Chinese Orange Industry 
Following the Joining of the WTO”, the MoA published “Developing Superior 
Agricultural Products and Their Regional Distribution 2003-2007”, within which it 
was indicated that “Gannan navel orange” was one of the “superior agricultural 
products”, and accordingly announced that it would provide financial support for the 
development of the Gannan navel orange industry. Later that year, and encouraged by 
the central government, the local government decided to develop the Gannan area as 
“The Orange Capital of the World”. In 2008, for example, the local government spent 
14 million RMB
41
 on television advertising, roadside billboards and exhibitions, to 
promote “Gannan navel orange” in the market. Under the support of the government, 
the cultivation area of navel oranges has expanded very quickly in the Gannan area 
(Figure 5.5). It was around 20,000 ha in 2000, 80,000 ha in 2005, and 105,333 ha in 
2009. The output has risen even faster. In 2000, 0.05 million tonnes were produced, 
which rose to 0.48 million tonnes in 2005, and 1.12 million tonnes in 2009. In 2009, 
the annual output of navel oranges in the Gannan area was just less than Brazil and 
Florida (National Research Council, 2010).  
                                                        
39 Different brix and acid criteria are required for fresh eating varieties and juicing varieties 
40 The storage ability of refrigeration warehouses is less than 0.03 million tonnes in the Gannan area — less than 
3% of annual output in 2009 (Local government data, unpublished) 
41 The number is higher than the local government income generated by the agricultural sector in that year 
 
Figure 5. 3: A Gannan navel orange tree 
 




Figure 5. 5: The cultivation size and output of Gannan navel oranges 2000-2009 
Source: Local government data, unpublished 
 
Compared with the expanding rate of land cultivation, production is increasing 
dramatically. The local government believes this result is partly caused by the 
life-cycle of navel orange trees
42
 and partly driven by the application of relevant 
research. In order to help producers improve production skills, based on the research 
of various institutions (i.e. Jiangxi Province Navel Orange Research Institute, Citrus 
Research Institute of the China Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Huazhong 
Agriculture University, and Jiangxi Agriculture University), relevant standards and 
regulations have been published and implemented, such as 
 “The National Standard: Product of geographical indication — Gannan navel 
orange” (GB/T 20355-2006); 
 “Production Technical Specifications for Pollution-Free Gannan Navel Oranges” 
(GB36/T 390-2003); 
 “Production Technical Specifications for Organic Gannan Navel Oranges” 
(DB36/T442-2005); 
 “Pollution-Free Food: Gannan Navel Oranges” (DB36/T389-2003); 
 “Criteria for Growing Virus-Free Navel oranges”; 
 “The Rules of Preventing and Controlling Diseases and Insect Pests”; 
 “Production Environment Requests”; 
 “Basic Principles and Requirements for Harvest”; 
 “Regulations of Storage”;  
 “Regulations of Post-harvest Processing”.  
Today, in the Gannan area, fruit disease and pest prevention systems have been 
enhanced and a nursery stock supply system has been offering quality navel orange 
                                                        
42 A navel orange farmer can only expect to get his/her first substantial crop in the sixth or seventh year after 
planting navel orange plantlets 
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plantlets to farmers for several years.  
 
Two GI frameworks within the Gannan navel orange network are theoretically held by 
the Gannan Navel Orange Association (GNOA) which is composed of small-size 
co-operatives
43
, farmers/companies whose farms are at least 3.3 ha big
44
, technical 
experts, sellers, and government officers (Longnan county government, 2010). Its 
aims are managing the Gannan navel orange network, collecting information to help 
the local government adjust its policies, issuing GI labels, offering technical, legal, 
and marketing support for producers, and mediating disputes in the network (Ganzhou 
Navel Orange Association, 2005). But, in contrast to the Florida Citrus Commission, 
whose aims can be ensured through a specific governmental organisation, the FDOC, 
the aim of the GNOA is only to make recommendations as no one sub-organisation 
carries out its decisions. The impact of GNOA is thus limited in the network. Without 
effective organisation, local farmers have to market their products individually. As 
most local farmers do not have the time and appropriate abilities to sell their navel 
oranges to the market at a reasonable profit
45
, middlemen are becoming very 
important actors in the network. Every year, around 80% of naval oranges in the 
Gannan area are sold by middlemen. The remaining 20% are sold directly to the retail 
market by farmers or navel orange companies who sign contracts with individual 
small-scale farmers at the beginning of each farming year to ensure navel oranges 
with certain quality characteristics can be purchased at the end of farming year with a 
fixed price
46
 (Zeng et al., 2007). 
 
Most Gannan navel oranges are sold into the national market. In 2009, less than 0.03 
million tonnes of Gannan navel oranges were exported to international markets, 
around 2.29% of the total output (Huang et al., 2011). Also, to protect the reputation 
of the “Gannan navel orange” in international markets and earn hard currency, only 
companies
47
 based on Xunwu, Anyuan and Xinfeng counties can export “Gannan 
navel orange” to international markets and only after passing strict quality 
examination programmes based on specific quality standards. As the international 
                                                        
43 These small-size co-operatives are normally funded by the county governments 
44 The farm land cannot be sold but can be loaned in China 
45 The average size of navel orange farms in the Gannan area is around 0.7 ha (local government data, 
unpublished) 
46 This form is also called the contract farming 
47 Individual farmers are not allowed to export Gannan navel oranges 
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market is very small and operating under a different regulatory system from the 
national market, this thesis only focuses on the national market to explore the quality 
forming process in the Gannan navel orange network. 
 
Based on documentary and preliminary research, the local government is a critical 
actor in the network because it is an important supporter of the Gannan navel orange 
network and has issued many standards and regulations to regulate production 
activities. Farmers are also main actors in the network involved in the production 
process. As the relevant research and the application of modern technologies have had 
a great impact on navel orange production, technicial experts are important actors 
engaged in the quality forming process too. Furthermore, the role that middlemen play 
in the network is essential, as they help individual farmers sell navel oranges and may 
thus influence the quality construction process based on their market knowledge. 
Finally, because companies which sign contracts with farmers always identify certain 
quality characteristics they would like to purchase through the contract, they may 
have an influence on the quality construction process as well. Therefore, government 
officers, farmers, technicians, middlemen and contracted companies were identified as 
the main actors to interview with the aim of exploring quality construction processes 
in the Gannan navel orange network. 
 
5.3 Profile for respondents 
 
4 local government officers, 4 farmers, 4 middlemen, and 3 technicians from the 
Gannan area participated in this investigation which took place from the 22 November 
2010 to 07 December 2010. The reason why no contracted company was interviewed 
is that all respondents indicated that almost no company signs the contract with 
farmers directly in today’s network due to a lack of a fully developed credit 
mechanism (both farmers and companies can break the contract without any penalty).  
 
The first government officer interviewed is from a village, he is also a middleman and 
a farmer who owns a 25 ha navel orange farm and produces more than 300 tonnes of 
navel oranges each year. The second officer is from a county’s SAIC and the county 
he works for is believed to have not very suitable natural conditions to produce navel 
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oranges. The last two officers work for the Ganzhou Fruit Industry Bureau and the 
Ganzhou AQSIQ.  
 
Farmer interviewees were recommended by government officers and middlemen and 
chosen by the size of the farm, which may have an impact on the ability of farmers to 
adopt modern technology
48
 and thus quality development processes. The first farmer 
owns a 6.5 ha farm (Figure 5.6). As many of his navel orange trees are less than 4 
years old, his output is around 50 tonnes per year. The farm size of the second farmer 
is around 3.5 ha, which is filled with high productivity navel orange trees and the 
output is more than 100 tonnes per year. The third farm is 2.5 ha big, and the output is 
around 60 tonnes each year. The last farmer interviewed has a 0.7 ha navel orange 
farm in Anyuan county which is a perfect location for producing navel oranges due to 
specific natural conditions. His farm produces 20 tonnes of navel oranges per year.  
 
 
Figure 5. 6: The navel orange farm of farmer A 
 
All of the technicians interviewed work for the government because technical service 
is mainly offered by the local government in the Gannan area. The first respondent 
works for the Ganzhou Fruit Industry Bureau and also a member of the GNOA. He 
focuses on the technical aspect to help farmers produce and middlemen process
49
 
navel oranges. The second interviewee is an officer from a county’s fruit and tea 
bureau. His responsibilities include offering technical support for farmers and 
processing companies and helping individual farmers apply for bank loans and 
government subsidies. The last officer works for several villages to solve farmers’ 
technical problems and promote new techniques, such as controlling pests by the 
                                                        
48 This observation is made based on the preliminary research  




fluorescent light.  
 
Four middlemen were recommended by government officers and farmers. The first 
interviewee is also a farmer who owns a 35 ha farm that produces 300 tonnes of navel 
oranges every year. With a large output, he sells his products to wholesalers directly 
and therefore builds his own distribution channel. To maximise the use of the channel, 
he also purchases navel oranges from his neighbours’ farms for selling. Nowadays, his 
turnover is around 2,000 tonnes per year. The second respondent is a retailer and also 
owns a farm, which is 30 ha big and produces 400 tonnes of navel oranges each year. 
As the navel oranges he produces are very famous in the Gannan area due to the 
excellent taste based on 20 years of extensive production experience, he set his own 
trademark up 5 years ago. Through purchasing his neighbours’ navel oranges that he 
knows the quality of very well, around 2,000 tonnes of navel oranges are sold under 
his own trademark (with the GI) in the north of China per year. The third interviewee 
is a wholesaler and also a retailer. He purchases navel oranges from local small-scale 
middlemen and farmers and sells middle to low quality navel oranges to retailers 
under the GI and quality products under his own trademark (with the GI) to both 
retailers and individual consumers. His turnover is around 50,000 tonnes per year. The 
fourth middleman has a similar but smaller business to the third one. He sells around 
20,000 tonnes of navel oranges to the market. All of these middlemen pointed out that 
navel oranges need to be graded by size before selling because such activities allow a 
high income for them (Figure 5.7).  
 
 
Figure 5. 7: A grading factory 
 





 and focused on quality evaluation criteria in the 
network, the political, social and economic influences on quality development 
processes, and the contributions of GI schemes on quality. Each interview resulted in 
a large volume of qualitative data and all answers were checked by the respondent 
after each interview. 
 
Respondents Personal Characteristics 
Government 
officer A 




works for a county’s SAIC, the county is believed to have not very 
suitable natural conditions to produce navel oranges; 
Government 
officer C 
works for the Ganzhou Fruit Industry Bureau, a member of GNOA;  
Government 
officer D 
works for the Ganzhou AQSIQ; 
Farmer A owns a 6.5 ha farm, produces 50 tonnes navel oranges per year, has 
a junior school certificate; 
Farmer B owns a 3.5 ha farm, produces 100 tonnes navel oranges per year, 
has a junior school certificate; 
Farmer C owns a 2.5 ha farm, produces 60 tonnes navel oranges per year, has 
a junior school certificate; 
Farmer D owns a 0.7 ha farm, produces 20 tonnes navel oranges per year, 
from Anyuan county which is believed as a perfect location for 
producing navel oranges due to specific natural conditions, has a 
junior school certificate; 
Technician A works for the Ganzhou Fruit Industry Bureau, a member of the 
GNOA; 
Technician B  works for a county’s fruit and tea bureau; 
Technician C  works for several villages; 
Middleman A owns a 35 ha farm, sells around 2,000 tonnes navel oranges to 
wholesalers each year under the GI; 
Middleman B owns a 30 ha farm, sells 2,000 tonnes “quality” navel oranges 
under his own trademark (with the GI), a member of the GNOA; 
Middleman C purchases navel oranges from local small-scale middlemen and 
farmers, sells middle to low quality navel oranges to retailers under 
the GI and “quality” products under his own trademark (with the 




has similar business as the middleman C, trades 20,000 tonnes 
navel oranges per year. 




                                                        
50 The semi-structured interviewing guide is shown in Appendix 1 
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5.4 Quality development processes embedded in power relationships 
 
Based on interviewing guide
51
, the data was intended to be organised within three 
parts according to the conceptual framework (see Figure 2.1): the socio-economic 
environment, power relationships and the final quality characteristics presented into 
the market. However, the environment is found to be interdependent with power 
relationships. In other words, because the environment is also constructed through 
power relationships, it is difficult to seperate them out in terms of analysis. For 
example, the political environment includes not only published laws, regulations and 
standards, but also the government enforcement of these laws, regulations and 
standards, which cannot be examined seperately from power relationships. Therefore, 
the data are finally structured into four main parts concentrating on exploring power 
relationships influencing production activities and thus quality from the perspective of 
government enforcement, organisational influence, economic relationships and other 
impacts (Figure 5.8). Meanwhile, depending on the data analysis principles that were 
discussed in Chapter 4, not only the primary data collected in the interviewing, but 
also secondary data obtained through various publications, the internet and personal 
solicitation are used to explore the networks and improve the validity of the findings. 
 
 
Figure 5. 8: The structure of data analysis section in the Gannan navel orange case  
 
 
                                                        
51 See the Appendix 1 
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5.4.1 Impact of government enforcement upon quality 
Beside the common food quality laws and regulations, such as the Product Quality 
Law of the P.R.C., the Food Safety Law of the P.R.C., and Agricultural Product 
Quality Safety Law of the P.R.C., all mentioned in Chapter 3, many specific standards 
and regulations (listed in the section 5.2) were issued by the government to regulate 
the production activities of Gannan navel oranges. However, these laws, regulations 
and standards are not well-known or embedded in the network. As farmer A said, “I 
heard there were some special standards published. But, I have not read them until 
now” and middleman D indicated “I don’t know relevant standards at all”. The 
government officers and technicians interviewed also showed their limited 
knowledge, 
 
The interviewer: Are there any laws, regulations or relevant quality standards that 
producers must obey? 
Government officer B: Only some sorts of pesticides can not be used. 
The interviewer: Can you list them? 
Government officer B: DDT …I don’t remember others. All of forbidden pesticides 
can be found in the Food Safety Law and relevant regulations. 
 
This situation may be caused by several reasons. Firstly, with low education level, 
small-scale farmers may prefer to produce navel oranges “in their own way” 
(technician C) rather than complying with relevant regulations and standards through 
studying or attending teaching courses. This finding is similar to Wan et al. (2009), 
who indicate that low education levels make farmers less interested in reading 
published laws, regulations and standards. Secondly, the overlapping regulatory 
authorities between different government departments reduce the impact of these laws, 
regulations and standards in the network. Although government officer D introduced 
“[T]he responsibility of the local agriculture department is inspecting inputs, the 
local AQSIQ is supervising production activities, the local SAIC is regulating 
marketing activities, and the Ganzhou Fruit Bureau is mediating the conflicts between 
these departments”, many areas of the responsibility overlap between these 
departments. For example, government officer C (from the Ganzhou Fruit Industry 
Bureau) believes it is the responsibility of the local SAIC to regulate the pesticide 
market and therefore secure the safety of navel oranges in the market. But, 
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government officer B (from the local SAIC) indicated that, it is the responsibility of 
the agricultural department to control farming inputs, such as pesticides and fertilisers. 
The direct result of overlapped regulatory responsibilities are, “I know some sorts of 
forbidden pesticides can not be used, but some farmers still can and prefer to buy and 
use them because of the low cost” (government officer A), and “[T]he picking day
52
 
is decided by the local government every year, but as nobody has been punished for 
early picking, some farmers still pick navel oranges very early. … The price may 
decrease when a large amount of navel oranges appear in the market” (middleman A). 
Unclear responsibilities also slow the respondent speed of the government to some 
accidents. For instance, several tonnes of dyed Gannan navel oranges
53
 were found 
on the market by journalists in the winter of 2010. The government officer C (from the 
Ganzhou Fruit Industry Bureau) complained that,  
 
“It is the Bureau’s duty to catch the dealers who dyed and sold these navel oranges. 
However, there is not any term in relevant laws, standards or regulations against 
dyeing activities. The material they used is not forbidden according to the Food Safety 
Law. Also, as my department has no right in law to sentence and make any 
punishment, I do not know which department, the SAIC or the AQSIQ, would help my 
Bureau to manage this situation” 
 
Dyed Gannan navel oranges have been found several times on the market over the last 
decade and the safety level of Gannan navel oranges was thus questioned by 
consumers. But, until now, the relevant regulation is not in place and the response 
system is still lacking. Thirdly, due to “a lack of officers” and “it is not necessary”, 
the government officers infrequently regulate production activities and check for the 
quality of Gannan navel oranges. Technician B indicated, “[N]ot many officers work 
for my department, it is impossible to regulate production activities and check the 
quality regularly” and government officer B specified, “[M]y county is located at the 
edge of the Gannan area with the navel orange farms less than 1,500 ha in total. As 
the output is not high (compared with other counties), the quality inspection is not a 
priority task for the county’s government”. In fact, none of the farmers or middlemen 
                                                        
52 Navel oranges do not ripen after removing from the tree. To avoid Gannan navel oranges with bad taste and 
appearance appearing on the market, the local government decides the picking day every year and asks all farmers 
to start their harvest after this day 
53 Using staining materials to make navel oranges look better 
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interviewed announced that their products were inspected by the local government. 
Farmer D said, “[T]he government does not take care about the quality of my 
products. … I use pesticides when I feel it is necessary”. Fourthly, the limited 
acknowledgement of government technicians on the safety aspect also weakens 
government enforcement. Technician B believes, “… the high level of pesticide 
remaining is not a matter. In most of the time, farmers or middlemen only need to sell 
their navel oranges later, because pesticide remaining on the peel would decrease as 
time passes by”. However, this point is debatable. According to Kang et al. (2002), 
the chemical material, such as pesticides, can be absorbed by oranges through soil 
rather than simply remaining on the peel. The attitude of technicians to the safety 
aspect is also an obstacle in attracting producers’ attention to safety and enhancing 
government enforcement with respect to the safety aspect. 
 
Although the low education level of farmers, overlapping responsibilities between 
different government departments, few quality inspection programmes, and limited 
knowledge of technicians weaken the influence of relevant laws, regulations and 
standards on quality, GI schemes are supposed to offer an extra insurance of quality 
because products have to be proved that they have met “pre-set standards” before 
being sold under the GI.  
 
Both AQSIQ and SAIC frameworks adopt “The National Standard: Product of 
geographical indication — Gannan navel orange” (GB/T 20355-2006), which was 
written by the Jiangxi Association of Standardisation
54
, the Ganzhou Fruit Industry 
Bureau, and the Ganzhou Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, to define 
quality characteristics and regulate production activities of Gannan navel oranges in 
the network (General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine and Standardisation Administration of the People’s Republic of China, 
2006). According to the national standard, the quality of Gannan navel oranges can be 







, and net weight
58
. The methods of choosing samples from a certain 
                                                        
54 A technical association formed by technological experts and administrated and funded by the government 
55 Shape, size, colour, peel smoothness 
56 Soluble solids content, total acid, edible rate — related to the taste aspect 
57 Fenitrothion, Quinalphos, Cyhalothrin, Deltamethrim, Fenvalerate, Chlorpyrifos, Isocarbophos, Carbendazin, 
Cs, Pb, and Cd, remaining level — related to the safety aspect 
58 How to calculate the net weight and show it on the package 
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batch and checking appearance, physical contents, pollution level and net weight of 
samples are also specified in the national standard. But, even though this national 
standard should be enforced in the network, interviewees indicated it is not enforced 
in practice.  
 
In China, the standardisation system includes compulsory standards and 
recommended standards (General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic 
of China, 2011). All producers have to produce products according to compulsory 
standards. For example, “The Standards of Growing Environment for Pollution-free 
Oranges” (NY 5016-2001) is a compulsory standard. It means, all orange producers 
have to ensure their farms have met listed requirements in this standard to produce 
oranges, or the producer will be punished. But, recommended standards are not 
compulsory for producers, unless the producer voluntarily accepts. For instance, only 
when a producer wants to sell his/her navel oranges under the name of “Gannan navel 
orange”, “The National Standard: Product of geographical indication — Gannan navel 
orange” is imposed. In other words, only for producers of “Gannan navel orange”, this 
national standard is compulsory. However, all respondents (including all government 
officers and technicians interviewed) did not realise it. Technician A said, “… there 
are many standards, such as the national standard and green food production 
standards. But, all standards are not compulsory”.  
 
Because the national standard is not imposed, trading quality criteria do not meet the 
regulatory standards. For example, according to the national standard, the ideal size of 
Gannan navel oranges is between 7.5cm and 8.5cm diameter with a round or ellipse 
shape (depending on different varieties). But, middleman D indicated, “[D]ifferent 
sizes are sold with different prices on the market. For example, the price of navel 
oranges with 6-8cm diameter is higher than bigger and smaller navel oranges”. And, 
government officer B pointed out, 
 
“…the national standard is only a guideline. For example, the bigger size (diameter 
around 8.5cm) is believed to be a sign of quality in the northern market, and small 
size (diameter around 6.5cm) is believed to be a sign of quality in the southern 





According to interviewees, it can be seen that the production activities in the Gannan 
navel orange network are not effectively governed by general 
laws/regulations/standards and “pre-set” GI standards mainly due to weak 
government enforcement and an incorrect interpretation of “The National Standard: 
Product of geographical indication — Gannan navel orange”. 
 
5.4.2 Impact of organisational influence upon quality 
Theoretically, various forms of co-operatives should have a critical influence on the 
quality development process in GI networks because the GI is a collective intellectual 
property, supposed to offer the benefit of economies of scale to its members through 
co-operative activities. But, as Chinese farmers were not encouraged to co-operate 
until 2006 when the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Specialized Farmers 
Cooperatives” was issued, the influence of co-operatives is very limited in the Gannan 
navel orange networks partly due to a lack of accumulated knowledge.  
 
With the support of the local government, the GNOA, formed by “government 
officers, farmers (not many), and sellers” (government officer A), is the largest 
association in the network. The regular works of the GNOA are “helping farmers 
improve farming skills” (technician A), “offering a place for farmers and middlemen 
to communicate and trade navel oranges” (middleman A), “remaining farmers 
watering navel orange trees in time and picking navel oranges after the certain date” 
(farmer A), and “purchasing pesticides and fertilisers for farmers (not free)” (farmer 
D). It is also the GI holder of both GI frameworks (set by the SAIC and the AQSIQ)
59
. 
However, even though the GNOA is supported by the local government and entrusted 
with the legal right to issue GI labels, under government controlling GI issuing 
procedures, its abilities in regulating production activities according to the national 
standard are limited. Based on the local government data, applicants who want to 
apply the GI on their products are asked to fill the application form and hand it into 
the local Fruit Industry Bureau. After holding the permit of the city government, the 
applicants can buy
60
 GI labels from the GNOA for one year. Within this process, the 
                                                        
59 With same GI holder and same “pre-set standards”, differences cannot be found between these two frameworks. 
Thus, registering with the third GI framework set by the MoA is indicated “useless”(government officer C) 
60 “… 0.006 RMB for an orange lable and 0.1 RMB for a package lable” (government officer C) 
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quality checking stage is not involved. As middleman B indicated,  
 
“…the GI label is useless. Everybody can get it very easy… I hand an application 
form every year, and then I can buy as many GI labels as I want. I have to pay 0.1 
RMB for a label on the package box that is what the local government asks for” 
 
Without the authority to regulate producers’ activities through the GI issuing 
procedure, the GNOA is described as a branch of the local government, operating 
under the local government requirements, dealing with issues that are “not suitable to 
do by government departments (such as applying the GI)” (government officer D), 
and preferring to “get more government money to spend” (government officer C). 
 
Beside the GNOA, small-scale co-operatives formed by individual farmers can also 
be found in the network. However, these co-operatives were indicated simply 
combined under the government support and always very small. As middleman A 
pointed out, “[T]he local government offers subsidies to support the setting up of 
co-operatives”, technician C announced, “[T]he GI label can be bought through 
co-operatives (individual farmers cannot get the permit from the local government)”, 
and technician B described “… around 80% to 90% of local co-operatives are formed 
by less then ten farmers”. Because it is very difficult for a small size co-operative to 
negotiate with middlemen and thus help its members obtain a high economic reward, 
regulating members’ production activities is becoming an impossible mission for 
these co-operatives. As farmer B questioned “[W]hy do I have to work according to 
others’ requirements?” 
 
Another type of “organisations” formed by trading companies and farmers, also called 
contract farming was mentioned by many interviewees. Within this type of 
“organisation”, trading companies have to pay a certain amount of deposit to farmers 
at the beginning of the farming season for reserving navel oranges with certain quality 
characteristics at a fixed price in the autumn under the contract. Then, to ensure 
quality, technicians are sent to contracted farms regularly. At last, when navel oranges 
have matured, the farmers sell their navel oranges to contracted trading companies 
under the contracted price. In this way, the quality can be secured by the trading 
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companies and the market risks can be reduced for both. However, according to the 
interviewees, contract farming does not work well in the network due to a lack of a 
fully developed credit mechanism (e.g. although contracted trading companies pay a 
certain amount of deposit to farmers in advance, farmers can break the contract 
without any penalty). For example, if the market price is higher than the contracted 
price, the farmers will sell their navel oranges to market rather than contracted trading 
companies. Even if the market price is the same as the contracted price, the farmers 
still will sell “quality” navel oranges to middlemen who offer a higher price, and give 
contracted trading companies “low-quality” navel oranges under the contracted price. 
Unless the market price is lower than the contracted price, the farmers will sell their 
products to contracted trading companies. As the local court always protects farmers’ 
rights and does not support the trading companies’ compensation requirements, the 
trading companies raise rather than decrease their risks by contract farming. This 
situation happened before, and the result was that the trading companies, such as the 
Ganzhou Fruit Industry Company, got neither navel oranges nor compensation at the 
end of the farming season. Therefore,  
 
“Less and less trading companies sign contracts with farmers because they may 
receive nothing at the end of the year. Also, last year, as the market price was too low, 
many contracted trading companies refused to buy navel oranges under the 
contracted price as well. Contract farming will be very difficult to be found in the 
future” (government officer B) 
 
The fieldwork Wan et al. (2009) also shows the disappearing contract farming in the 
Gannan navel orange network, as most farmers only have very simple trading 
relationships with their purchasers (both of them may change their minds without any 
compensation) and only 0.11% farmers declare that buyers offer technical support to 
them. A lack of a fully developed credit mechanism makes it is difficult to retain a 
long-term relationship between buyers and sellers in the Gannan navel orange 
network.  
 
In short, the influence of the GNOA, small co-operatives, and contract farming on the 
quality forming processes is limited in the network. Farmers’ activities are not 
impacted by any organisations even though the GNOA is entrusted with the legal right 
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to issue GI labels.  
 
5.4.3 Impact of economic relationships upon quality 
The total output value of Gannan navel oranges increased very quickly from 0.5 
billion RMB in 2003 to 1.3 billion RMB in 2005 to 2.24 billion RMB in 2009 whilst 
output rose from 0.2 million tonnes in 2003 to 0.48 million tonnes in 2005 to 1.12 
million tonnes in 2009. But, the data also shows, after “Gannan navel orange” 
registered with the AQSIQ as a GI in 2004, the average price of Gannan navel oranges 
decreased, rather than increased (Figure 5.9). 
 
 
Figure 5. 9: The total output, output value and average price of Gannan navel oranges 2003-2009 
Source: Local government data, unpublished 
 
According to interviewees, farmers have to pay around 15,000 RMB per ha (the cost 
does not include the personal input as small farms are always run by families) to raise 
their navel orange trees (pay for plantlets, irrigation, fertilisers, and so on) for the first 
6 years. From the seventh year, navel orange trees start to produce large quantities of 
navel oranges which are around 50KG per tree and 20 tonnes per ha, and the variable 
cost from the seventh year is also increased to almost 21,000 RMB per ha per year or 
1.05 RMB per KG (the cost also does not include the personal input. If the personal 
input is included, the cost will rise to around 32,000 RMB per ha per year or 1.6 RMB 
per KG). As the average market price of Gannan navel oranges was less than 2 RMB 
per KG in 2008 and 2009, some farmers’ income “cannot even cover their inputs” 
(government officer B). To secure farmers’ income, the local government invested 
“several million RMB per year from 2006” (technician A) and “14 million RMB in 
2008 (1.3% of total output value)” (government officer C) on television advertising, 
roadside billboards, and exhibitions to promote “Gannan navel orange”. However, the 
average market price still decreased rather than increased between 2006 and 2008. 
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Although the price rose in 2009, it was believed to have been mainly caused by “the 
changing navel orange supply in the market” (farmer C) rather than improved market 
reputation, because “[M]ore and more trademarks are appearing in the network. 
Sellers want to distinguish their products from normal Gannan navel oranges” 
(government officer C). As quality is also believed to be one variable influencing 
market price, the local government started to provide subsidies and co-operate 
schemes with the local banks to offer small-amount loans to farmers for “purchasing 
modern farming equipment (to improve quality)” (government officer A). But, such 
financial support does not influence farming activities great because “[I]t is not 
necessary to purchase modern farming equipment with an average farm size of 0.7 ha 
in an area filled with hills” (government officer A) and “the application process of 
bank loans is too complicated, such as fill the form, find another three farmers to 
guarantee, and pay a high interest … I never borrow the money from local banks” 
(farmer B). 
 
To secure farmers’ income, the local government has tried to improve market 
reputation and quality of Gannan navel oranges through promotion programmes, 
subsidies and loans, but the impact of these is minimal on both market price and 
production activities. Compared with the local government, middlemen’s “purchasing 
power” is indicated having a more significant influence on quality development 
processes by interviewees.  
 
In the network, middlemen set their own quality criteria based on their market 
knowledge. As middleman D announced,  
 
“I purchase navel oranges from farms and process them after purchasing, such as 
washing, grading, waxing and packaging. Then, different navel oranges will be sold 
to different markets/consumers. …What consumers take care about and how much 
they would like to pay decide my quality criteria and purchase price” 
 
Although quality criteria for Gannan navel oranges have been listed in the national 
standard (appearance, physical contents, safety level and net weight), and farmers 
interviewed showed their different quality preferences from middlemen, the farmers 
admitted that they have to produce navel oranges according to middlemen’s 
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preferences for obtaining a high economic reward. Firstly, the good taste was believed 
to be a certain quality characteristic of Gannan navel oranges, but middlemen pointed 
out that their purchasing decision is not simply taste.  
 
“…the taste of Gannan navel orange is always better than navel oranges from other 
areas due to local special environments. Consumers thus prefer to buy and pay a high 
price for ‘Gannan navel orange’
61
. For me, all navel oranges I purchase from the 
Gannan area can be sold in the market because of good taste. The taste is thus not a 
critical purchasing standard” (middleman A) 
 
Therefore, although farmers announced that taste is critical to evaluate the quality of 
navel oranges because everybody likes tasty oranges, they focus instead on decreasing 
inputs on taste as the good taste cannot bring an extra income to them. Farmer B 
explained, 
 
“If you mention taste, I would like to say, I do not have any incentive to improve 
quality at all, because a few buyers pay a higher price for better taste. … Even though 
some buyers pay a higher price for better taste, compared with increased inputs, such 
as using organic fertilisers instead of chemical ones … I cannot get a fair profit at 
all” 
 
More and more chemical fertilisers rather than organic fertilisers are thus used to 
increase production regardless of the taste in the production process. Some consumers 
“started to complain that the taste of Gannan navel oranges is not as good as several 
years ago” (middleman C). As decreasing market reputation may have a direct impact 
on the market price, not only middlemen interviewed prefer to set their own 
trademarks but also some counties in the Gannan area, which can produce navel 
oranges with better taste than other counties under excellent natural conditions, started 
to register and promote their own collective/certification marks, such as Sanbaishan, 
Xin feng navel orange (Figure 5.10) and Anyuan navel orange, for helping local 
farmers obtain a relatively high economic reward in the market (Zeng et al., 2007).  
 
                                                        
61 “Based on the good taste, the average price of Gannan navel oranges can be 100% higher than other navel 




Figure 5. 10: The certification trademark of Xinfeng navel orange 
 
Secondly, compared with the taste, the appearance is a more important criterion to 
evaluate the quality for middlemen. For instance, in the Ganzhou Gannan Navel 
Orange E-Market
62
, the only criterion to distinguish Gannan navel oranges is the size 
(this market only trades Newhall variety) (Ganzhou Gannan Navel Orange E-Market 
Co. Ltd, 2011). In the same delivery date (01, Dec., 2011), the average price for navel 
oranges with a diameter from 7.5cm to 8.0cm was 11,980 RMB per ton, but the price 
for navel oranges with a diameter from 8.0cm to 9.0cm was only 5,720 RMB per ton 
in 29, July, 2011. As the price differentiation between good and bad appearance navel 
oranges is significant in the market, farmers indicated, “I make my production 
decisions based on their (middlemen’s) standards … if they prefer to buy 
medium-sized navel oranges, I have to think how to prune my trees to produce 
medium-sized navel oranges” (farmer D) and  
 
“If you mention appearance, I do have incentive to improve quality. It is not difficult 
for me to adopt certain techniques to produce navel oranges with the appearance that 
buyers prefer to pay a high price for... there is a 20-30% price difference between 
navel oranges with a good or bad appearance …middle size navel oranges can be 
sold around 4 RMB per KG on the market. And unattractive, small navel oranges can 
just be sold around 2.5 RMB per KG on the market” (farmer B) 
 
Thirdly, although the safety criteria are listed in the national standard and all 
interviewees showed that they want to buy safe agrifood products in the market, the 
                                                        
62 This E-Market is supported by the GNOA and focuses on offering market information in time  
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safety aspect was not indicated as quality criterion in the network. Middleman C 
explained, “…it is difficult to judge the safety. … Even though products should be 
produced according to government safety standards, the safety issue in the retail 
market is not important at all”. As middlemen do not take care of the safety aspect in 
their purchasing processes, none of the farmers interviewed pay special attention to 
the pesticides they used. 
 
Middlemen control more than 80% outputs of Gannan navel oranges. The affluent 
market knowledge gives them a space to make their own quality criteria and thus 
maximise their profit in the network. Based on the local government data, the total 
agriculture output value has increased 237.72% from 2001 to 2010 in the Gannan area, 
but the farmers’ income only rose by 197.92% in the same period. Middlemen 
interviewed also admitted that they received a “high” and “low risk” income 
compared to farmers. As middleman A said, “[I]n this year, the price of Gannan navel 
oranges in the retailer market is around 30%-40% higher than similar products. But 
in wholesaler market, it is only around 20% higher” and middleman C specified, “[I]f 
the price difference between wholesaler market and retailer market is suitable, I will 
trade navel oranges. If not, I will stop my business”. Facing a high and low risk 
economic reward, with certain market knowledge, all large-scale farmers 
interviewed
63
 also trade navel oranges as middlemen in the network.  
 
When focusing on the economic relationships in the network, production activities in 
the Gannan navel orange network are found greatly impacted by the quality criteria 
set by middlemen due to their huge “purchasing power”. Although the local 
government also wants to influence quality forming processes through offering 
subsidies/loans, the effect of these activities is limited because of the local natural and 
social contexts.  
 
5.4.4 The impact of other factors upon quality 
Beside the political, organisational and economic relationships between the main 
actors in the network, producers’ production activities as well as quality development 
processes, are also impacted by many other factors, such as the natural environment, 
                                                        
63 Government officer A, middleman A and middlemen B 
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the farm size and the cultivation experience. 
 
Firstly, although the quality of Gannan navel oranges is always influenced by farming 
activities, such as the usage of fertilisers and the picking time, the impact of local 
unique natural conditions and carefully picked varieties cannot be ignored when 
examining quality. Government officer C explained,  
 
“Orange trees have been planted in the Gannan area for more than 1500 years. But, 
due to unsuitable varieties (other varieties from today), most farmers could not earn a 
living from orange production till the end of the 1970s … specific natural environment 
and certain varieties are combined to produce tasty Gannan navel oranges”  
 
Thus, farmer D prefers to sell his products under the name of “Anyuan navel orange” 
rather than “Gannan navel orange” because the taste of navel oranges from Anyuan 
county is better than that from many other counties in the Gannan area due to specific 
natural conditions. And, farmer B has no interest in improving the taste of his 
products because navel oranges with better taste and a relative low price (compared 
with his inputs on improving the taste) can be offered by farmers from several 
counties with excellent natural conditions in the Gannan area. 
 
Secondly, the small-scale farm size may limit the ability of many farmers to improve 
the quality of navel oranges through increasing inputs. According to the data offered 
by the local government officers, the average profit per navel orange farm was only 
6,400 RMB in 2009 (the fixed cost for the first 6 years is not calculated) — the 
average farm size is only 0.7 ha, the average output was 20 tonnes per ha, the average 
input was 1600 RMB per ton, and the average market price was only 2,000 RMB per 
ton. In the face of a low economic reward, improving quality through increasing 
inputs is not a wise choice for farmers.  
 
Thirdly, farming experience also has a certain impact on the quality construction 
process. For example, middleman B established his private trademark based on more 
than 20 years farming experience. He said, “I have a special way to cultivate my 
orange trees. And, I teach my neighbours to plant their navel oranges because I also 
purchase their navel oranges for selling. Tasty navel oranges with good appearance 
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are the market advantage of my company”. And, farmer A indicated,  
 
“The taste of my navel oranges is OK, not good and not bad, because I have only 
owned my navel orange farm for 4 years. I am not experienced in managing my farm, 
such as when pesticides and fertilisers should be used and how to take care of navel 
orange trees during flowering time. In fact, management skills have certain influences 
on the appearance and the taste. But, because the Gannan area is a good place to 
grow navel orange trees, the taste of my products is OK”  
 
Natural factors, farm size, and cultivation experience all have a certain impact on the 
quality development process of Gannan navel oranges. Also, it should be noticed that 
many other factors may also have an impact too. Such as, the number of technicians 
sent to villages. Although farmers may refuse to read technological books and attend 
relevant courses, technicians can help them cultivate their navel orange trees in a right 
way and thus improve the quality of Gannan navel oranges. And, the increasing 
attention of journalists to the scandal of dyed navel oranges and consumers greater 
awareness of the safety, may also result in more and more farmers harvesting their 






Supported by the government, the GI appeared in the market to help producers obtain 
a high economic reward through offering certain quality characteristics that 
consumers prefer to pay a high price for (Watts and Goodman, 1997; Parrott et al., 
2002). Securing certain quality characteristics is thus becoming an essential task in GI 
networks. In Europe and America, the relevant standards and regulations were 
proposed by various co-operatives, issued by the government and enforced by the 
government and/or the third party to regulate actors’ activities and ensure quality. 
However, this investigation has shown the pre-set quality characteristics of Gannan 
navel oranges cannot be secured because the national standard is proposed mainly by 
government officers and not imposed by the local government. Also, the GI holder, 
the GNOA, does not have the authority to regulate production activities through GI 
                                                        
64 Early picked navel oranges have to be dyed before selling because of green peel 
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issuing procedures. In other words, there is no powerful quality inspector in the 
network. The effectiveness of GIs in securing quality in this network is thus limited.  
 
The findings also indicate that small-scale farmers’ incomes cannot be improved by 
GIs automatically. To secure the income, farmers have to cultivate their navel orange 
trees based on middlemen’s quality criteria. With weak government enforcement and 
limited organisational influences, the “quality” is thus presented into the market 
reflecting economic rationality (i.e. producing navel oranges under “purchasing 
power”) rather than the national GI standard, and decreasing taste and safety levels 
are becoming unavoidable results.  
 
5.6 Chapter summary 
 
The first theme of the chapter provided a background to the network. The main actors 
involved in the quality forming process were indicated at the end of this theme. The 
second theme of the chapter concentrated on exploring quality development processes 
in the network based on the power relationships. The results show that GI schemes 
have a limited impact on quality construction processes of Gannan navel oranges and 
middlemen are the “powerful” actors in the network to dominate quality forming 
processes through their “purchasing power”. 
 
The quality development process of Gannan navel oranges has been analysed in this 
chapter. However, more GI networks still need to be explored as power relationships 
involving agrifood quality construction processes in different GI networks may differ 
under different contexts. To obtain more generalised results, the Nanfeng mandarin 
network operating in very different socio-economic environments, such as a longer 









Chapter 6: A GI Case Study: Nanfeng mandarin 
 
“With the globalization of the agro-food system, agro-food quality and safety has 
been the focus of increasing public concern in China (Huang & Gale, 2006) and 
around the world. Indeed, it has been argued that “[g]overnment policies and 
regulations on labeling, in conjunction with input, process, and performance 
standards for food products, significantly influence how markets for food quality 
function and develop” (Caswell & Mojduszka, 1996, 1248). In addition, third party 
certification of food and agricultural products has become common place in both 
industrial and developing nations (Fulponi, 2006; Hatanaka, Bain, & Busch, 2005; 
Ponte & Gibbon, 2005)” 




Chapter 5 provided a detailed analysis of quality construction processes in the Gannan 
navel orange network through revealing power relationships between different actors 
to evaluate the effectiveness of GIs on developing agrifood quality. The results show 
that economic relationships govern the quality construction process in the Gannan 
navel orange network whilst the pre-set GI standard has little or no impact on the 
quality forming and the GI issuing processes. The local government and the GI holder, 
the GNOA, are “powerless” in managing and regulating production activities. 
However, according to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2, quality 
meanings and involved power relationships between different GI networks may not be 
the same under different contexts. Therefore, the aim of Chapter 6 is continuing to 
explore the quality development process in Chinese GI networks under a different 
context. 
 
The socio-economic environment of the Nanfeng mandarin network is completely 
different from the Gannan navel orange network. For example, compared with less 
than 40 years production history of Gannan navel oranges, farmers have cultivated 
Nanfeng mandarin trees for more than 1,300 years. And, unlike the Ganzhou 
government who limit the growing area of Gannan navel oranges within the GI 
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protection area, the Fuzhou government which Nanfeng county belongs breaks GI 
schemes by expanding the cultivation area to unprotected counties. Also, different 
from the Gannan navel orange network which only contributes 0.07% of local 
government income in 2010, more than a third of Nanfeng county’s GDP is generated 
by the Nanfeng mandarin network. The case of Nanfeng mandarin offers a useful 
comparison with the Gannan navel orange case and makes it possible to analyse the 
influences of history, government policies and strong economic pressure on the 
quality of GI products. Further useful insights of the quality forming process and the 
effectiveness of GI schemes on developing quality in Chinese GI networks can thus 
be generated. 
 
Similar to the last chapter, Chapter 6 explores quality construction processes in the 
Nanfeng mandarin network through two main themes. One focuses on describing the 
background to the network based on documentary research and preliminary research 
which was undertaken in January 2010. The main actors involving the quality 
development process are indentified at the end of this theme. The other theme 
concentrates on primary data analysis. The power relationships involved in the quality 
construction process are explored with reference to government enforcement, 
organisational influence, economic relationships and the impact of other factors. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a short summary. 
 
6.2 Historical background 
 
Nanfeng county is located to the east of Jiangxi 
province, between latitudes 116°09'E and 116°45'E 
and longitudes 26°51'N and 27°21'N, and governed 
by Fuzhou City (Figure 6.1). According to the local 
government, Nanfeng county is a good place to 
grow mandarin trees with a high average 
temperature (18.3°C), long average annual sunshine 
hours (1928.2 hours), and 271 frost-free days. 
 
“Nanfeng mandarin” is one of the smallest and 
 
Figure 6. 1: The location of 
Nanfeng county in China 
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oldest mandarin varieties in China and has been produced for more than 1,300 years 
in Nanfeng county. With a golden colour, thin peel, good taste, small shape (25-50g) 
and unique fragrance, it was offered to the Chinese Emperors as a tribute in the old 
times (Figure 6.2). However, despite the comments from the local government, the 
annual output of Nanfeng mandarins before the 1980s was very low due to unstable 
local temperatures (only the temperature around the town is relatively stable) and 
government policies that discouraged trading activities.  
 
 
Figure 6. 2: Nanfeng mandarins 
 
According to the records, around 5,000 tonnes Nanfeng mandarins were produced 
every year before the end of 19
th
 century (Huang, 2007a). Then, the annual output 
decreased very quickly during the war period (from the end of the 19
th
 century to 
1949). In 1949, the annual output of Nanfeng mandarins decreased to only 895 tonnes 
and the cultivation area fell to 174.4 ha (Zhu, 2007). After the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, the output and cultivation area of Nanfeng 
mandarins only increased to 2,101 tonnes and 185.9 ha in 1971 because all farm land 
in China was owned by the state and collectively used by people’s communes
65
 and 
private trading activities were not permitted by the government (Zhu, 2007). The 
situation changed after the introduction of the “Household Production Responsibility 
System” in rural China in 1978 which encouraged farmers to produce agrifood 
products on their “own” land and allowed farmers to obtain the economic rewards 
from trading their products after handing a certain amount to the government, or by 
simply paying a tax in cash. In 1991, the numbers were more than 17 times that of 
                                                        
65 Collective units in rural areas with economic and political functions 
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1971, reaching 34,838 tonnes and 4,307.5 ha. Despite the winter of 1991, when the 
temperature dropped to -10.8°C and 80.27% Nanfeng mandarin trees died, the annual 
output still climbed to 35,000 tonnes in 1997 (Zhu, 2007). In 2009, 0.8 million tonnes 




Figure 6. 3: The cultivation size and output of Nanfeng mandarins 1991-2009 
Source: Local government data, unpublished 
 
The rapid growth in production is believed was stimulated by the high economic 
reward. Between 1997 and 2006, the price of Nanfeng mandarins doubled from 1.6 
RMB/ per KG to 3.2 RMB/ per KG, whilst the cultivation area expanded from 
12566.7 ha to 26666.7 ha. The direct results of quick expansion are that more than 
90% local farmers are involved in and more than 80% of the local farmers’ income is 
generated by mandarin production (Nie, 2008; Nanfeng county Government, 2011a, 
b). Nanfeng mandarins have become a major agricultural product in Nanfeng county. 
However, the price of Nanfeng mandarins decreased sharply from 2007. It was 3.0 
RMB/ per KG in 2007, 1.6 RMB/ per KG in 2008, and 1.8 RMB/ per KG in 2009 
whilst the output continued to increase from 0.5 million tonnes in 2007 to 0.8 million 
tonnes in 2009 (Figure 6.4). 
 
 
Figure 6. 4: The output and price of Nanfeng mandarins 1998-2009 




Many articles (e.g. Liang et al., 2008; Fang et al., 2009; The People’s Government of 
Fuzhou, 2009; Huang et al., 2009) indicated that the supply is not the sole reason to 
explain the decrease in market price but also concerns over quality. For instance, it 
was noted that Shatang mandarins (which has a similar shape and taste as Nanfeng 
mandarins but is not a GI product) whose output increased in the same period but 
whose price rose from less than 3.0 RMB/ per KG in 2007 to 4.4-4.6 RMB/ per KG in 
2009 (Huang et al., 2009). This interesting phenomenon caught the attention of the 
local government. To regulate farming activities, secure consistent pre-defined quality 
characteristics, and thus protect the market reputation and increase market price, the 
county government refined the national standard of Nanfeng mandarins in 2008. 
 
In fact, the first vision of the national standard of 
Nanfeng mandarins appeared very late in the 
network. In 1998, the trademark office of SAIC 
approved “Nanfeng mandarin” as a certification 
mark by the application of the Citrus Technology 
Centre of Nanfeng County (Figure 6.5). On 12 
February, 2003, following the application of the 
Association of Quality and Technical Supervision of 
Nanfeng County, the AQSIQ announced “Nanfeng mandarin” is a GI product. One 
month later, “The National Standard: Product of destination of origin or geographic 
indication — Nanfeng mandarin” (GB 19051-2003) was written out by the Jiangxi 
Provincial Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, the Fuzhou City Bureau of 
Quality and Technical Supervision, the Nanfeng county Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision, the Jiangxi Province Fuzhou City Nanfeng Mandarin Research 
Centre, and the Citrus Technology Centre of Nanfeng County, and issued by the 
AQSIQ. The 2003 national standard shows the protected area (whole Nanfeng county), 
defines the quality characteristics of Nanfeng mandarins, identifies the quality 
standards, sets the grading criteria, clarifies sampling methods, and specifies the 
production codes. In 2008, to correct some mistakes in the 2003 national standard, for 
example, it was issued as a compulsory rather than a recommended standard, and to 
meet new requirements in the network, “The National Standard: Product of 
geographic indication — Nanfeng mandarin” (GB/T 19051-2008), was written by the 
 




same drafters and issued by the AQSIQ to replace the 2003 national standard.  
 
The critical changes in the 2008 national standard are the definition of “Nanfeng 
mandarin”, the quality evaluation standards, the grading criteria, and certain 
production codes (Table 6.1). Firstly, in the 2003 national standard, “Nanfeng 
mandarin” was defined as “... produced in the protected area, with oval shape, orange 
to orange yellow colour, shiny peel, soft, juicy, sour and sweet taste, strong fragrance, 
seldom or no core, C.reticulata mandarin small size variety”. In the 2008 national 
standard, “Nanfeng mandarin” is now defined as “… produced in the protected area, 
with oval shape, orange to orange yellow colour, shiny peel, soft, juicy, sour and 
sweet taste, strong fragrance, seldom or no core, C.reticulata mandarin small size 
Nanfeng special variety”. The production area does not change between the two 
standards, but the local mandarin trees have been confirmed as a special variety
66
 
under specific government requirements. Secondly, in the 2003 national standard, 
Nanfeng mandarins have to meet three criteria: appearance, physical content (edible 
rate, soluble solids content, and total acid), and hygiene standards. But, hygiene 
standards are changed to safety standards (the pollution-free standards are added) in 
the 2008 national standard. Thirdly, Nanfeng mandarins can be graded into three 
levels according to the criteria in both national standards. But, the indices in the 2003 
national standard are stricter than the 2008 national standard. For example, the soluble 
solids content is an important index in the 2003 national standard but does not appear 
in the 2008 national standard. And, the bruising damage should not be found on the 
peel of the top level Nanfeng mandarins according to the 2003 national standard. But, 
it is allowed in the 2008 national standard. Furthermore, the organic contents and PH 
value of the soil are specified, black-spot disease is mentioned, and planting density is 
lower in the 2008 national standard. These changes clearly show that the quality 
standards in this network were not consistent. Local governments’ intention (on the 
definition), producers’ requirements (on decreasing grading indices), and consumers’ 
needs (on the safety aspect) all impacted upon the 2008 national standard. This 
refined national standard was also used by the Nanfeng Mandarin Association (NMA) 
to register “Nanfeng mandarin” as a GI product with the MoA in 2010. (General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and 
                                                        




Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China, 2003, 2008) 
 
 The National Standard: 
Product of destination of origin 
or geographic indication — 
Nanfeng mandarin (GB 
19051-2003) 
The National Standard: Product 
of geographic indication — 





... produced in the protected 
area, with oval shape, orange 
to orange yellow colour, shiny 
peel, soft, juicy, sour and sweet 
taste, strong fragrance, seldom 
or no core, C.reticulata 
mandarin small size variety 
… produced in the protected 
area, with oval shape, orange to 
orange yellow colour, shiny peel, 
soft, juicy, sour and sweet taste, 
strong fragrance, seldom or no 
core, C.reticulata mandarin small 
size Nanfeng special variety 
The grading 
criteria 
The soluble solids content is 
included; the bruising damage 
should not be found on the 
peel of top level Nanfeng 
mandarins 
The soluble solids content is not 
included; the bruising damage is 




The appearance, physical 
contents (edible rate, soluble 
solids content, and total acid), 
and hygiene standards 
The appearance (no change), 
physical contents (no change), 
and safety standards (the 




Does not mention the organic 
contents and PH value of the 
soil and black-spot disease; 
planting density is high 
(495-750 trees per ha) 
The organic contents and PH 
value of the soil and black-spot 
disease are specified; planting 
density is relatively low 
(495-630 trees per ha) 
Table 6. 1: The differences between the 2003 and 2008 national standards 
Source: “The National Standard: Product of destination of origin or geographic indication — 
Nanfeng Mandarin” (GB 19051-2003) and “Product of Geographic Indication — Nanfeng 
Mandarin” (GB/T 19051-2008) (General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine and Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China, 2003, 2008) 
 
To ensure the implementation of the national standard in the network, many notices 
and regulations were issued by the local government (Huang, 2007b; Wang et al., 
2011), such as 
 “Notice: The Usage of GI labels and the Packages of Nanfeng Mandarins”; 
 “Notice: Enhancing Quality Supervising Activities in the Harvest Season”; 
 “Managing Production Processes of Nanfeng Mandarins according to the 
National Standard”; 
 “The Technique Advices for Producing Nanfeng Mandarins”; 




Meanwhile, to enable co-ordination between different departments and avoid 
duplication of work under the three GI frameworks, the Quality Inspection and 
Marketing Regulation Office of Nanfeng Mandarins was established in 2004, formed 
by the local Police and the officers from the local AQSIQ, the local SAIC, the local 
agriculture department and other relevant departments, with the aim of inspecting the 
quality of Nanfeng mandarins on the market in the harvest season (between October 
to the following February). In 2006, to manage the network more effectively, the 
Jiangxi Province Fuzhou City Nanfeng Mandarin Research Centre and the Citrus 
Technology Centre of Nanfeng County were merged into the Nanfeng Mandarin 
Industrial Bureau. The responsibility of the new bureau is to co-operate with other 
government departments, such as the local AQSIQ, the local SAIC and the local 
agriculture department, to regulate production, research and promotional activities in 
the network. Furthermore, to help producers adopt modern technologies and involve 
in the GI system more effectively, two associations were set up with the support of the 
local government. The NMA (funded by the local government and middlemen) was 
formed in 2006, which is composed of farmers, processors, sellers and technology 
researchers and focuses on offering technological assistance to individual farmers and 
regulating marketing activities. In the following year, the Nanfeng Mandarin Research 
Association (NMRA) was established by government officers, researchers and 
technicians and concentrates on scientific research and promotes modern farming and 
storage technologies in the network.  
 
In practice, however, these government activities are not very useful in improving 
quality because of the great influence of natural factors and the weak scientific 
research abilities (The People’s Government of Fuzhou, 2009; Zhu, 2007). Firstly, as 
a GI product, certain characteristics of Nanfeng mandarins, such as shape, size and 
taste, are greatly determined by natural conditions, and thus are remarkably different 
according to location. Even within Nanfeng county, some areas are perfect for 
producing “quality” Nanfeng mandarins, and some areas are not. The ideal cultivation 
region (the suitable area) is around the town (the traditional growing area). In this area, 
the elevation is less than 100 metres, the soil is sandy and contains various organic 
compounds and the annual average temperature is higher than 18.1°C. To the east and 
west of this area, the annual average temperature decreases to between 17.6°C and 
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18.0°C and the elevation rises to 250 metres. With heavy rainfall, these areas (the 
less-suitable area) are less suitable for Nanfeng mandarin trees. In the rest of the 
territory in Nanfeng county (the unsuitable area), the average temperature drops to 
between 15.8°C and 16.7°C and the elevation reaches 400 metres, all of which are 
unsuitable conditions to produce “quality” Nanfeng mandarins at all (The People’s 
Government of Fuzhou, 2009). The expansion of the cultivation area in the last three 
decades to the whole of Nanfeng county thus brings a large amount of “low quality” 
Nanfeng mandarins into the market. Secondly, keeping the original characteristics of 
Nanfeng mandarins in the plantlet breeding process is not an easy task. It is one of the 
reasons why the cultivation area and annual output were limited to a small number 
before the 1980s (Zhu, 2007). Even though the government funded technical research 
centres (e.g. the Jiangxi Province Fuzhou City Nanfeng Mandarin Research Centre 
and the Citrus Technology Centre of Nanfeng County) advise farmers with respect to 
“better” plantlets, none of them can guarantee certain characteristics due to unstable 
generic properties. Stimulated by a desire to obtain a high income in a short period of 
time, a large amount of plantlets with unstable generic properties were planted over 
the last 3 decades (Yan, 2006; Liang et al., 2008).  
 
Most of Nanfeng mandarins are sold into the national market. According to the local 
government, only 7.45% output (0.06 million tonnes), which is controlled by a very 
different quality inspection system
67
 from the national market, was exported to 
international markets in 2009. Because more than 90% mandarins were sold in the 
national market and the quality inspection system is very different between national 
and international markets, this thesis only focuses on the national market to do the 
investigation. 
 
Within the national market, around 70% of annual output was sold to final consumers 
directly by more than 25,000 farmers
68
 and the rest around 25% annual output was 
traded by 54 trading companies in 2009 (Figure 6.6). Traditional face to face trading 
activities still dominate the network. Meanwhile, most Nanfeng mandarins are sold 
fresh between October to the following February because few companies have 
                                                        
67 Only 19 companies passed the special inspection programme run by the local AQSIQ and thus can export 
Nanfeng mandarins 
68 43,000 farms exist in the network. Some farmers not only sell their own products but also help their neighbours 
sell mandarins through charging a small amount admission fee 
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refrigeration warehouses to store mandarins and Nanfeng mandarins are not suitable 
to make juice or other products based on its small size and not very sweet taste. This 
analysis is supported by preliminary research conducted in January 2010 — many 
processing companies were closed down and the factory that the Huiyuan Group 
wanted to invest for making orange juice in 2007 was not constructed until 2010. 
 
 
Figure 6. 6: The trading pathway in the Nanfeng mandarin network 
Source: Local government data, unpublished 
 
Based on documentary and preliminary research, the local government is an important 
actor in the quality construction process of Nanfeng mandarins because it is the 
national standard maker and executor. Farmers are also main actors in the network 
involved in the production and thus quality forming processes. Some farmers even 
work as intermediaries to trade Nanfeng mandarins. The influence of technicians on 
quality cannot be ignored because the responsibilities of technicians are stabilising 
generic properties of plantlets and helping farmers cultivate mandarin trees. These 
technicians are also the main actors of the NMA and the NMRA even though both 
associations are criticised as having no authority in regulating its members’ activities 
(Huang, 2007b). Furthermore, trading companies are essential actors as they trade 
around 25% of annual outputs into the national market and may thus partly influence 
the quality forming process based on their market knowledge. So, government 
officers, farmers, technicians and intermediaries/trading companies were interviewed 
as the main actors in this investigation to explore quality development processes and 
the effectiveness of GI schemes on improving quality in the Nanfeng mandarin 
network. 
 




Almost 70% of output 
is sold by around 
25,000 farmers to final 
consumers 
Around 30% of output 
is sold by farmers to 54 
trading companies  
Around 25% of output is 
traded by 54 trading 
companies into the national 
market 
Only 7.45% of output is 
traded by 19 trading 




6.3 Profile of respondents 
 
The interviews were conducted face to face with 3 government officers, 4 farmers, 3 
technicians, and 4 intermediaries/managers of trading companies from 04 November, 
2010 to 16 November 2010, in Nanfeng county.  
 
The three government officers work for the local AQSIQ, the local SAIC, and the 
Nanfeng Mandarin Industrial Bureau. One of them contributed to the draft of the 2008 
national standard.  
 
The farmers interviewed were recommended by government officers and technicians 
and chosen by the location (“suitable” and “less-suitable” areas and the “unsuitable” 
area) rather than the size
69
 because location is believed to be the key factor 
influencing the quality of Nanfeng mandarins. Two farmer interviewees are from the 
unsuitable area. The first respondent owns a 0.3 ha farm and produces 3 tonnes of 
mandarins per year. With more than 20 tonnes of annual output, the size of the second 
farm is around 1.5 ha. The other two farms are located in “suitable” and 
“less-suitable” areas
70
. 800 Nanfeng mandarin trees
71
 are cultivated by the third 
farmer. The output of this farm is 25-35 tonnes per year which are all sold to local 
government officers directly due to the excellent taste. The last farmer has a 3.3 ha 
farm and produces around 200 tonnes mandarins per year.  
 
The technical service is mainly offered by the local government in the network. So, 
two technician interviewees were chosen from the local government technical offices, 
and one respondent was selected from a trading company which sign contracts with 
individual small-scale farmers and thus need technicians to ensure the quality. One 
officer is from the local AQSIQ, and another officer works for the Nanfeng Mandarin 
Industrial Bureau. Two of them are members of both the NMA and the NMRA.  
 
In contrast to the Gannan navel orange network, contract farming works well in the 
                                                        
69 Small-scale farms (the average farm size is 0.8 ha and 80% of farms are smaller than 0.67 ha in the county) and 
numerous hills limit the usage of modern industrial farming techniques in the county (Wang et al., 2011) 
70 The edge between the suitable area and the less-suitable area is not very clear. And, the size of the less-suitable 
area is relatively small when compared to the suitable area and the unstuitable area 
71 This farmer does not have an idea about how big his farm is, but according to the density criterion in the 
national standard, the size of his farm should be around 1.5 ha 
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Nanfeng mandarin network because unique quality characteristics of Nanfeng 
mandarins
72
 cannot be duplicated in other areas. In other words, as Nanfeng 
mandarins with certain quality characteristics can only be produced in a small area, 
buyers prefer to pay a high price for such quality which enforces the performance of 
the contract. Therefore, one trading company owner, one retailer (as intermediaries), 
and two managers (one is a factory manager and one is a large farm manager) were 
interviewed. Three of them were recommended by the government officers and the 
retailer was introduced by a technician. The trading company sells 5,000 tonnes of 
mandarins (all from “suitable” and “less-suitable” areas) under its own trademark 
every year. The retailer runs a small corner shop and helps his family (his family has a 
small farm which is around 0.7 ha and is located in the unsuitable area) and family’s 
neighbours sell the products under the GI. Around 100 tonnes of Nanfeng mandarins 
are sold by his shop every year. The first manager interviewed takes charge of a 
packaging and grading factory which processes around 200 tonnes of “quality” 
mandarins per year. These “quality” mandarins are produced by contracted farmers 
who are located in the suitable area and sold under the factory’s own trademark rather 
than the GI. Another manager runs a 300 ha farm which is located in the suitable and 
less-suitable areas, farmed by contracted farmers and produces 4,000 tonnes of 
mandarins per year. All mandarins produced by the farm are also sold under a private 
trademark rather than the GI into the market. 
 
With each respondent, more than 20 questions were asked according to the 
semi-structured interviewing guide
73
 and focused on quality evaluation criteria in the 
network, the political, social and economic influences on quality development 
processes, and the contributions of GI schemes on quality. Each interview resulted in 
a large volume of qualitative data and all answers were checked by the respondent 







                                                        
72 Quality Nanfeng mandarins can only be produced in the suitable and less-suitable areas 
73 The semi-structured interviewing guide is shown in Appendix 1 
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Respondents Personal Characteristics 
Government 
officer A 
from the local AQSIQ, a member of the NMA; 
Government 
officer B 
from the local SAIC; 
Government 
officer C 
from the Nanfeng Mandarin Industrial Bureau, contributed to the 
draft of 2008 national standard, a member of both the NMA and the 
NMRA; 
Farmer A from the unsuitable area, owns a 0.3 ha farm, produces around 3 
tonnes of mandarins every year, has a primary school certificate; 
Farmer B from the unsuitable area, owns a 1.5 ha farm, produces around 20 
tonnes of mandarins every year, has a junior school certificate; 
Farmer C  from the suitable area, owns 800 mandarin trees, produces 25-35 
tonnes of mandarins every year, sells all his mandarins to local 
government officers, has a primary school certificate; 
Farmer D from the less-suitable area
74
, owns a 3.3 ha farm, produces around 
200 tonnes of mandarins every year, did not attend school; 
Technician 
A 
from the Nanfeng Mandarin Industrial Bureau, a member of both the 
NMA and the NMRA; 
Technician 
B  
from the local AQSIQ, a member of both the NMA and the NMRA; 
Technician 
C  




sells 5,000 tonnes of mandarins (produced in “suitable” and 
“less-suitable” areas) per year under his own trademark; 
The retailer  sells 100 tonnes of mandarins (under the GI) per year for his family 
and family’s neighbours;  
The factory 
manager 
manages a packaging and grading factory which signs the contract 
with individual small-scale farmers, sells 200 tonnes “quality” 
mandarins per year under the private trademark; 
The farm 
manager 
manages a 300 ha farm which is farmed by contracted farmers and 
produces 4,000 tonnes of mandarins per year, sells mandarins under 
the private trademark, a member of the NMA. 
Table 6. 2: The characteristics of interviewees in the Nanfeng mandarin network 
 
6.4 Quality construction processes embedded in power relationships 
 
Similar to the previous case, this section is structured into four main parts. 
Concentrated on power relationships which influence production decisions and thus 
the quality, quality construction processes are explored from the perspective of 
government enforcement, the influence of organisations, economic relationships and 
other factors (Figure 6.7). Meanwhile, based on the data analysis principles discussed 
                                                        
74 As the edge between the suitable area and less-suitable area is not clear, a part of his farm can also be seen as 
located in the suitable area 
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in Chapter 4, not only the primary data collected in the interviewing, but also 
secondary data obtained through various publications, the internet and personal 
solicitation are used to explore the network and improve the validity of the data.  
 
 
Figure 6. 7: The structure of power relationships analysis section in the Nanfeng mandarin case 
 
6.4.1 Impact of government enforcement upon quality 
Beside the common food quality laws and regulations, such as the Product Quality 
Law of the P.R.C., the Food Safety Law of the P.R.C., and Agricultural Product 
Quality Safety Law of the P.R.C., all mentioned in Chapter 3, the national standard is 
issued by the government to regulate production activities and set the minimum 
standards that Nanfeng mandarins have to meet. Many specific regulations (listed in 
Section 6.2) were also published by the local government to ensure the 
implementation of the national standard. However, not only do most producers know 
little of these laws, regulations and standards but also their executors — government 
officers and technicians are not very familiar with them. As government officer B said,  
 
“Producers have to obey mandatory terms to produce their products. For example, 
some pesticides are not allowed in the production of Nanfeng mandarins according to 
the Food Safety Law… (but) only the Food Safety Law rather than others is 




For the local government, the purpose of developing the Nanfeng mandarin network 
is increasing local incomes. As “[M]ore than half of GDP of Nanfeng county is 
contributed by the Nanfeng mandarin industry” and “[S]trict quality inspection 
programme may increase inputs and thus decrease producers’ incomes and the local 
government income” (government officer A), “[N]othing needs to take special 
attention except the food safety law because the food safety crises has caught 
consumers’ attention” (government officer B). However, even though it is believed 
that only the safety aspect should take special attention, the local government 
enforcement on ensuring safety is still very weak due to the lack of officers and the 
unreliable sampling processes. As government officer C announced,  
 
“In 1979, the central government started to allow farmers growing and selling 
agrifood products individually. After that time, it was very difficult to regulate 
production and marketing activities (as there are too many small-scale farmers and 
sellers)”  
 
And, Technician B indicated, 
 
“…the local AQSIQ, SAIC, agriculture department, the Nanfeng Mandarin Industry 
Bureau, and the Quality Inspection and Marketing Regulation Office of Nanfeng 
Mandarins always ask big farms, companies and wholesalers to send mandarin 
samples for checking rather than choosing random samples by the officers or the third 
party … under such incredible sampling procedures, the results of the examination 
cannot be trusted” 
 
Except two managers and farmer C who sells his products to government officers, no 
other interviewees (except government officers) announced that the government 
officer had regulated their production activities or checked the quality of their 
products. Even for two managers and farmer C, the quality inspection programmes 
were described as very weak: “government standards are too basic” (factory 
manager), “my consumers’ requirements are stricter than government standards” 
(farm manager), and “I was asked to send my samples (rather than the government 
selecting) to quality inspection offices every month” (farmer C). Thus, some 




“…certain pesticides can not be used when growing mandarin trees, such as DDT. 
But, depending on my knowledge, some farmers still use it. It is one of the reasons 
why I said enhancing government enforcement is the most important thing for 
securing quality” 
 
With weak government enforcement, many producers even retain a wrong perception 
that chemical materials are very important to improve quality, such as keeping the 
peel smooth, and that all materials which are sold in the market are safe to use 
regardless of the amount used. For example, many farmers use special chemical 
materials to store mandarins because mandarins are not easy to be stored for more 
than 2 months without specific equipment, such as refrigeration warehouses, or 
chemical materials. But, as “producers have no idea how to use them” (technician C) 
over usage may occur. 
 
“I always use a sort of special chemical to store my mandarins. After using this 
chemical, my mandarins can be stored for more than two months, and the color will 
be changed to red. …I do not know the name of this chemical. But, it is not harmful 
for consumers’ health. …It can be sold in the corner shop (if it is harmful, it cannot be 
sold). And it is the sellers’ recommendation” (farmer B) 
 
Besides the general laws and quality inspection programmes, GI schemes are 
supposed to offer extra quality assurance to the market because the GI is a 
certification mark proving the products have met pre-set standards (Watts and 
Goodman, 1997; Parrott et al., 2002). However, all respondents pointed out that the 
quality checking stage is not included in the GI issuing procedure.  
 
As three GI frameworks co-exist and three labels are applied by different 
organisations (see Section 6.2), the local government established Nanfeng County 
Protection Office of Nanfeng Mandarins to manage three GI frameworks (including 
issuing GI labels) and to minimise the duplication of work. But, the ability of this 
office on ensuring quality through the GI issuing procedure is questionable. Farmers 
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interviewed indicated that they can get GI labels for free
75
 without application or 
quality checking stages, and trading companies/ intermediaries announced they are 
required to hand the application form in and pay for GI labels but without proceeding 
through the quality checking stage as well. Government officers and technicians 
explained it is because the quality characteristics are defined too flexibly in the 
national standard, relevant production codes are not very useful in improving certain 
quality characteristics, the financial input that the national standard required is 
unaffordable for most of farmers, and the national standard is not forcibly adopted. 
Firstly, the purposes of issuing the national standard are to develop the GI network 
and thus effectively “increase[ing] rural incomes” (government officer A). So, in face 
of “rapid expansion of the planning area and quick changing genetic properties”, 
because “lacking relevant research ability to well define Nanfeng mandarins” 
(government officer C), the local government has no choice but define the quality 
characteristics of “Nanfeng mandarin” very flexibly with reference to the national 
standard to ensure all mandarins produced in Nanfeng county meet the standard. 
Ironically such an approach fails to distinguish fake from genuine Nanfeng mandarins 
as a consequence of the government’s need to improve incomes of local producers. 
 
“… the office sends samples to the laboratories for examining the level of remaining 
pesticide and the physical indices, such as the sweetness, acidity, and soluble solid 
materials contamination … Depending on my experience, no samples fail the 
examination. It does not mean the quality of these mandarin samples is good. Due to 
very flexible standards, it is impossible for the most of Nanfeng mandarins, even for 
mandarins growing outside of Nanfeng county, to fail it” (Technician A) 
 
Secondly, the effectiveness of the national standard on improving certain quality 
characteristics, such as the taste, is questionable. The natural factors rather than 
farming technology/skills have been proved to have a greater impact on the taste.  
 
“Several national standard testing districts have been set up from 2005 … The quality 
(taste and appearance) of Nanfeng mandarins from these districts are better than 
mandarins produced in neighbouring areas because the plantlets are carefully chosen 
                                                        
75 The government officers send GI lables to different villages and farmers can use them as many as they like 
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before planting, a large amount of financial input has been paid to these districts to 
build modern agricultural systems, and these districts are carefully managed 
according to the national standard. But, compared with Nanfeng mandarins from the 
traditional planting area, the taste is still not so good. …The trees planted in the old 
time always produce tastier mandarins than new trees (due to the quick changing 
generic properties). And the natural environment around the town is more suitable to 
produce Nanfeng mandarins” (Government officer A) 
 
Thirdly, the financial input that the national standard required is difficult to afford for 
most small-scale local farmers. Many mandarin farms in Nanfeng county do not even 
have the necessary electric power to set up a modern irrigation system. The local 
government and banks also refuse to offer financial support because of a lack of a full 
developed credit mechanism. Technician B specified, 
 
“Several years ago, the government asked local banks to provide a loan for farmers 
to buy farming equipment, which is around 30,000 RMB for each farm. But, most 
farmers use this loan to buy what they want to buy, such as motor bikes. The worse 
thing is a lot of farmers refuse to pay their loan back. Today, it is difficult for local 
farmers to borrow money from the bank” 
 
Furthermore, the national standard is even broken by the government. For example, in 
order to bring a high income for more farmers,  
 
“… the Fuzhou city government, which Nanfeng county government is managed by, 
announced that ‘Nanfeng mandarin’ is a variety
76
 rather than a GI product. The 
expansion policy thus issued in 2007 encouraged all 10 counties governed by Fuzhou 
city to produce Nanfeng mandarins” (technician C) 
 
Under this circumstance, government officer B pointed out, “the national standard is 
not forcibly adopted as ‘Nanfeng mandarin’ is believed to be a variety”. 
 
                                                        
76 This opinion is added into the 2008 national standard 
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Based on respondents, the production activities in the Nanfeng mandarin network are 
not limited by general laws, regulations and the GI standard mainly because of an 
ineffective quality inspection system, missing quality checking stage in the GI issuing 
procedure, worthless production codes and the wrong opinion that the national 
standard is voluntary rather than compulsory. As the quality development process is 
not greatly influenced by the national standard, almost all interviewees (include 
government officers and technicians) indicated the GI works as a sort of marketing 
technique rather than a certification sign in the network. Many producers thus refuse 
to apply GI labels on their products because “…everybody can use them to show their 
mandarins are Nanfeng mandarins even for those mandarins from other counties. It is 
totally meaningless” (farmer A). 
 
6.4.2 Impact of organisational influence upon quality 
Funded by the local government, two associations — the NMA and the NMRA, were 
established in the network
77
. The NMA is formed by “technical officers, suppliers 
(pesticide, fertiliser, machine and plantlets sellers), farmers, and middlemen” 
(technician A) and the NMRA is formed by “government officers and technicians” 
(technician C). Even though these two associations were formed by different actors 
with different purposes initially — the NMA was formed to apply the GI and manage 
the whole network and the NMRA was formed to enhance the scientific research and 
modern technology distribution, both of which focus on technology diffusion (which 
is one of the government departments’ responsibilities) in the contemporary network 
according to the respondents. The responsibilities of NMA are “sending 2 notices to 
each village per year to help farmers cultivate their mandarin trees in a more 
scientific way” and organising the members of the association to “investigate different 
villages twice per year, which normally relate to technique issues” (technician A), and 
the responsibility of the NMRA is “distributing relevant technical information to 
farmers” (technician C). Two associations are thus described as “government 
branches” and have a minimum impact on production activities because “with little 
financial fund from the government and few officers” (government officer C) 
producers “can not get any benefit from these associations” (government officer B).  
 
                                                        
77 The Association of Quality and Technical Supervision of Nanfeng County was set only for GI application 
 
 159 
In the research, registered co-operatives formed by individual farmers were not found 
as local farmers are used to produce and sell mandarins by themselves
78
. But, contract 
farming was found in the network and is believed to be an effective way to regulate 
production activities and thus ensure certain quality characteristics by many 
interviewees, especially government officers.  
 
Two investigated contract farming companies are located in the suitable and 
less-suitable areas because “[T]he unsuitable area is not able to produce tasty 
mandarins” (farm manager). Both companies sign contracts with individual farmers 
each farming year. Under the contract, farmers can only use the fertilisers, pesticides, 
and other farming materials purchased by the companies, and cultivate their mandarin 
trees according to the requirements of companies’ technicians who inspect the farms 
regularly. To ensure that contracted farmers sell their products to the companies rather 
than other middlemen, the contracted price paid to farmers is always “around 20-30% 
higher than the average market price” (farm manager). In some years, when the 
market price is too low, the companies even pay a higher than the contracted price to 
maintain good relationships with farmers.  
 
“… my company pays a high price to purchase mandarins produced by contracted 
farmers. Last year, the price was more than 50% higher than the average market 
price because the average market price was too low which could not even cover 
farmers’ inputs. But, if a farmer breaks the production codes, my company will stop 
buying his products. It means he has to sell his products to market at a relatively low 
price” (factory manager)  
 
If farmers produce mandarins according to contracted production codes, both farmers 
and companies will obtain satisfactory incomes by this production model. On the one 
hand, farmers can receive a high economic reward under the contract. Based on local 
government data (unpublished), contracted farmers sold their products around 2.8 
RMB per KG in 2009 while the average market price was 1.8 RMB per KG. On the 
other hand, the companies can get “quality” products through contracted farmers. As 
such “quality characteristics” can meet specific consumers’ requirements (undertaken 
                                                        
78 The cultivation history of Nanfeng mandarins is very long. But, as the output historically was very low, local 
farmers prefer to sell their mandarins individually (Tang, 2006) 
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carefully market investigation) and thus charge a relatively high price in the market, 
contracted companies can also obtain a high profit. 
 
“With detailed market investigation, my company has made its own production codes 
and quality standards to regulate contracted farmers’ activities …If the quality of my 
products increases, I can sell the products for an even higher price on the market … 
last year, the highest price consumers paid for my mandarins was 28 RMB per KG ... 
So, for me, it is not difficult to pay a high price to farmers” (farmer manager) 
 
As farmers’ activities can be regulated through commercial contracts effectively, this 
approach is believed to be an appropriate way to secure the quality of Nanfeng 
mandarins by government officers, 
 
“I would like to expand this model around the county … contract farming is an 
effective way in securing and improving quality. Participators are combined by 
contracts very tightly and companies can totally control farmers’ activities according 
to contracts” (government officer A) 
 
However, there is a big problem with the expansion of this model. Not many modern 
companies choose Nanfeng county to locate their business because “25 million tonnes 
of similar products are produced in China every year” (government officer C) and 
“most of the area in Nanfeng county is unsuitable for growing Nanfeng mandarins” 
(farm manager). As almost all local trading companies are too small to afford the 
detailed market analysis programme (trading company owner)
79
, less than 8% annual 
outputs were produced through this model in 2009.  
 
Within the Nanfeng mandarin network, contracted companies have a greater influence 
on the quality forming process than government funded associations. However, as 
both investigated companies set their production codes and quality criteria based on 
consumers’ requirements through market investigation and sell their products under 
private trademarks rather than the GI, the specific impact of GI schemes on enhancing 
quality through the contract farming system is still highly limited in the network. 
                                                        





6.4.3 Impact of economic relationships upon quality 
In 2003, only 30% of local farmers’ income was generated by Nanfeng mandarin 
production (Liu and Qiu, 2006). In 2009, the number had risen to 80% (Nanfeng 
county Government, 2011a, b). As Nanfeng mandarins have became the most 
important agrifood product for local farmers and it is difficult to continue to expand 
the farming area in the county (limited lands), how to increase its market price is 
becoming a critical issue in the network.  
 
The decreasing price is believed not to have been caused by the increasing output but 
relative lower quality in comparison to similar products, such as Shatang mandarins, 
by researchers and the government (e.g. Liang et al., 2008; Fang et al., 2009; The 
People’s Government of Fuzhou, 2009; Huang et al., 2009). However, farmers from 
the unsuitable area refuse to improve quality through inceasing inputs (such as 
establishing a modern irrigation system) due to unchangeable natural conditions and 
the cost of investment. Based on the data offered by the local government officers, the 
average income that a mandarin farm can generate was 32,496 RMB per ha in 2008 
and 41,526 RMB per ha in 2009. But the average farms’ input for pesticides, 
fertilisers and workers was 27,000 RMB per ha in 2008 and 29,700 RMB per ha in 
2009. As the average mandarin farm size is less than 0.8 ha in Nanfeng county, 
without any financial support from the government and the local banks, there is little 
incentive for farmers to improve quality by increasing the input. Indeed, the income 
of farmers located in the unsuitable area is even lower because what buyers pay for 
mandarins from the unsuitable area is always lower than average price due to the “low 
quality” (bad taste). Some farmers only received 1.2 RMB per KG
80
 in the market in 
2009 (technician A). Meanwhile, as the average price of Nanfeng mandarins is 
believed also to be influenced by the total mandarin supply in the national market 
(high supply causes low average price in the market), increasing output of Nanfeng 
mandarins from other counties
81
 further decreases the incentive of risk adverse 
farmers (see also Hennessy, 1998) located in the unsuitable area to improve the 
quality of their products. As farmer B complained,  
                                                        
80 The average market price was 1.8 RMB per KG in 2009 
81 According to the local government data (unpublished), the cultivation area of Nanfeng mandarins in Fuzhou 




“The price is decided by the market (total supply) rather than me. And, no matter 
what I do, the quality of my mandarins is always not as good as mandarins from 
certain areas…quality can be partly improved by increasing the input, but, I do not 
know whether the increased cost can be covered by future income” 
 
Therefore, two farmers from the unsuitable area declared they never water their trees 
and do not use organic fertilisers at all, as they “may not get a suitable income by 
increasing the input” (the retailer). A negative taste forming circle in the unsuitable 
area is formed (Figure 6.8).  
 
  
Figure 6. 8: The negative taste forming circle in the unsuitable area 
 
Only farmers from more suitable areas prefer to improve the quality of their products 
through increasing the input because even though the average market price is low, 
final consumers and trading companies/intermediaries still prefer to pay a high price 
for tasty mandarins. Their inputs can be totally covered by price differentiation. As 
farmer C explained,  
 
“I never sell my mandarins to wholesalers. There are a lot of local consumers who 
prefer to pay a high price for my products because they know the taste of my products 
is great, even if my price was double or triple average market price. All of my 
mandarins are sold very quickly each year … (in this year) the average price for 
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Nanfeng mandarins is around 3.6 RMB per KG due to the weather (which influences 
the total output). But, my mandarins can be sold around 8-12 RMB per KG”  
 
Thus, two farmers from suitable and less-suitable areas “choose good plantlets” and 
“use organic fertilisers” to cultivate their mandarin trees for a high economic reward.  
 
For all farmers interviewed, quality is identical to taste rather than the safety or the 
appearance which is listed in the national standard. Firstly, they are not forced to 
ensure safety of their products under weak government enforcement. And, securing 
safety is not perceived as the means to bring high income for them because consumers 
and trading companies/intermediaries never check the safety level of their products. 
As trading company owner indicated, “I have no ability to check the safety level of 
mandarins. And, consumers do not have such ability either although they prefer to 
buy safety mandarins”. Secondly, quick changing consumers’ preferences on 
appearance make farmers realise it is difficult to catch consumers’ appearance 
preferences and thus obtain a high income. As farmer D specified, 
 
“In my farm, the price for quality mandarins is 8 RMB per KG, and for low quality 
mandarins is around 4 RMB per KG. The price difference is mainly based on colour 
rather than size. … Some years ago, mandarins with a small size can be sold with a 
high price. But, in the last three years, my consumers prefer the red colour rather than 
the small size” 
 
In the Nanfeng mandarin network, the quality forming process is greatly influenced 
by actors who hold “purchasing power” as farmers always make their production 
decisions after carefully calculating the input and future incomes. It is also the reason 
why contracted farmers prefer to produce their products according to contracted 
companies’ requirements. Although many production codes have to be obeyed, 
contracted farmers can obtain a high income at the end of the farming season.  
 
6.4.4 Impact of other factors upon quality 
Beside the political, organisational and economic relationships between main actors in 
the network, producers’ production activities as well as quality development processes, 
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are also impacted by many other factors, such as natural factors, the education level of 
producers, and the local individual selling culture.  
 
All respondents indicated the location and unstable generic properties are critical 
factors which influence quality as defined by taste and appearance of Nanfeng 
mandarins. For example, old mandarin trees always produce Nanfeng mandarins of a 
small size, and tasty mandarins are always produced in the suitable area. Even though 
natural factors can be shaped by human intentions, such as picking mandarins in three 
batches can change the colour of some mandarins by increasing exposure to the sun 
and mandarins with good taste can be produced by carefully choosing plantlets, like a 
GI product, the natural influence on quality cannot be ignored. As technician C 
described,  
 
“If Nanfeng mandarin trees move to other counties, the taste will be changed (due to 
the changing natural environment) … The taste of Nanfeng mandarins which grow 
around the town is better than that from other areas, because there are many old trees, 
the soil contains a lot of organic materials, and the weather is more suitable for 
producing mandarins than other areas” 
 
Under a great natural influence, combined with economic consideration, production 
activities are therefore different between more suitable and unsuitable areas.  
 
Meanwhile, all farmers interviewed have a low education level. The low education 
level and their accompanying short term view make it is difficult for local farmers to 
attend technical introduction courses, to familiarise themselves with different 
pesticides through reading relevant materials and to co-operate together to investigate 
the market. As Technician A declared, “it is difficult for farmers to learn or think 
something unless they can get economic rewards immediately”. And, farmer D said, 
“[S]ome introduction courses were run in the village in the last year. But I did not 
attend the course because I will not be paid for attending”.  
 
Also, as local farmers prefer to sell their products individually, it is not easy for 
trading companies (rather than contracted trading companies) and intermediaries to 
impact production activities through their market knowledge and thus obtain a higher 
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economic reward in the network. Only contracted trading companies, who control less 
than 8% annual outputs in 2009, can manage quality construction processes under 
pre-set production codes through a high payment to contracted farmers. Like of 
effective middlemen in the network may limit the response speed of local farmers to 
market requirements. Thus, farmer C and farmer D announced “catching consumers’ 
needs is difficult” and “[I]t is worthless to change the appearance of my products to 
meet quickly changing consumer needs”. 
 
Natural factors, producers’ education level and the local culture, all have a certain 
impact on production activities and thus the quality characteristics of Nanfeng 
mandarins. But, it should be noticed that the quality may also be impacted by many 
other factors. For example, the cultivation experience may influence the production 
activities and thus products’ taste level. And, the number of government technicians 




As a product with more than 1,300 years production history, “Nanfeng mandarin” was 
registered as a GI product in 1998, 2003 and 2010 with three Chinese GI frameworks 
under a desire of the government to increase local farmers’ income. However, the data 
has shown that GI status alone cannot bring a high income to its producers 
automatically in the Nanfeng mandarin network. A premium income can only be 
generated by “superior quality” aligned to management and organisational skills 
influenced by the market. 
 
Although the network developed under local government support, government 
enforcement on securing certain quality characteristics based on the national standard 
and relevant laws and regulations is very weak. As government funded associations 
also cannot regulate production activities and the quality checking stage is not 
involved in the GI issuing procedure, the quality characteristics of Nanfeng mandarins 
is mainly decided by the economic relationships in the network despite the influence 
of other factors, such as the natural environment. Contracted companies are thus 
becoming powerful actors in the quality development process based on their 
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“purchasing power”. Compared with contracted trading companies, the impact of 
normal trading companies/intermediaries on quality forming processes is much 
weaker under individual selling culture and weak marketing research abilities.  
 
6.6 Chapter summary 
 
Similar to the last case study, the first theme of the chapter focused on introducing the 
background of the Nanfeng mandarin network and identifying the main actors 
involved in the quality forming process based on documentary and preliminary 
research. The second theme of the chapter concentrated on examining power 
relationships between different actors to explore the impact of GI schemes on 
developing quality. The results show that under weak government enforcement and 
inappropriate GI issuing procedures, most producers only focus on economic rewards 
to provide “quality” characteristics. The effectiveness of GI schemes on improving 
quality is highly limited in this network.  
 
The analysis raises several important issues with respect to the quality of Chinese GI 
agrifood products. Firstly, the influence of long production history on the quality may 
vary in different contexts. Secondly, compared with GI schemes, contract farming 
with conventional production codes may be a more effective method in securing 
certain quality characteristics especially when the local government and associations 
struggle to regulate individual production activities based on GI standards and when a 
high price is paid to contracted farmers by purchasers. Thirdly, the local government 
may yet play a critical role in the Chinese GI system. Its political orders can add to or 
weaken the national standard. These findings seems very different from the previous 
case of “Gannan navel orange” in which middlemen are “powerful actors” involved in 
quality forming processes, contract farming does not work well, and the impact of 
local government on quality is limited. To continue to explore the effectiveness of GI 
schemes on developing quality and obtain a more comprehensive understanding of GI 






Chapter 7: A GI Case Study: Wuyuan Green Tea 
 
“Legend claims that tea was discovered in 2737 B.C. by an ancient Chinese 
emperor. … In modern Chinese culture, tea is consumed all day long both for its 
ceremonial and cultural significance, and for its taste. The three most common types 
of tea used are Black, Green and Oolong. …The light and mildly sweet flavor of 
Green tea contrasts sharply with the heavier taste of Oolong and Black tea” 




GI schemes are supposed to secure certain quality characteristics of agrifood products 
but Chinese GI products may be an exception. Based on socio-economic theory and 
networks approach and focusing on power relationships, Chapters 5 and 6 have 
provided a detailed analysis of quality construction processes in the Gannan navel 
orange network and the Nanfeng mandarin network and have revealed the 
ineffectiveness of GI schemes on developing quality in these two cases. However, the 
investigation also shows, under different contexts, quality construction processes in 
GI networks may not be the same. To obtain a comprehensive understanding of 
quality development processes of Chinese GI agrifood products and further develop 
this empirical contribution, Chapter 7 chooses a very different product from oranges 
and mandarins to extend this investigation.  
 
The Wuyuan green tea network is very different from the previous two networks. 
Firstly, processors are involved in the network. Secondly, a long co-operation culture 
between producers and sellers in the Wuyuan green tea network may enhance the 
influence of contract farming on quality. The role that history/culture plays in quality 
forming processes can be further examined. Thirdly, dissimilar to oranges and 
mandarins, green tea products are drunk directly without peels. The safety aspect may 
thus attract more attention in this network rather than the previous two. As Wuyuan 
green tea may offers several interesting counterpoints to oranges and mandarins, 
further useful insights of quality forming processes in Chinese GI system may be 




As with the last two chapters, Chapter 7 provides a comprehensive analysis of quality 
construction processes in a GI network of Wuyuan green tea based on the 
socio-economic theory and network approach and focuses on power relationships. 
Again, two main themes are presented in this chapter. One provides a background to 
the product mainly based on documentary research and preliminary research which 
was undertaken in October 2010. Key actors involved in the quality forming process 
are indentified at the end of this theme. The other one is dedicated to data analysis. 
After examining 14 respondents’ interviews, the power relationships between the 
main actors are explored to show the quality development process of Wuyuan green 
tea. Finally, the chapter concludes with a short summary. 
 
7.2 Historical background 
 
China was the first country in the world to cultivate tea trees. Six counties (Jixi, 
Qimen, Wuyuan, Xi, Xiuning, and Yi) called the Huizhou area are located in or near 
the northeast of Jiangxi province, and are traditional areas to grow tea trees in China. 
In these six counties, Wuyuan county is described as the “hometown of the green tea” 
because green tea products produced in Wuyuan county was recorded in “Tea 
Classics” in the Tang Dynasty (1300 years ago) and was called “a fantastic product” 
in the Song Dynasty (1000 years ago) (Cheng and Li, 2006). 
 
Wuyuan county is located in the northeast of 
Jiangxi province between latitudes 117°22'E and 
118°11'E and longitudes 29°01'N and 29°35'N 
(Figure 7.1). According to the government, with 
more than 500 meters average altitude (more than 
80% area in Wuyuan county is filled with 
mountains and hills), high annual average 
temperature (16.8°C), short annual average 
sunshine time (1715.1 hours), and high annual 
average rainfall amounts (1962.3mm), the county 
is a perfect place to grow tea trees. 
 
Figure 7. 1: The location of 




Tea is an important agrifood product for local farmers to earn their living in the 
Huizhou area. Since the 18th Century, green tea products from this area have been 
sold into international markets under the name of “China green tea”. With frequent 
trading activities, the small-scale co-operatives appeared from 1878 to enhance the 
communication between local traders. To be able to obtain a high economic reward in 
the market, encouraged by the government, small-scale co-operatives in this area were 
merged into the “Tea Co-operative of Huizhou” in 1930. With large quantity outputs 
(several thousand tonnes per year), this co-operative controlled several large cities’ tea 
markets in the south of China, such as Shanghai and Guangzhou, through setting a 
monopoly price and forcing its members to co-operate. Stimulated by a high 
monopoly income, the tea output in the Huizhou area increased sharply. For example, 
the annual green tea output in Wuyuan county was 800 tonnes in 1930 but 1250 
tonnes in 1936. This monopoly profitable tea market attracted the government’s 
attention. In 1939, the “Tea Production and Distribution Co-operative” was set up by 
the government instead of the “Tea Co-operative of Huizhou”. According to the 
government policy, all tea products produced in the Huizhou area had to be sold to the 
new co-operative and the co-operative also was obliged to purchase these tea products. 
Under this mass buying policy, the output increased even quicker than before, as 
annual green tea output in Wuyuan county jumped from 1250 tonnes in 1936 to 2300 
tons in 1938. More than 90% of farms in Wuyuan county were involved in the tea 
industry in this period. However, accompanying the dramatic increase in output, the 
average quality and the market price of tea products from the Huizhou area declined. 
Facing an unprofitable market, the “Tea Production and Distribution Co-operative” 
disbanded in 1940. Without mass buying policy, the annual green tea output in 
Wuyuan county decreased steeply to around 1,500 tonnes in 1941, and continually 
dropped over the following years to 750 tonnes in 1949. After the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, as a state monopoly policy for purchasing and 
marketing tea products was issued, tea production in Wuyuan county rose again to 
2,500 tonnes in 1976, and increased faster after the introduction of the “Household 
Production Responsibility System” to 4,350 tonnes in 1986. But, at the beginning of 
1990s, the monopoly policy was cancelled because the Soviet-style centrally planned 
economy was replaced by the market-oriented system in China. It means local tea 





 do not have suitable abilities to develop and protect the market, the market 
price and output of Wuyuan green tea decreased. At the end of the 1980s, more than 
half of the county tax was contributed by green tea production. But, in 2004, only less 
than 7% of local GDP (0.13 billion RMB) was generated by the local green tea 
industry. (Lv, 2001; Gu, 2005; Cheng, 2006; Xiong, 2007; Hong and Yang, 2009) 
 
In order to increase local farmers’ income and 
GDP, the local government decided to develop 
the green tea industry at the beginning of the 
21
st
 Century through increasing the input (2 
million RMB per year — 1.58% of local 
government income in 2004) and establishing 
the Tea Industry Development Committee 
(which is supervised by the Mayor directly) 
and the Wuyuan County Tea Association 
(WCTA) to regulate the farming, processing 
and marketing activities. Registering “Wuyuan 
green tea” as a GI was also considered as an effective way to promote Wuyuan green 
tea products in the market and thus improve farmers’ incomes. In 2005, supported by 
the local government, “Wuyuan green tea” was approved as a certification mark by 
the trademark office of the SAIC through the application of the WCTA (Figure 7.2). 
In 2008, following the application of the Tea Industry Centre, the AQSIQ issued 
No.122 notice which announced protection “Wuyuan green tea” as a GI product 
(General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, 2008). In 
2010, “Wuyuan green tea” was registered as a GI product in the GI framework run by 
the MoA through the application of the Wuyuan County Tea Technology Promotion 
Center. Within the application processes, 8 provincial production and processing 
standards of “Pollution-free Wuyuan Green Tea” and “Organic Wuyuan Green Tea” 
were issued in 2006. They are: 
 “Quality Requirements of Organic Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 494-2006);  
 “Management System of Organic Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 495-2006); 
 “Labeling and Marketing Organic Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 496-2006); 
                                                        
82 The average tea farm size in Wuyuan county is around 0.51 ha in 2010 (The Statistic Bureau of Jiangxi and 
Jiangxi investigation team of the National Statistic Bureau, 2011) 
Figure 7. 2: The trademark of 
“Wuyuan green tea” 
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 “Producing Technique Standards of Organic Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 
497-2006); 
 “Processing Technique Standards of Organic Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 
498-2006); 
 “Producing Technique Standards of Pollution-free Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 
499-2006); 
 “Processing Technique Standards of Pollution-free Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 
500-2006);  
 “Quality Standards of Pollution-free Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 501-2006).  
 
The pre-set GI quality standards of Wuyuan green tea were made based on these 
provincial standards. For example, “Quality Standards of Wuyuan Green Tea” issued 
by the AQSIQ is a simplified copy (less than 1,000 words) of the three provincial 
standards of “Pollution-free Wuyuan Green Tea” (General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, 2008).  
 
With the support of the local government, the average market price, cultivation size 
and output of Wuyuan green tea increased very quickly over the last decade. The 
average price was 27,800 RMB per tonne in 2002, 53,103 RMB per tonne in 2006, 
and 103,659 RMB per tonne in 2010. The cultivation size was 8,800 ha in 2002, 9,180 
ha in 2006, and 11,000 ha in 2010. The output was 4,000 tonnes in 2002, 5,800 tonnes 
in 2006, and 8,200 tonnes in 2010 (Figure 7.3). In 2010, the green tea industry 
contributed 17.82% annual GDP of Wuyuan county. 
 
 
Figure 7. 3: The cultivation size, output and output value of Wuyuan green tea 2002-2010 
Source: Local government data, unpublished 
 
Local farmers’ income also increased when the output value rose. In 2005, the green 
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tea production only contributed 520 RMB (15.47%) to the average local farmers’ 
income. In 2010, this number rose to 1250 RMB (23.68%). Today, more than 85% 
local farms are involved in the Wuyuan green tea network. In the northern mountain 
area of the county, 50% of rural incomes come from green tea production and 
distribution. 
 
Two product categories are included in the Wuyuan green tea network. One is called 
the supreme green tea which is made by the shoots with one, two or three tender 
leaves (Figure 7.4). With a low output (16.1% of annual green tea output in 2010) and 
a good taste, it can be sold at a high price in the market (several hundred RMB per 
KG to 40,000 RMB per KG in 2010). Another type is called the refined green tea 
which is made by normal tea leaves (Figure 7.5). With a high volume output (83.9% 
of annual green tea output in 2010) and “modest” taste, it can only be sold with a low 
price in the market (10 to 200 RMB per KG in 2010) (Figure 7.6).  
 
 
Figure 7. 6: The outputs of supreme and refined Wuyuan green tea products 2003-2010 
Source: Local government data, unpublished 
 
In fact, the price of the refined green tea has barely changed from the end of 1980s to 
 
Figure 7. 4: The supreme Wuyuan green tea 
 
Figure 7. 5: The refined Wuyuan green tea 
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the middle 2000s. According to the research of Yan (2007), the average price of the 
refined Wuyuan green tea was 8.8 RMB per KG in 1987. Over two decades, the 
average price rose by only 14% to 10 Yuan per KG in 2006. Compared with pork, the 
price of which rose more than 10 times in the same period, the price of refined 
Wuyuan green tea products was relatively static. Therefore, the local government 
decided to adopt an organic strategy to promote the refined Wuyuan green tea based 
on the market investigation. After publishing 5 provincial standards of organic 
Wuyuan green tea in 2006, the local government started to encourage local farmers to 
accept these standards by offering subsidies from 2007. Stimulated by the subsidies 
and a relatively high market price (more than 50% higher than non-organic products), 
the output of organic Wuyuan green tea increased very quickly, from 1,800 tonnes in 
2005 to 3,100 tonnes in 2010. The output value rose even faster under the government 
promotion, from 40 million RMB in 2005 to 105 million RMB in 2010.  
 
Harvested fresh tea shoots and leaves have to be processed before selling (Figure 7.7 
and 7.8). In today’s network, almost all refined tea products and most supreme tea 
products are processed by machines and only some top quality supreme tea products 
are still processed by hand
83
. As green tea products have to be processed as quickly as 
possible due to the consideration of taste, and because it is impossible for small-scale 
farmers to buy processing machines individually, more than 100 processing 
factories/companies appear in the network. On the one hand, these processing 
factories/companies help farmers not only to decrease cost but also simplified the 
processing stage (many farmers lack a relevant experience of processing tea products, 
especially supreme tea products). On the other hand, machine-made supreme tea 
products are always criticised by some consumers because of “inappropriate” 
techniques compared to the traditional way. With more than 1000 years’ tea drinking 
history, drinking tea products in China has developed its own art form called “Chinese 
Tea Culture”. Within this culture, drinking hand making supreme tea products is 
believed to bring a better individual experience based on shape, smell, colour and so 
on. Therefore, small amount of top supreme green tea products still processed by hand 
of experienced farmers to meet some consumers’ requirements and obtain a high 
economic reward.  
                                                        






Figure 7. 7: The processing process of the supreme Wuyuan green tea  
Source: “Processing Technique Standards of Pollution-free Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 
500-2006) (Jiangxi Province Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 7. 8: The processing process of the refined Wuyuan green tea  
Source: “Processing Technique Standards of Pollution-free Wuyuan Green Tea” (DB36/T 
500-2006) (Jiangxi Province Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, 2006) 
 
In the most of time, Wuyuan green tea products do not sell to final consumers directly 
by farmers because of low consumption quantity per person in China — 0.76 KG per 
person per year in 2009 (Guan and Qiu, 2011; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2011) and local trading history. Therefore, middlemen are becoming important actors 
in the network. In fact, not only does traditional middlemen but some processors trade 
green tea products as middlemen in contemporary network. But, according to the local 
government, the average output value of most of middlemen and processors is less 
than 0.5 million RMB, and only 35 companies’ annual revenue was higher than 5 
million RMB in 2010. According to Xiong (2007), small-scale middlemen/processors 
prefer to trade their products under the GI because the price of Wuyuan green tea is 
higher than similar products
84
. But, many middle to large-scale middlemen/processors 
would like to sell their products under their own trademarks (with or without the GI), 
such as Linsheng, Yayu, Yuanfa, Wulongshang, and Dazhangshan, as the quality of 
Wuyuan green tea sold by small-scale middlemen/processors are very unstable. These 
                                                        
84 For example, the average price of green tea products produced in Fuliang county which is next to Wuyuan 
county was 58.47 RMB per KG and that of Wuyuan green tea products was 103.66 RMB per KG in 2010 (Local 
government data, unpublished) 
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small-scale middlemen/processors are criticised only focusing on their own profit, 
rather than the whole industry, to market their products.  
 
Based on documentary and preliminary research, the main actors involved in quality 
construction processes of Wuyuan green tea are: government officers, farmers, 
processors, middlemen, and three GI application organisations who are GI holders 
and may thus influence quality forming processes through the GI issuing procedure. 
They were intended to be interviewed as the main actors in this investigation to 
explore the quality development process of Wuyuan green tea and the effectiveness of 
GI schemes on enhancing quality. Like the last two cases, as only 12% of the annual 
output value was contributed by international markets in 2010 by only 6 exporting 
companies who were accredited by the local AQSIQ and thus running under very 
different quality regulatory system, this case study only focuses on the national 
market.   
 
7.3 Profile of respondents 
 
This investigation was conducted face to face with 5 government officers, 3 farmers, 
3 processors, and 3 middlemen from 15 December, 2010 to 28 December, 2010, in 
Wuyuan county as all three GI applicants are not independent and managed by and 
located in the Tea Industry Bureau of Wuyuan County.  
 
The first government officer interviewed is from a village located in the flatland area 
where most farmers do not rely on tea production to live because quality/high price 
green tea products can only be produced in the mountain area due to natural 
conditions. Two officers are from the Tea Industry Bureau — one is a leader of the 
bureau and also in charge of managing the GI system and another one is a technical 
officer who attended all three GI application processes. The last two officers are from 
the local AQSIQ and the local agriculture department. The one from the local 
agriculture department contributed to the draft of the provincial standards.  
 
Government officers and processors recommended five farmers for the investigation. 
But, as winter is not a suitable season to get into the mountain area, only two farmers 
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from the mountain area and one from the flatland area were interviewed. The first 
farmer has a 0.3 ha farm located in the mountain area. All his products, 500-600 KG 
fresh organic tea shoots and leaves per year, are sold to contracted processors. The 
second farmer is also from the mountain area. His village was mentioned by many 
respondents as an ideal place to grow tea trees due to the specific natural environment 
(Figure 7.9). This farmer processes the refined green tea by machine and the supreme 
green tea by hand and sells his products around 250 KG per year (1 KG processed 
green tea product is normally made by 4 KG fresh tea leaves) to middlemen. The last 
farmer is located in the flatland area (Figure 7.10). His 0.3 ha farm produces 400-500 
KG fresh tea shoots and leaves per year which are all sold to contracted processors. 
All of these farmers are small-scale farmers because under the “Household Production 
Responsibility System”, with large numbers of local farmers, large-scale farms are 
difficult to find in the county (government officer B).  
 
 
All processors are recommended by government officers with medium to large 
production scale because almost all small-scale processing factories have a very 
limited influence on the quality aspect
85
. The first respondent is a manager of a big 
processing company which is contracted with local farmers and processes 0.3 million 
tonnes of fresh tea shoots and leaves each year. More than 7,000 tonnes of processed 
green tea products which are worth several hundred million RMB are sold to tea drink 
making companies by this processor every year. The company that the second 
interviewee has worked for 15 years focuses on processing organic green tea products 
                                                        
85 These small-scale processing factories only offer old semi-automatic machines for farmers to process fresh tea 
leaves or shoots. After paying an admission fee, individual farmers still need to control the processing process by 
themselves 
 
Figure 7. 9: The tea farm of farmer B 
Source: Offered by farmer B 
 
Figure 7. 10: The tea farm of farmer C 
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according to its buyers’ requirements. Less than 20 tonnes of organic green tea 
products, which are worth around 2 million RMB, are sold to wholesalers by this 
company per year. The company that the last respondent manages not only processes 
green tea products but also has several retail tea shops. The turnover of this company 
is 2,000 tonnes and 100 million RMB per year. All these processors are contracted 
with local farmers and sell green tea products under their own trademarks with or 
without the GI.  
 
Three middlemen interviewed were introduced by farmers and government officers. 
The first middleman focuses on trading supreme green tea products between local 
individual small-scale farmers and retailers in Zhejiang province. His sale volume is 
around 500 KG per year and sale value is less than 0.3 million RMB. The second 
respondent purchases supreme and refined tea products from local farmers and 
processors and sells them to Hunan and Hubei provinces. With one shop in Wuyuan 
county, his turnover is less than 1 million RMB per year. The last middleman is a 
retailer who owns several retail tea stores in Jiangxi province. He purchases around 
500 KG supreme and refined green tea products from local farmers directly and sells 
them to final consumers through his retail shops. All interviewed middlemen prefer to 
sell their products under the name of “Wuyuan green tea” because it can help them 
charge a high price in the market. 
 
With each respondent, more than 20 questions were asked according to the 
semi-structured interviewing guide
86
 and focused on quality evaluation criteria in the 
network, the political, social and economic influences on quality development 
processes, and the contributions of GI schemes on quality. Each interview resulted in 
a large volume of qualitative data and all answers were checked by the respondent 






                                                        
86 The semi-structured interviewing guide is shown in Appendix 1 
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Respondents Personal Characteristics 
Government 
officer A 
from a village located in the flatland area; 
Government 
officer B 








from the local AQSIQ; 
Government 
officer E 
from the local agriculture department, contributed to the draft of the 
provincial standards; 
Farmer A located in the mountain area, sells fresh organic tea shoots and 
leaves to contracted processors, has a junior school certificate;  
Farmer B located in an ideal place of growing tea trees, processes the supreme 
green tea by hand and the refined green tea by machine, has a junior 
school certificate; 
Farmer C from the flatland area, sells fresh tea shoots and leaves to contracted 
processors, attended primary school; 
Processor A manages a big processing company which produces more than 7,000 
tonnes green tea products each year under the own trademark, signs 
contracts with local farmers and sells most of products to tea drink 
making companies;  
Processor B works for a company which processes less than 20 tonnes organic 
green tea products, signs contracts with local farmers and sells 
products under the own trademark; 
Processor C  manages a company which not only processes tea products but also 
has its own tea shops in the retail market, sells around 2,000 tonnes 
green tea products per year under the own trademark with the GI, 
and signs contracts with local farmers;  
Middleman 
A 
concentrates on trading supreme green tea products as a wholesaler, 
without any shop, sells products under the GI; 
Middleman 
B  
purchases supreme and refined green tea products from local 
farmers and processors, has one shop in the county, sells products to 
retailers under the GI; 
Middleman 
C 
purchases supreme and refined green tea products from local 
farmers, owns several retail tea shops in Jiangxi province, sells 
products under the GI. 
Table 7. 1: The characteristics of interviewees in the Wuyuan green tea network 
 
7.4 Quality construction processes embedded in power relationships 
 
Similar to the previous two cases, based on the conceptual framework, this section is 
structured into four main parts. The power relationships which influence production 
decisions and thus quality are explored from the perspective of government 
enforcement, organisational influence, economic relationships and other factors 
(Figure 7.11). Meanwhile, based on the data analysis principles discussed in Chapter 4, 
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not only the primary data collected in the interviewing, but also secondary data 
obtained through various publications, the internet and personal solicitation are used 
to explore the networks and improve the validity of the data. 
 
 
Figure 7. 11: The structure of power relationships analysis section in the Wuyuan green tea case 
 
7.4.1 Impact of government enforcement upon quality 
Beside the common food quality laws and regulations, such as the Product Quality 
Law of the P.R.C., the Food Safety Law of the P.R.C., and Agricultural Product 
Quality Safety Law of the P.R.C., all mentioned in Chapter 3, the quality requirements 
of Wuyuan green tea are listed in the GI application materials. The provincial 
standards were also issued by the government to help producers regulate their farming 
and processing activities
87
. However, only the food safety law was referred to by 
farmers as “the local government officers stick the notes on the board to tell farmers 
what sort of pesticides can not be used” (farmer A).  
 
This situation may have been caused by two reasons. Firstly, with low education level, 
pride in a long history and doubt over the usefulness of relevant production codes in 
improving quality, farmers prefer to farm their tea trees in their own way. As farmer A 
claimed, “[I]f these laws and standards are useful, many farmers should already 
know because quality products can be sold with a very high price in the market”, and 
                                                        
87 Unless producers sell their products under the name of “organic Wuyuan green tea” or “pollution-free Wuyuan 
green tea”, the provincial standards are encouraged rather than imposed 
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farmer B announced “I do not know the standards. I do not want to read it. I have 
more than 20 years’ production experience”. Secondly, the weak government 
enforcement decreases the incentive for farmers to adopt relevant laws and standards. 
All of the farmers interviewed indicated that their products had not been checked by 
the local government over the last decade, as, “The quality was checked long time ago. 
It was before the 1990s when the government buying policy existed. Nowadays, 
nobody takes care of the quality and checks it” (farmer C). Government officers’ 
explanations of this situation were “a lack of officers” and farmers cannot be 
punished with small quantity production.  
 
“… for individual farmers, I have to admit that these laws and standards are not very 
useful, especially for farmers who process green tea products by themselves. It is easy 
for government to regulate companies’ activities rather than individual farmers. No 
punishment is available for farmers, even they break the laws, such as using 
forbidden pesticides, the government can do nothing. … Normally, they are very poor 
and the government thus cannot take their property. Also, according to the laws, the 
government can not put them into the jail due to the small quantity production” 
(government officer B) 
 
Because farmers’ farming and processing activities are not regulated by the 
government, forbidden chemical pesticides and herbicides may be used in the farming 
process, and the sanitary aspect did not attract individual farmers’ attention in the 
processing process. For example, individual farmers process most of their products in 
small processing factories which charge a hiring fee through offering processing 
equipment. Even though the hygiene condition in these small-scale processing 
factories is questionable (Figure 7.12), no farmer respondent believes it is really a 





Figure 7. 12: A small semi-automatic processing factory beside the road 
 
But, even though “[T]here is not any requirement on farmers’ farming and 
processing activities” (government officer D), the government quality inspection 
programmes are running more frequently for processors and middlemen. Government 
officer B pointed out,  
 
“My department focuses on processors and sellers to check the quality rather than 
farmers. Normally, my colleagues go to market around 5 to 6 times from March to 
September each year, and 1 to 2 times in the rest of the year” 
 
The government officers indicated checking the quality of products processed by 
processors or sold by middlemen is a good way to ensure quality because “[O]nly a 
few farmers sell their products to final consumers by themselves” (government officer 
E). Under the strict government enforcement, “processors and middlemen have to 
ensure their products meet relevant requirements or they will be punished” 
(government officer D), such as “pay a fine” or “stop running for a while”. Therefore, 
processors interviewed are very familiar with compulsory laws/regulations
88
 of green 
tea products and announced that “[A]ll standards within my factory are made based 
on government compulsory food safety and hygiene laws/regulations” (processor A). 
But, as “the government standards on the safety aspect are too basic” (processor A) 
and “the requirements of my consumers’ on organic products are stricter than 
government compulsory laws/regulations” (processor B), the compulsory 
laws/regulations are believed to have had a limited influence on the processing 
                                                        
88 Compulsory laws/regulations are always concentrated on the safety and hygiene aspects 
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process when compared with buyers’ requirements. Meanwhile, although middlemen 
know compulsory laws/regulations very well because “if the pesticides remaining are 
in excess of the allowance level, I will have to pay a fine” (middleman C), the 
respondents showed that the government enforcement level on middlemen is much 
weaker than on processors. Compared with processors who announced local 
government officers go to their factories “two or three times per year” (processor B), 
middleman A said that his products had not been checked and the remaining two 
middlemen pointed out that their products were checked at most once per year. 
Processor C (he is also a retailer) also complained about the ineffective inspection 
programmes on middlemen,  
 
“… all samples they checked in the market were provided by sellers. Even though 
government officers pay for these samples, sellers know them and know the reason 
why they want to have these samples (therefore, the checking results are not 
reliable)” 
 
Beside the compulsory safety and hygiene laws/regulations, all farmers, processors 
and middlemen interviewed showed their limited knowledge on the GI standards, 
because the standards are “not very detailed and too basic” (government officer C). 
For example, within the AQSIQ framework, the pre-set quality standards of 
“Wuyuang green tea” are less than 1,000 words which relate to varieties, natural 
conditions of planting, production codes, harvest requirements, processing codes, and 
quality standards (grading criteria, physical contents and safety standards). All 
information contained in these 1,000 words is not very detailed, such as harvest 
requirements: “… according to the growth condition of the tea trees and the 
requirements of the final tea products, under the principle of picking, considering of 
quality and quantity, picking shoots with one leaf, two leaves, three leaves or without 
leaves” (according to the provincial standards, the leaves can also be picked alone to 
produce “pollution-free Wuyuan green tea” and “Organic Wuyuan Green Tea”) and 
the safety requirements: “… the safety characteristics have to meet the relevant 
national requirements for similar products” (similar products are not specified). In 
practice, even green tea products that are produced in neighbouring counties can meet 
these very basic standards. Therefore, processor C said, “all my products are sold 
under the GI. But I do not remember any special quality requirement for the GI 
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products”. Government officers explained that issuing such basic standards is an 
unavoidable result because the local government is stimulated by the economic 
rewards to apply GIs (ensuring these standards can be met by all local tea products) 
and the scientific research ability of the local county is still very weak. Government 
officer D noted that the GI standards were made “under farmers’ and processors’ 
experience” rather than the results of detailed scientific research and government 
officer C specified,  
 
“Only several aspects, such as water and ash content levels, can be checked in the 
county’s laboratories. The important quality characteristics that can be used to grade 
Wuyuan green tea products still can be only judged by personal experience. It is even 
impossible to distinguish the green tea products produced in Wuyuan county or 
neighbouring counties by laboratory tests”  
 
According to respondents, the safety aspect of green tea products processed by 
processors can be secured if there were regular government inspection programmes. 
However, it still needs to be noted that the government enforcement of compulsory 
laws/regulations on middlemen and farmer levels is very weak as samples are chosen 
by middlemen rather than through scientific methods or with the third party, and 
individual small-scale farmers’ production activities are not regulated by the local 
government at all. The safety aspect of Wuyuan green tea produced by these 
individual farmers and sold by middlemen thus cannot be ensured in the network. 
Meanwhile, because the GI standards are too basic and not very detailed, the ability of 
GI standards to regulate production activities and ensure certain quality characteristics 
is questioned. Most actors interviewed thus believed that the GI is a type of promotion 
technique rather than a certification mark. 
 
7.4.2 Impact of organisational influence upon quality 
Theoretically, the quality of GI products can be secured by GI holders through GI 
issuing procedures. But, with basic GI standards and inappropriate sample selection 
methods, the influence of GI holders on ensuring quality is very limited in the 




From 2005, several government funded organisations set up to apply for GIs
89
 and 
manage the network. The first one is the WCTA, which was set up to apply the 
certification mark of “Wuyuan green tea” in 2005 and was originally made up of 
twenty-one members – three government officers, sixteen processing or trading 
company managers, one technician, and one teacher from the local tea school. This 
association is located in and managed by the local tea bureau
90
, and concentrates on 
“protecting the legal right of Wuyuan green tea products in the market, helping the 
local government manage the network, collecting relevant information for the local 
government and members, enhancing the communication between members, offering 
assistance in standards’ writing and issuing processes, and helping members regulate 
their own producing and marketing activities” (government officer B). According to 
“The Measurements of the Certification Trademark of Wuyuan Green Tea” that was 
issued by the WCTA in 2005, within 60 days after receiving the application, the 
WCTA should check the 15 index (such as the moisture, ash, power, lead, copper, 
DDT, dicofol, benzene hexachloride, decamethrm and methamidophos content) of the 
applicant’s samples. If the samples can pass the examinations, have been processed 
through “fixation”, “rolling” and “drying”, the three processing steps, and “no other 
contents, no strange smell, no red branch, taste and smell good, with fresh green 
colour and soft green leaves outlay”, the applicant can obtain the certification 
trademark on their package for three years after paying a management fee. As all 
examining indices are made based on the national mandatory standards for tea 
products and the sample selection method is not clarified (according to processor C 
and middleman C, samples are sent by applicants) all applicants can get the permit 
from the WCTA very easily. The second one is the Tea Industry Centre. Even though 
the Centre is the GI applicant of the AQSIQ framework, the AQSIQ GI holder is the 
“GI Protection and Management Committee of Wuyuang Green Tea” which was built 
in 2009 under the local government order. Formed by government officers and 
managed by the leader of the local tea bureau, the responsibilities of this Committee 
are, “managing and promoting the GI, encouraging the adoption of the provincial 
standards in the network, offering suggestions on the packaging, and accomplishing 
the work that the government requires” (government officer B). According to “The 
                                                        
89 According to the requirements of three Chinese GI frameworks, GI applicants are limited to societies, 
associations, organizations, enterprises, and excellent professional co-operatives 
90 The government officers who are members of the association manage the association for the bureau. Thus, 
government officer B described the WCTA works as a “sub-organisation of the local tea bureau” 
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Measurements of Protecting and Managing the GI of Wuyuan Green Tea” that was 
issued by the Committee, the applicants have to be the companies. After handing in an 
application form, an application explanation letter, the relevant certification of the 
company (such as the business license), an government certificate of the products’ 
production area, a quality examination report of the product, a statement of predicted 
production and selling quantity, and an announcement of managing the GI labels 
according to the Committee’s requirements, signing the contract with the Committee, 
and paying a management fee, the applicants can show the GI on their products for 
one year. As the application materials asked by the AQSIQ framework are much more 
than the SAIC framework, and the certification mark appeared earlier, “most 
producers prefer to use the SAIC one rather than the AQSIQ one” (processor C). The 
last GI applicant and holder is the Wuyuan County Tea Technology Promotion Center, 
which is also an organisation managed by the local tea bureau. According to 
government officer C who attended the GI application process, the local government 
was forced by the higher level government department to apply for the third GI. 
 
“… the application fee is 200,000 RMB each for the SAIC and AQSIQ frameworks. In 
2009, the MoA set another GI framework up, and asked my bureau to register with it. 
Even though it was free to register, my bureau still thought it was useless. In Wuyuan 
county, most companies prefer to use the GI label issued by the SAIC rather than the 
AQSIQ. It is impossible to force producers to use the third one. … But, the officers 
from the provincial agriculture department phoned us and asked my bureau to register 
with this system” (government officer C) 
 
Because the third GI framework had not caught the attention of the local government 
and was issued in 2010, nothing has been published by the local government to 
manage the usage of this GI label in the network.  
 
Under too basic standards and inappropriate sampling methods, the specific influence 
of the WCTA on regulating production activities and ensuring quality through GI 
issuing procedures is very weak. Meanwhile, as not many actors use the other two GI 
labels, the impact of the GI Protection and Management Committee of Wuyuang 
Green Tea and the Wuyuan County Tea Technology Promotion Center on quality are 
also limited. The quality of Wuyuan green tea is thus difficult to ensure through GI 
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issuing procedures by GI holders.  
 
At the same time, because the Chinese government did not encourage farmers to 
co-operate before 2006 and individual small-scale farmers can process their fresh tea 
shoots and leaves by hand or by renting processing machines, in face of numerous 
middlemen in the network, there was no reason for local farmers to co-operate until 
middle to large-scale processors appeared in the network over the last few years. 
Compared to GI holders, these processors have a greater impact on the quality 
forming process through the contract and based on the local culture. 
 
According to respondents, contract farming is working well in Wuyuan county 
because processors need a large amount of fresh tea shoots and leaves every year, and 
it is not a wise choice for local farmers to process green tea products (especially for 
large quantity low value refined green tea products) and find buyers individually 
considering processing and channel costs. But, contract farming in this network is 
always formed under the contract between processors and villages rather than 
individual farmers. On the one hand, with a long co-operative history, farmers believe 
that if all farmers in the village co-operate together, they will get a better price than 
negotiating with processors individually (farmer A). On the other hand, the processors 
prefer to discuss the terms of the contract with the whole village rather than individual 
farmers because it saves costs and the quality requirements listed in the contract can 
be also secured by the local culture (processor B). For example, as villages in Wuyuan 
county are always formed by big families
91
, the head of the village can not only 
express the common opinions of farmers but also convince individual farmers to agree 
the terms in the contract. It simplifies the contract discussion and signing processes. 
And, with a long co-operation history, the terms in the contract can also be 
implemented by local farmers automatically.  
 
“My company co-operates with several bases/villages. Each year, my company sign 
the contract with these bases, and indicates what sort of tea shoots and leaves my 
company wants to purchase. If the farmers who belong to these bases break the 
contract and sell sub-quality products to my company, they will be blamed and 
                                                        
91 It means most males in a village have the same surname 
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isolated by the rest of the farmers in his village. Both contract and local culture help 
my company to ensure the quality of fresh tea shoots and leaves” (processor A) 
 
Contracted farmers also admitted that their farming activities can be secured by 
contracts and the local culture together. Firstly, the taste can be secured by the local 
culture. For example, only organic fertilisers should be used to cultivate tea trees 
because the usage of chemical fertilisers may “lighten” the taste. But, many farmers 
still prefer to use chemical fertilisers because of the cost. As it is impossible for 
processors to examine farming activities every day and judge the taste of tea products 
before processing, the local culture plays a critical role in limiting the usage of 
chemical fertilisers. Both farmers A and C who sign contracts with processors pointed 
out that they never use chemical fertilisers to increase their output, otherwise they will 
be blamed by their neighbours. Government officer A explained,  
 
“… if a farmer use chemical fertilisers to increase output … and is found out by his 
neighbours, he will be blamed, because local farmers are very proud of a long and 
stable relationship with the processor who brings a high income for the village. The 
activities that may break the good relationship are believed to be unacceptable in the 
village”  
 
Secondly, the appearances can be ensured through the contract. The appearance of 
harvested fresh tea shoots and leaves is related to personal experience and input. For 
instance, tea leaves can be harvested by machine or by hand. Even though farmers 
need to spend more time to harvest fresh tea leaves by hand, the appearance of tea 
leaves harvested in this way is better because those harvested by machines may mix 
full leaves with branches and crushed leaves. As the appearance is easily 
distinguished by eye, detailed fresh tea shoots and leaves grading criteria are listed in 
all contracts. Economic motivation drives farmers to make their farming decisions 
based on the contract, as“I would like to harvest tea leaves by tools in summer and 
autumn because of the low price that processors pay” (farmer C). Thirdly, the safety 
issue can be secured by both contracts and the local culture. The safety in farming 
processes is generally related to the usage of chemical materials, such as pesticide and 
herbicide. To ensure a low chemical material residue level, the processors set strict 
chemical examination programmes after purchasing fresh tea leaves from contracted 
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farmers. If a farmer’s tea shoots/leaves can pass all examinations, he/she will receive 
an extra 30% to 50% premium according to the contract.  
 
“Many villages sign the contract with processors as a whole. The contract regulates 
farmers’ activities and indicates the quality standards that fresh tea shoots and leaves 
have to meet. If a farmer’s products can pass all examinations and be proved as 
organic shoots or leaves, the processor will pay an extra 30%-50% premium to the 
farmer. The contract not only protects processors’ right to have a quality input, but 
also brings a high economic reward for farmers” (government officer E) 
 
In practice, the usage of chemical materials is restricted by not only the premium but 
also the local culture. If any farmer breaks the contract and sells sub-quality products 
to contracted processors, he will be “blamed and isolated by the rest of the farmers in 
his village” (processor A), and “some benefits, such as special bonus, that he can 
have as a villager may be cancelled by the head of the village” (farmer A). Therefore, 
even though farmer C knows the usage of pesticides can increase the output, he 
claimed that he only spread pesticides once or two times per year according to the 
suggestion of contracted processor’s technicians. 
 
Enhanced by the local culture, farmers have realised that regulating their own farming 
activities according to the contract is their obligation if they wish to sustain a long 
stable relationship with contracted processors who generally offer high prices for 
“quality” products. The quality thus can be ensured by the contract farming system in 
the network. However, as all three managers investigated announced that GI standards 
are “too basic” to be adopted in their companies and the products of two processors 
are sold under private trademarks rather than the GI, the specific impact of GI 
schemes on enhancing quality of Wuyuan green tea is still highly limited. 
 
7.4.3 Impact of economic relationships upon quality 
To increase local farmers’ incomes, the local government invested in both marketing 
promotion and quality improving programmes to increase the market price of Wuyuan 




“Wuyuan green tea is a traditional agrifood product for local farmers. … In the last 
several years, the local government invested around 10 million RMB per year into the 
Wuyuan green tea industry to encourage farmers to plant quality tea trees and 
promote ‘Wuyuan green tea’ in the market through TV advertising, exhibitions, and 
magazine advertisement. Farmers can get quality green tea plantlets for free from the 
local tea plantlet breeding centre funded by the local government. If farmers agree to 
build or re-build their tea farms according to the provincial standards, they will get 
an extra subsidy of around 6,000-10,050 RMB per ha from the local government”  
 
This quality improving programmes had a great influence on farmers’ production 
activities as farmers can not only obtain free green tea plantlets and subsidies from the 
local government but also earn a high income through upgrading tea trees and farms 
according to the local government’s requirements. Such as farmer C indicated, “[A]ll 
farmers in my village change the varieties of tea trees because new varieties offered 
free by the local government can produce more tea shoots and leaves than the old 
one”, and middleman C announced  
 
“… upgrading tea farms focuses on using organic fertilisers and controlling the 
planting density. Both of them are critical to produce organic green tea products 
which can be sold with a high price in the market. Stimulated by the government 
subsidies and future high incomes, farmers prefer to upgrade their farms” 
 
Increased quality (through changing varieties and upgrading farms) combined with 
effective promotion programmes have enhanced the price of Wuyuan green tea in the 
market which is “at least 10% to 20% higher than green tea products from 
neighbouring counties” (middleman B). The average local farmers’ annual income 
generated by green tea production thus more than doubled between 2005 and 2010 
from 520 RMB to 1250 RMB. However, according to unpublished local government 
data, local farmers only obtained 28.82% of the total output value of Wuyuan green 
tea in 2010, but the processing stage took 49.41% of it and middlemen acquired the 
remaining 21.76%. Because green tea products are not suitable to sell individually, 
based on advanced market knowledge, processors and middlemen have made their 





All processors interviewed set their own quality criteria according to their consumers’ 
requirements. They explained, “[M]y consumers have special requirements for green 
tea products. I have to meet their requirements …The taste, smell, appearance, 
contents and safety aspects are all (have to be) examined” (processor A) and “under 
the own trademark, my company has to offer green tea products with consistent 
quality that consumers prefer to buy and thus I can charge a high price in the market” 
(processor B). In practice, these criteria are not only imposed very strictly in the 
contract to control farming activities but also regulate processors’ own processing 
activities. For example, all managers interviewed announced that their companies 
bought modern full automatic tea processing machines to process tea products under 
consumers’ requirements. 
 
“… the standards referred in the provincial standards are too basic, my consumers 
have different quality requirements, which are stricter than the provincial standards. I 
have to process my products according to their requirements. … The reason why 
consumers want to buy my product is my products can perfectly meet their 
requirements. Securing quality is the only way to improve market share and obtain a 
high economic reward … To ensure stable quality characteristics, my company 
purchased full automatic processing machines. Although they are very expensive, but 
they are necessary” (Processor A) 
 
Not only processors but also middlemen set specific quality criteria based on their 
market knowledge thereby influencing individual farmers’ farming and processing 
activities through their “purchasing power”. For example, even though farmer B 
would like to drink the green tea made by old tea trees (the taste of which is stronger 
than new varieties), he cultivates new varieties in his farm mainly because the new 
varieties can produce more early spring tea shoots, that middlemen prefer to pay a 
very high price for, than the old varieties and accordingly he is rewarded with a high 
income in the market. 
 
Middlemen’s quality criteria primarily focus on detectable characteristics such as taste 
and appearance rather than undetectable attributes such as safety and hygiene because 
they face individual consumers who “prefer to drink quality green tea products with 
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good taste and appearance” (middleman A) and “[I]t is very difficult for them to 
identify the safety and hygiene levels of green tea products” (middleman C). 
Therefore, for individual un-contracted farmers, chemical fertilisers, pesticides and 
herbicides are used to increase the output, special attention has been paid to harvest 
fresh tea shoots, and old semi-automatic processing machines are adopted to process 
almost all refined green tea products. For instance, after evaluating the input and 
possible future income, pesticides and herbicides and a small amount of chemical 
fertilisers were used by farmer B to increase output, as  
 
“Cultivating my tea farm is very simple. I never irrigate my tea trees due to local 
natural conditions. But, I use chemical fertilisers to improve the output. … Using 
chemical fertilisers can increase the output (with low cost) and all farmers in my 
village prefer to obtain a higher income by using them. … The taste does not change a 
lot with a small amount usage and it is not easy to be found by middlemen … 
pesticides and herbicides have to be used to secure the output. … I do not know what 
sorts of pesticides and herbicides I used. They are recommended by sellers. …They 
are used three to four times per year when I believe they should be used” 
 
And, stimulated by the price middlemen paid, different ways were adopted by farmers 
to harvest and process their tea shoots and leaves. Fresh tea shoots were harvested 
very carefully by farmers because quality supreme green tea can be sold more than 
1,000 RMB per KG. To obtain a higher income, farmers even grade fresh tea shoots to 
“shoots, shoots with one leaf, shoots with two leaves, and shoots with three leaves” 
(middleman C) based on the preferences of middlemen before processing. Conversely, 
as the price of refined green tea products is normally under 100 RMB per KG, 
carefully picking activities were described as “worthless” (farmer B) and old 
semi-automatic machines were used to process these tea leaves under the 
consideration of the cost.  
 
“There is a processing factory in my village. It was set up by the local government 
before the 1990s. Now, if a tea farmer wants to use these machines to process their 
fresh tea leaves, he will be asked to pay a processing fee … it is impossible to process 
refined tea products by hand. The price of refined tea products is always less than 100 
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RMB per KG. But, processing 1 KG refined green tea needs at least 4-5 hours by 
hand. The personal input is even higher than the price middlemen paid” (farmer B) 
 
Through offering free plantlets and subsidies, the impact of the local government on 
enhancing quality based on the provincial standards cannot be ignored. Also, 
depending on advanced market knowledge and “purchasing power”, middlemen and 
processors have a great influence on production activities and thus quality through the 
specific quality criteria they made. The quality of Wuyuan green tea is greatly shaped 
by economic relationships between different actors.  
 
7.4.4 Impact of other factors upon quality 
All respondents indicated that the impact of natural factors cannot be overlooked 
when analysing quality of Wuyuan green tea products. For example, the appearance 
(colour and smell), taste (freshness) and safety level (pesticides remaining) of green 
tea products from the mountain area are always better than that from the flatland area 
because “[T]he weather in the mountain area is very different from the flatland area” 
(farmer B), “[T]he contents in the soil are very different” (government officer A), “(in 
the mountain area) better ecology environment can decrease the usage of pesticides” 
(processor B). Even though “[T]he quality of green tea products is not only decided 
by the local environment, but also greatly impacted by farming and processing 
activities” (middleman B)”, the influence of natural factors on quality is still 
significant in the network. Therefore, middlemen/processors pay a high price for 
mountain tea leaves/products and a relative low price for that from the flat area. 
Accordingly, tea farmers in the flat area “have less interest to pick their tea shoots 
and leaves carefully” (government officer A). 
 
Meanwhile, the low education level of farmers also has a certain influence on the 
production activities and thus quality. For example, individual farmers ignoring safety 
and hygiene aspects in production processes is caused not only by weak government 
enforcement and middlemen’s quality criteria, but also by the low education level of 
farmers. Such as middleman C specified, “[F]armers believe all germs can be killed 
by hot water used to make tea drink … it is difficult to change their opinion”. And, 
farmer B indicated, “[A]ll pesticides can be evaporated through heating in the 
processing process. How much I use is not a matter”. But, according to Sood et al. 
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(2004, p.2123), not all pesticides can be totally evaporated in the processing process, 
“the decreases in residue levels were different for different pesticides”. Because of 
wrong opinions, safety and hygiene levels are difficult to improve with respect to 
individual farmers.  
 
Also, the quality is partly decided by the personal processing experience as well. 
Hand making supreme Wuyuan green tea products requires not only traditional tools, 
such as iron pan and bamboo tablet but also extensive experience on controlling the 
time and the temperature. 
 
“The hand-made Wuyuan green tea is always better than the machine-made one. 
Different fresh tea shoots and leaves are needed to be processed at different 
temperatures with different times. For example, fresh tea shoots harvested in the early 
morning need to be processed with different temperatures from that harvested in the 
afternoon …The green tea has its own life, only experienced processors know how to 
deal with it. It is what the machine cannot do” (farmer B) 
 
The specific processing skill some local farmers have is an important historical 
heritage. It is why the high quality hand-made supreme Wuyuan green tea can be sold 
40,000 RMB per KG in the market.  
 
The natural factors, producers’ education level and personal processing experience 
have a great influence on production activities and thus the final quality 
characteristics of Wuyuan green tea products. But, it should be noticed that many 
other factors may also have an impact too. Such as lacking government loan for 
small-scale processing factories on upgrading processing machines and environments 




The quality development process is more complicated in the Wuyuan green tea 
network than the previous two cases because more factors/actors are involved, such as 




According to the standards listed in the “The Management of the Certification 
Trademark of Wuyuan Green Tea” and “The Measurements of Protecting and 
Managing the GI of Wuyuan Green Tea”, the quality of Wuyuan green tea can be 
subjectively judged by appearance and taste, objectively judged by physical criteria, 
safety criteria, net weight measurement error, and certain processing procedures. 
However, producers interviewed prefer to judge the quality of Wuyuan green tea 
through appearance and taste, and also the safety issue as referred to contracted 
farmers and processors. Different quality judging criteria demonstrate the weak 
influence of GI schemes on quality of Wuyuan green tea in the network. 
 
According to the interviewees, contemporary quality evaluating criteria are mainly 
developed by processors and middlemen and enforced through their “purchasing 
power”. Although the impacts of government enforcement (on processors), 
government subsidies, local culture, natural factors, farmers’ education level, and 
processing experience cannot be ignored when examining quality development 
processes of Wuyuan green tea, contracted processors and middlemen have an 
unavoidable significant impact on production activities as well as quality. Compared 
with processors and middlemen, the influence of GI schemes upon quality is rather 
minimal. 
 
7.6 Chapter summary 
 
The first theme of the chapter mainly focused on secondary data to provide a 
background of the network. The main actors involved in the quality development 
process were indicated at the end of this theme. The second theme of the chapter 
concentrated on exploring power relationships between main actors to examine the 
quality contraction process and the influence of GI schemes on quality. The results 
show that the quality forming process is mainly influenced by economic relationships 
and the impact of GI schemes is limited. 
 
The conclusions raise some interesting questions that need to be examined, such as 
which system — GI or “industrial” — can provide “quality” agrifood products into 
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the market. The GI system is believed by many researchers (such as Watts and 
Goodman, 1997; Barham, 2003; Tregear et. al., 2007) to offer “quality” agrifood 
products rather than the industrial agrifood system. But, the research in the Wuyuan 
green tea network shows the contract farming operating under “industrial 
conventional codes” is an effective way to secure certain quality characteristics. The 
“industrial agrifood system” within this case provides a better (especially in the safety 
aspect) and more stable “quality” than the GI system. This interesting point will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, which pulls the empirical analysis of the three 




























Chapter 8: A Comparative Evaluation of the Chinese GI System 
Based on Three Sample Cases  
 
“The third concern of producers is the dissemination of information on GIs and 
their promotion as a tool for sustainable development. In several countries (especially 
developing economies and LDCs), in spite of the tremendous potential arising out of 
local products, the concept of GIs is not properly grasped by policy-makers and 
producers. The emergence of specific problems (lack of marketing skills, poor legal 
framework) reduces the chances for the communities to take full advantage of local 
products”  




The introductory chapter of this thesis established six inter-related research objectives. 
Chapter 8 is concerned with the final objective, namely to provide an overall 
evaluation of the Chinese GI system in the construction of quality and to establish a 
foundation for future study. This chapter attempts to bring the review-based and 
interviewing-based parts of the thesis together. It does this by comparing the empirical 
material presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 and revisits the main concepts and contexts 
outlined earlier in Chapter 2 and 3. 
 
To develop a comparative and conceptual analysis, which moves from the in-depth 
empirical material towards broader theoretical concerns associated with the social, 
political and economic relations that are built around the Chinese GI system, the rest 
of this chapter is composed of three sections. Section 8.2 focuses on identifying the 
uniformity and diversity of power relationships involved in quality development 
processes among the three sample cases. The empirical analysis has illustrated the 
quality construction process inherent in the three sample cases individually through 
examining power relationships. But, they have not been compared to draw reliable 
results. Section 8.3 returns to the main issues outlined in Chapter 2 and 3. Based on 
the results in the comparison section (Section 8.2), this evaluation section comments 
upon “the industrial agrifood system” “consumers’ quality re-orientation” “alternative 
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agrifood networks” and “the impact of GI schemes” in Chinese GI networks. This 
links the analysis with broader theoretical debates and thus lays a foundation for 
future analysis. Finally, Section 8.4 provides a short summary based on the findings. 
 
8.2 A comparative evaluation of the three case studies 
 
Three case studies have been presented in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. It has been found that 
analysing agrifood quality under Chinese GI schemes is a contested and contradictory 
process with many differences between different GI networks. Table 8.1 summarises 
some different characteristics of the three sample cases. First, the production history is 
significant. Gannan navel oranges have only been cultivated for less than 40 years, 
selling new products within a new network. The other two products are old products 
with more than 1,000 years of production history. Secondly, the main producers 
involved are different between the three sample cases due to the varied nature of the 
products. Thirdly, the trading behaviours of the three GI networks are not same. 
 




From 1971 Farmers Through 
middlemen 
Nanfeng mandarins Since 1,300 years 
ago 
Farmers Individual trading 
Wuyuan green tea Since several 






Table 8. 1: Some differences between the three sample cases 
 
In the face of the many differences within the socio-economic environment, and in 
order to gain a reliable common conclusion of the influence of GI schemes on quality 
in the Chinese GI system, this section tries to identify commonalities and differences 
between the three sample cases through a detailed comparative assessment focusing 







8.2.1 Comparison of the impact of government enforcement upon quality 
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The initial 
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Table 8. 2: Major differences of political factors between the three sample cases 
 
Through comparing the political factors involved in the three cases (Table 8.2), it can 
be seen that the political environment within the three GI networks is not the same. 
Many differences can be found, such as the GI issuing procedure, the frequency of the 
quality inspection programmes and how many GI frameworks are actively involved. 
However, according to respondents, the limited impact of local government on 
production activities according to compulsory laws/regulations/standards is quite 
similar in the three cases. For example, most farmers do not need to consider 
government compulsory laws, regulations and standards to produce their products as 
they can almost discount the probability that their products will be examined by 
government officers. In spite of a few farmers, some middlemen and processors 
announcing that their products were checked by the local government, inappropriate 
sampling methods and very “basic” quality standards suggest that the quality 





When focusing on GI schemes, government enforcement on quality is also weak and 
minimal in the three cases. Although GIs are supposed to be certification marks which 
prove products have met “pre-set” GI standards, GI producers do not need to pay 
special attention to ensure the quality of their products as the quality checking stage is 
not involved in the GI issuing procedure in the Gannan navel orange and the Nanfeng 
mandarin networks and the GI standards are “too basic” in the Wuyuan green tea 
network. Weak government enforcement on regulating producers’ activities as well as 
ensuring certain quality characteristics may be caused by the structure of the Chinese 
GI system. The government plays three roles in all three GI networks — the 
“legislator”, the “executor”, and the “judiciary”. Firstly, the main drafters of GI 
standards are local government officers. Secondly, the decision to issue GI labels is 
made by the local government or government officers. Thirdly, the quality inspection 
programme is also run by the local government. There is neither separation of duties 
nor independence between the legislator and regulator. This situation is very different 
from European “PDO” and “PGI” systems and the Florida citrus network (see Section 
2.5), within which the GI production codes are proposed by co-operatives, applied 
under specific control systems and regulated by the government. Without independent 
oversight to monitor the three sample GI networks, and with a desire to increase local 
incomes, the local government is encouraged to adopt policies that may increase local 
incomes even if that contravenes GI standards. For example, the Fuzhou government 
decided to expand the cultivation area to unprotected counties because such a policy 
may benefit more farmers and will not bring any result/punishment to decision makers. 
Basic GI standards and “low quality” GI products are becoming the unavoidable 
results in the three sample cases. As a consequence, many businesses have started to 
build their own trademarks within the GI network and almost all interviewees believe 









8.2.2 Comparison of the impact of organisational influence upon quality 








The GNOA The NMA and 
the NMRA 









Many  None None  
Contract farming Seldom and difficult 
to find 
A few Many 
Table 8. 3: Major differences of organisational factors between the three sample cases 
 
When focusing on organisational influence (Table 8.3), many common issues can be 
found between the three cases. Firstly, although many associations are funded by the 
government for a variety of purposes, none of them have a strong influence on the 
quality forming process in the network. They (including GI holders) are all controlled 
by the local government with no authority to regulate its members’ activities, and thus 
are described as “government branches” by interviewees. Secondly, although many 
formal small-scale co-operatives formed by farmers exist in the Gannan navel orange 
network and none of them has been found in the other two networks, these small-scale 
co-operatives have a very limited impact upon their members. In fact, as farmers were 
not encouraged to co-operate until 2006, it is almost impossible for low educated 
farmers to co-operate, propose GI standards, or regulate their production activities 
effectively within a short co-operation history. Hence, GIs are applied by government 
funded associations and GI standards are proposed by government officers in each of 
the three cases. 
 
Contract farming, however, is the main difference between the three sample cases 
when examining organisational influences on quality. Contract farming may have a 
profound influence on quality through enforcing farmers to accept conventional 
production codes by the use of contracts. But, it has been proved that the effectiveness 
of contract farming on quality may vary under different contexts, such as the 
precondition of the existence of a fully developed credit mechanism, uniqueness of GI 
products and the local culture. For example, in the Gannan navel orange network, as a 
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large amount of similar products exist in the national market
92
, there is no specific 
reason for middlemen to purchase Gannan navel oranges with a high price. A 
relatively low pre-set purchasing price combined with a lack of a fully developed 
credit mechanism (both farmers and companies can break the contract without any 
penalty) make it difficult to regulate farmers’ production activities under the contract. 
The influence of contract farming on quality is thus minimal. Conversely, with unique 
natural conditions and weak research ability in securing specific generic properties, 
alternative products of quality Nanfeng mandarins cannot be found in the market. 
Therefore, contract farming works well in “suitable” and “less-suitable” areas (natural 
conditions in these areas are different from others and thus the quality characteristics 
of Nanfeng mandarins from these areas are better) commanding a high price offered 
by middlemen/companies. And, in the Wuyuan green tea network, the production 
activities and thus quality characteristics can be totally controlled by contracted 
processors because local farmers have realised that ensuring quality is their obligation 
if they wish to sustain a long stable relationship with the processors who generally 
offer high prices for “quality” products. 
 
The impact of formal organisations on quality is limited whilst the influence of 
contract farming may vary under different contexts. But, it should be noticed that with 
a lack of a fully developed credit mechanism, the relationship which binds farmers 
and contracted middlemen/companies/processors together and encourages farmers to 
produce their products according to certain production codes is the economic 
relationship allied to the local culture rather than political enforcement, as in the 









                                                        
92 Many areas in China produce navel oranges with good taste. Some products are even registered as GI products, 
such as “Zhigui navel orange” and “Fengjie navel orange”. 
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8.2.3 Comparison of the impact of economic relationships upon quality 
 Gannan navel 
oranges 
Nanfeng mandarins Wuyuan green tea 
Total output Increased Increased Increased 
Total output 
value 










to the local 
economy 




Generated more than 
80% of the local 
farmers’ income, and 
contributed 31.79% 
of the county GDP in 
2009 
Generated 23.68%  
of the local farmers’ 
incomes, and 
contributed 17.82% 













Refuse to offer 
financial support to 
farmers 
Government invests 
several millions RMB 
per year to improve 
quality (offering 
quality plantlets and 
encouraging farmers 
to upgrade their 
farms)  
Table 8. 4: Major differences of economic factors between the three sample cases 
 
Although the importance of GI networks for the local economy and farmers’ incomes 
are different in the three GI networks (Table 8.4), as discussed in previous chapters, 
the data analysis shows that producers primarily focus on the economic aspect when 
making their production decisions. In other words, the quality forming processes in 
the three cases are strongly influenced by economic relationships between different 
actors. 
 
Firstly, the influence of the local government on farming activities through offering 
subsidies/bank loans depend on the economic reward they can bring. For example, in 
the Gannan navel orange network, the government encourages farmers to buy modern 
farming equipment. But, modern equipment is difficult to use in the Gannan area 
characterised by hills and small-scale farms. With limited ability to yield a high 
income, government subsidies/bank loans have a minimal impact on farming 
activities as well as quality. Conversely, in the Wuyuan green tea network, the local 
government has a great influence on farming activities by offering subsidies to 
encourage farmers to upgrade their tea trees and farms according to provincial 
standards, because upgrading tea trees and farms can not only increase output but also 
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improve the quality of fresh tea shoots/leaves and thus raises farm incomes. Therefore, 
the influence of the government on quality through offering subsidies/bank loans 
varies depending on the additional income which can generate to farmers.  
 
Secondly, after registering as GI products, the average prices of the three GI products 
changed in different ways for many reasons. As the GI itself cannot generate a high 
income to producers automatically, farmers have to calculate their inputs and estimate 
future incomes carefully. Middlemen/contracted companies who hold the “purchasing 
power” are thus becoming “powerful” actors in the quality forming process based on 
the quality criteria they initiated. Farmers are forced to accept these quality criteria to 
obtain a high income in the market. For example, based on quality criteria made by 
middlemen in the Gannan navel orange network, farmers have less interest in securing 
taste but prefer to change the appearance of their products because price is reflected in 
the appearance rather than the taste. And, in the Wuyuan green tea network, individual 
farmers do not take care of the safety level of their products because it is not a quality 
criterion for middlemen.  
 
Under weak government enforcement, quality forming processes within the three 
cases are mainly regulated by economic relationships between different actors. But, 
beside economic relationships, the influence of other factors, such as the natural 
environment, also cannot be ignored when analysing quality. Therefore, the following 
section will be dedicated to explore the impact of these factors on quality. 
 
8.2.4 Comparison of the impact of other factors upon quality 
Producers’ production activities as well as quality development processes, are also 
impacted by many other factors, such as natural factors, the farm size, the education 
level of farmers, the local culture and so on.  
 
Firstly, as the quality of GI products is greatly influenced by the natural environment 
in the three sample cases, farmers always make their production decisions based on 
certain natural conditions. For example, Nanfeng farmers from the suitable and 
less-suitable areas prefer to increase inputs to secure the taste of their products and 
farmers from the unsuitable area have no interest in improving the taste mainly 
because the taste is difficult to be improved in this area. Secondly, as the Chinese 
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government introduced the Household Production Responsibility System in 1978 and 
forbids the trading of farm lands, the three networks investigated are populated with 
small-scale farms. It limits farmers’ abilities to improve the quality of their products 
through increasing inputs, such as using modern farming equipment because they are 
always unaffordable for small-scale farmers. Thirdly, in the urbanisation process, 
most well educated farmers went to the cities to earn their living because urban 
income is much higher than rural income. As well-educated farmers have more 
employability chances in the city, all farmers interviewed in this research have a low 
education level (see also Zhong et al., 2011). It limits farmers’ abilities to improve 
their farming skills through learning modern techniques and address safety issues in 
the production process. Fourthly, the impact of the local culture on the quality 
forming process cannot be ignored, especially with respect to the Wuyuan Green Tea 
network.  
 
Beside the four main factors mentioned, many other factors, such as the production 
experience, the scientific research abilities and the number of technicians, may also 
impact upon production activities as well as quality in different ways. These factors 
limit producers’ choices in the production process, and therefore should be considered 
carefully when analysing the quality forming process within the three cases. 
 
8.2.5 Comparison of the quality forming process in the three cases 
The quality characteristics of Gannan navel oranges are mainly decided by farmers’ 
production activities as Gannan navel oranges are better for fresh eating than for 
juicing. But, through exploring power relationships involved in quality development 
processes, farmers’ production decisions are found greatly influenced by quality 
criteria proposed by middlemen rather than the GI standard although “Gannan navel 
orange” is a GI product. Firstly, an incorrect interpretation of the national standard 
(which is not imposed) combined with inappropriate GI issuing procedures (the 
quality checking stage is not involved) made farmers realise that whether producing 
navel oranges according to the GI standard or not is not important. They can sell their 
products under the GI without any consistent adherence to the GI standard. Secondly, 
although the GI is a collective intellectual property, as farmers were not encouraged to 
co-operate until 2006, the associations/farmers’ co-operatives in the network are 
mainly supported and thus work for the local government. Without an independent 
 
 205 
certification authority to regulate members’ activities, the influence of these 
associations/farmers’ co-operatives on production activities is rather minimal. Thirdly, 
the decreasing price of Gannan navel oranges since 2004 shows the GI itself cannot 
bring a high income to farmers automatically. To ensure the income, farmers have to 
produce navel oranges based on middlemen’s quality criteria. The “quality” is thus 
presented into the market reflecting economic rationality, and middlemen are 
becoming “powerful” actors in the quality forming process. Decreasing taste and 
safety levels are unavoidable results under such power relationships. 
 
In the Nanfeng mandarin network, power relationships involved in quality forming 
processes are quite similar to the Gannan navel orange network as the producers 
(farmers) make their production decisions based on economic rationality rather than 
existing GI standards. Firstly, under inappropriate GI issuing procedures (the quality 
checking stage is not involved) and the policy approved by the Fuzhou government 
allowing mandarins from other counties to be sold under the GI, the influence of the 
GI standard on quality is minimal. Secondly, because local farmers prefer to sell their 
products individually and government supported associations (including GI holders) 
have no authority in regulating production activities, formal organisational influences 
on farming activities and thus quality can be ignored. Thirdly, as the GI cannot bring 
high economic rewards to its producers automatically, to secure the income, farmers 
always produce mandarins under the quality criteria presented by contracted 
companies who are thus becoming powerful actors in the quality development process 
based on affluent market knowledge and “purchasing power”. Compared with 
contracted trading companies, the impact of normal trading companies/intermediaries 
on quality forming processes is much weak under individual selling culture and weak 
marketing research abilities. Fourthly, through approving the expanding policy, the 
government plays an important role in the quality forming process through its political 
authority. But, its impact on the quality is negative rather than positive as farmers’ 
incentive to improve quality is partly decreased by rising output. Under complex 
power relationships between different actors, in face of government expanding policy, 
Nanfeng mandarins with insecure safety levels and decreasing taste levels
93
 are 
presented into the market.  
                                                        




The quality construction process in the Wuyuan green tea network is more 
complicated than that in the previous two cases, as Wuyuan green tea can be produced 
not only by farmers individually but also by processors through the contract farming 
system. However, by examining power relationships involved in quality forming 
processes, the findings indicate that the impact of the GI standard is still very limited. 
Firstly, although the government enforcement of relevant laws/regulations/standards 
on regulating farming activities is really weak, the government can still influence 
production activities and thus quality through offering subsidies. As upgrading tea 
trees and farms can bring not only subsidies but also higher future incomes (through 
increased output and quality), farmers prefer to cultivate their farms according to 
government requirements (which is based on provincial standards rather than the GI 
standard). Secondly, processors are regularly inspected by government officers based 
on the compulsory laws/regulations/standards (rather than the GI standard) which 
focus on the safety and hygiene aspects. The processing process within the contract 
farming system is thus greatly impacted by the local government. Thirdly, in face of 
three GI frameworks, GI applicants prefer to choose the SAIC one as its GI label can 
be obtained very easily with a small amount of payment due to the inappropriate 
sampling methods and “too basic” standards. The impact of GI schemes on quality 
through GI issuing procedures is thus limited. Fourthly, in face of different consumers, 
middlemen develop different quality criteria from contracted processors, such as 
middlemen focus on the taste and the appearance to purchase green tea products and 
processors concentrated on the taste, the appearance and the safety to evaluate quality 
of fresh tea shoots and leaves. To secure income, different farmers (individual farmers 
and contracted farmers) have to produce their products according to different criteria. 
Therefore, Wuyuan green tea products are presented into the market with various 
quality characteristics. In general, the average quality level of Wuyuan green tea is 
improved due to the increasing output of the supreme tea products and upgraded tea 
farms under the appropriate support of the local government. And, specifically, 
Wuyuan green tea produced by the contract farming system is safer than that 
produced by individual farmers because of the regular quality inspection programmes 
on processors. 
 
Focusing on power relationships, quality forming processes within the three cases 
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were carefully examined and compared. Although the findings show that the context 
and power relationships involved in quality forming processes within every network 
are unique, the limited influence of GI schemes on quality is a common point in the 
three cases mainly due to basic GI standards, inappropriate GI issuing procedures, 
weak government enforcement of GI standards, and unsuitable government policy 
contravening GI standards. This phenomenon is very different not only from the 
theoretical assumption that the GI system focuses on offering “quality” products to 
compete with industrial agrifood system, but also from the quality forming process 
illustrated in Cassis wine, Parma ham and Florida citrus networks. To gain a 
comprehensive understanding of such a weak influence of GIs on developing quality 
in the Chinese GI system, the analysis will be linked to broader theoretical debates in 
the following section. 
 
8.3 The wider network — the GI system revisited 
 
This section attempts to contextualise the empirical findings from the three sample 
cases within a broader agrifood debate, as the empirical material has raised a number 
of interesting issues pertinent to the agrifood production literature and several 
concepts outlined in Chapter 2, namely agrifood quality, industrial agrifood systems, 
consumers’ quality re-orientation and AAFNs. After revisiting the literature and 
concepts, this section ends with a grounded framework to conceptualise “differences” 
between Chinese and “Western” GI schemes.  
 
The starting point is the conceptual framework for agrifood quality presented in 
Chapter 2 (Figure 2.1, p.22) which indicates that agrifood quality is impossible to be 
defined based only on production or consumption aspects but can be analysed and 
understood through exploring power relationships between different actors within 
quality forming processes based on a given context. Under this framework, this 
research was designed and three sample cases were chosen. However, although the 
research has shown that the power relationships are useful clues to examine and 
understand agrifood quality, the edge between socio-economic environment and 
power relationships has been found to be always unclear in the real world. For 
example, culture is a factor that must be included in the socio-economic environment 
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category, but it cannot be observed unless examining power relationships between 
different actors. The analysis of agrifood quality should thus focus more on power 
relationships involved in production processes under varying contexts rather than 
analysing contexts separately from power relationships. 
 
Concentrating on power relationships, the link between quality and GI schemes are 
clearly noted in Chapter 2. In principle, GI products are produced in protected areas 
and the quality of GI products can be secured by government regulatory authorities 
through quality inspection programmes and GI issuing procedures based on GI 
standards. The “legislator”, the “executor”, and the “judiciary” are all independent of 
each other to ensure quality (see also O’Reilly and Hains, 2004; Hayes et al., 2004, 
2005; The Parma Ham Consortium, 2007). GI producers can thus obtain a high 
economic reward through offering certain quality characteristics that consumers 
would like to pay a relatively high price for (Marsden et al., 2000b; Renting et al., 
2003). But, the research results of the three Chinese cases do not follow this logic.  
 
Firstly, without an independent GI inspector, the government prefers to propose very 
“basic” GI standards and adopts lax GI issuing procedures (without/with inappropriate 
quality checking stages) to ensure all producers in the GI protection area can benefit 
from GI schemes. In other words, GIs are promoted by the government as a way to 
increase farm and rural incomes rather than a sign to show certain and consistent 
quality characteristics. The quality of agrifood products with GIs thus cannot be 
secured in the market.  
 
Secondly, in “Western” countries, GI systems appeared in tandem with consumers’ 
quality re-orientation which is partly fuelled by safety concerns relating to consumers’ 
falling confidence in industrial conventional “uniform standards”. But, both the 
industrial agrifood system and the GI system developed simultaneously in the 1990s 
in China. In other words, Chinese GI networks developed not in response to 
consumers’ changing quality attitudes to industrial agrifood products but to the 
government’s aim to increase farmers’ incomes. Concentrated on economic rewards, 
many GI products were involved in Chinese food scandals over the last decade. 
Consumers’ willingness to pay a high price for GI products is thus weakened. In this 
circumstance, the “Lemon market” may appear as individual small-scale GI producers 
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may prefer to increase their incomes through decreasing inputs consequently. Some 
middle-large scale middlemen/processors thus started to build their own trademarks as 
distinct from general GI products in order to obtain high economic rewards in the 
market (see also Jin, 2011).  
 
Thirdly, previous research has asserted the argument that GIs are a way for farmers to 
escape the “control” of the “industrial” agrifood system (e.g. Millstone and Lang 2003; 
Renard, 2005). Within the industrial agrifood system, retailers and processors, 
especially large-scale retailers, gain a higher income than farmers based on their huge 
buying and distribution abilities (Renard, 2005). GIs are supposed to empower 
qualified farmers/producers and give them a chance to capture extra value in the 
agrifood network through establishing their own quality definitions (Hayes et al., 
2004). However, Chinese GI schemes do not appear as an “alternative” system which 
has a competitive relationship with the “industrial” approach. After 20 years of 
development, the modern industrial agrifood system has not been well developed in 
many areas in China, especially in the rural areas, because of the highly fragmented 
farm land, a lack of a fully developed credit mechanism, ineffective logistical systems, 
low education levels of farmers and so on (Guo, 2008). Farmers within many GI 
networks still work in a traditional way — farmers sell their products by themselves 
or by small-scale middlemen and the channel cost is thus considerable. Therefore, in 
the face of strong market competition, Chinese GI producers do not see themselves as 
an “alternative” standing at the opposite end of the spectrum to the industrial agrifood 
system. Many farmers and even government officers support the modern industrial 
conventions agrifood system (i.e. contract farming system) as a good way to stabilise 
or even increase farmers’ incomes because of the advantage that specialisation can 
bring (see also Guo, 2008; Hu, 2010). The “blur” between the “industrial” agrifood 
system and the “alternative” GI system appears valid in China. Value distribution in 
the Chinese GI system is thus not very different from the “industrial” system where 
middlemen and processors capture most value based on their advanced market 
knowledge and “purchasing power” through the quality criteria which they initiated.  
 
The Chinese GI system is in many ways a mixture of European and American GI 
models as Chinese GI products are protected by both sui generis protection 
regulations like the European model and the trademark law as the American model 
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(see Section 2.5). However, because Chinese GI networks are operating in a very 
different context from both Europe and America, a range of differences between 
Chinese and “Western” GI schemes are found. To appreciate these differences, the 
thesis proposes the following table: 
 
Chinese GI schemes “Western” GI schemes 
 The government manages GI 
networks alone; 
 the GI system is developed under the 
government aim to increase farmers’ 
incomes; 
 GIs are a promotional tool and 
certain quality characteristics cannot 
be secured by GI schemes;  
 “blurs” appear between the 
“industrial” agrifood system and the 
“alternative” GI system;  
 middlemen/processors rather than 
farmers obtain a high economic 
reward in GI networks; 
 small-scale producers sell the 
product under the GI, but many 
middle-large scale producers have 
now started to build their own 
trademarks;  
 formal associations/ farmers’ 
co-operatives (including GI holders) 
have no authority in regulating 
members’ activities with a lax GI 
issuing procedure.  
 Producer co-operatives, the 
government and/or the third party 
manage GI networks together; 
 quickly developed with “consumers’ 
quality re-orientation” over the last 
two decades;  
 GIs are both a promotion tool and a 
quality sign as GI products are 
consistent with “pre-set” quality 
characteristics;  
 the GI system present itself to the 
market as a alternative network to the 
“industrial” agrifood system; 
 farmers are empowered and have a 
chance to get a higher income 
compared to the industrial agrifood 
system; 
 producers prefer to sell their products 
under GIs for a high economic 
reward; 
 strong producer co-operatives 
propose GI standards and regulate 
members’ activities. 
Table 8. 5: Conceptualising differences between Chinese and “Western” GI schemes 
 
8.4 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has provided a comparative evaluation of the three cases. Section 8.2 
continued to provide further analysis of the empirical material while Section 8.3 
focused on broader theoretical concerns.  
 
The findings reveal the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the three sample cases 
operated in Jiangxi province, China. Wary of making generalisations, the evaluation 
suggests that, despite the diversity of power relationships involved in the quality 
construction process, the three sample cases are in fact quite similar in terms of 
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limited influence of GI schemes on quality. The conceptual discussions raised various 
critical comments concerning agrifood literature. This included the application of the 
conceptual framework in analysing agrifood quality and the impact of Chinese GI 
schemes on quality and income distribution. The most essential arguments are: 1. the 
Chinese GI system is developed with the intention to raise rural incomes rather than 
responding to consumers’ quality demands and farmers’ empowering requirements; 2. 
as the Chinese GI system is managed by the government alone, the quality of GI 
agrifood products is difficult to ensure. Crucially, these comments do not diminish the 
value of GIs in helping small-scale farmers distinguish their products from other 
similar products and improve rural incomes
94
, but simply suggest that the quality of 
Chinese GI agrifood products may not be better than other similar non-GI products 
and it is not easy for Chinese farmers to obtain a high income through GI schemes. 
The findings clearly raise various issues for future research. These are included in 
Chapter 9, which returns to assess the six objectives established at the start of the 


















                                                        
94 Small-scale producers still prefer to sell their products under the GI 
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This final chapter of the thesis provides a summary of the key findings and is 
comprised of three sections. Section 9.2 revisits the aim and objectives of the research 
and summarises the main theoretical and empirical arguments outlined in the thesis. 
Section 9.3 discusses the implications of the research, especially in terms of directions 
for future research. Finally, the chapter ends by offering some brief concluding 
remarks about the thesis overall. 
 
9.2 Summary of key findings in relation to the research aim and 
objectives 
 
It is useful to begin this summary by restating the overall aim of the study. It will be 
remembered from Chapter 1 that the thesis aimed to “evaluate the effectiveness of GIs 
in terms of developing agrifood quality in contemporary China”. Compared to the 
stated functions of Western GIs, namely to act as third-party certification to help make 
the quality judgement for consumers and therefore improve producers’ economic 
rewards and rural incomes, the influence of Chinese GI schemes on quality is 
questionable, especially in the current context of the Chinese food safety regulatory 
system, a system criticised by many researchers (e.g. Tam and Yang, 2005; Roth et al., 
2008).  
 
After introducing the research aim, the research focused on six key objectives to 
explore the relationships between agrifood quality and Chinese GI schemes: firstly, 
developing a conceptual framework to analyse agrifood quality; secondly, reviewing 
shifting quality meanings in the world agrifood sector and the role of GIs in 
constructing agrifood quality in several “Western” countries; thirdly, examining the 
social-economic environment of the Chinese GI system; fourthly, developing a 
research methodological approach in order to undertake empirical analysis in China; 
fifthly, exploring the contribution of GIs in the construction of quality of specific 
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Chinese agrifood products through selected case studies; and finally, to provide an 
overall evaluation of the Chinese GI system in the construction of quality. The detail 
of these key objectives that helped to achieve the overall aim of the thesis is revisited 
below and the key findings summarised for each objective. 
 
1. To establish a conceptual framework for analysing agrifood quality 
The review of the academic literature on quality comprised two key elements. First, a 
critical survey of existing literature associated with quality was undertaken. Secondly, 
based on a general quality perspective, a conceptual framework for agrifood quality 
was built based on socio-economic theory and the network approach. The following 
commentary recaps some of the main arguments arising.  
 
Initially, a series of published papers from a management perspective to define or 
explore quality were reviewed (e.g. Juran, 1951; Feigenbaum, 1956; Levitt, 1960; 
Garvin, 1987; Crosby, 1979; Harvey et al., 2004; Kotler and Keller, 2006; Sung, 
2010). Responding to the question about “what is quality?” the literature review 
traced the historical roots of the “quality” concept. Informed by debates, a key 
distinction between a producer based quality conception and a consumer based quality 
conception in theory was highlighted. As quality criteria change over time and both 
consumers’ requirements and producers’ participation cannot be denied when 
examining and evaluating quality (e.g. Logothetis, 1992; Crosby et al., 2003), quality 
is believed to be difficult to define (Parrott et al., 2002). Thus, the analysis of quality 
must be set against the relevant context.  
 
Following this review, one of the key arguments of the thesis was developed, namely 
“how to concepture agrifood quality”. After reviewing different researchers’ opinions 
on agrifood quality from different perspectives (e.g. Ilbery and Kneafsey, 2000b; 
Parrott et al., 2002; Winter, 2003a; Harvey et al., 2004; Marsden, 2004; Morgan et al., 
2006; Kneafsey et al., 2008), agrifood quality is indicated as a social construction 
“dependent on the socio-cultural, political and economic contexts” (Ilbery and 
Kneafsey, 2000a p.219). In other words, although agrifood quality is difficult to 
define from simply a production or consumption perspective alone, it can be 
understood and analysed through exploring inter-relationships between different 




After presenting the conceptual framework for agrifood quality, the research 
continued to explore the theory and the approach that underpinned the conceptual 
framework to inform the design of a coherent research strategy. After comparing 
traditional economic, political economy, socio-economic theories, and, the chain, 
commodity circuits, networks, actor network approaches, the socio-economic theory 
and the network approach were viewed as being the most suitable perspectives with 
which to explore agrifood quality development processes and thus to understand 
agrifood quality. And, “power relationships” were used to assess the shifting 
“inter-relationships” amongst different actors in the network.  
 
2. To review shifting quality meanings in the world agrifood sector and the role of GIs 
in constructing agrifood quality in a range of geographical contexts 
According to the conceptual framework, agrifood quality is formed under different 
power relationships between various actors in specific contexts. To understand the 
power relationships involved in quality construction processes within GI networks, 
power relationships and relevant quality meanings in different agrifood systems were 
examined and several GI networks were analysed. 
 
Three agrifood systems were reviewed: the industrial agrifood system, alternative 
agrifood networks (AAFNs) and GI networks. Within the industrial agrifood system, 
the “industrial” or “institutionalised” quality standards reflect large-scale industrial 
production (Renard, 2005). As such quality conventions are always made under the 
preferences of giant processors and large-scale retailers, farmers usedly lose control in 
the agrifood system and products with very “basic” quality characteristics are 
presented into the market to save cost and maximise economic rewards (Murdoch and 
Miele, 1999). Although most consumers enjoyed a rise in mass agrifood products 
produced by the industrial agrifood system at low cost, the succession of agrifood 
crises over the last two decades has actually changed some consumers’ confidence in 
the industrial system (Goodman, 1999). Many consumers “turn” to “quality” rather 
than “price” and “quantity” to choose what they eat. Therefore, AAFNs appeared as a 
distinct attractive alternative to the industrial system. To meet different consumers’ 
quality requirements, AAFNs present a series of quality characteristics into the market, 
e.g. products perceived as healthier (e.g. organic products and GMO free products), 
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local (e.g. products with GI labels), with improved animal welfare (e.g. “free range” 
products), or more sensitive to the ecological environment (Nygard and Storstad, 
1998; Winter, 2003a, b). The GI system which concentrates on localised quality is a 
branch of AAFNs as agrifood quality is believed to be directly related to the location 
where it is grown or reared by many consumers (e.g. Renard, 2003; Mansfield, 2003a, 
b). As GIs may not only meet consumers’ quality requirements but also help local 
farmers distinguish agrifood products from anonymous mass produced goods, GIs 
provide an opportunity for qualified farmers/producers to capture extra value in the 
market (Hayes et al., 2004). Consequently, the GI system is widely supported by 
many countries/areas around the world, such as China and the E.U. 
 
The GI system focuses on location to promote quality. But, according to the 
conceptual framework, the specific quality meanings and quality construction 
processes may vary between different GI networks. To understand how power 
relationships form different quality characteristics in different GI networks, three GI 
networks, Cassis wine, Parma ham and Florida citrus, were explored and compared. 
The result provides evidence to support the conceptual framework and demonstrates 
that the quality meaning and construction processes vary in different contexts. 
Therefore, the agrifood quality under Chinese GI schemes is worthy of being a 
suitable research topic. 
 
3. To examine the social-economic environment of the Chinese GI system with specific 
foci upon the food safety regulatory system and GI legislative system in contemporary 
China 
Chapter 3 of the thesis was devoted to meet objective three and comprised two main 
themes according to the conceptual framework. One outlined the driving force of the 
Chinese government to develop the GI system through social and economic 
motivations; the other one was dedicated to exploring the political context by 
analysing the political enforcement of general food safety laws/regulations on 
agrifood quality forming processes and examining Chinese legislative system of GIs.  
 
The first theme summarised the key characteristics of the Chinese agricultural system, 
a rapidly increasing agrifood output, highly fragmented farm lands with millions of 
small-scale farmers, a widening gap between rural and urban incomes, and an 
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increasing consumer demand for quality agrifood products. The overall conclusion 
was that increasing farmers’ incomes had captured the Chinese government’s attention. 
In face of a large number of small-scale farmers and increasing consumers’ quality 
demands, GIs are promoted by the government not only to meet consumers’ quality 
requirements but more importantly to improve farm and rural incomes and retain 
social stability and harmony.  
 
The second theme reviewed the safety situation in the contemporary Chinese food 
system and indicated that maintaining a stable quality level or securing minimum 
safety levels of food products in China is not easy because of too many laws, a 
fragmented regulatory system, an ineffective production and marketing monitoring 
system, and an active counterfeiting businesses (e.g. Tam and Yang, 2005; Calvin et 
al., 2006; Roth et al., 2008; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). Although 
an important distinction between GI and normal agrifood products is supposed to be 
“quality”, under this circumstance, the degree to which the complicated GI system 
(three GI frameworks are involved) successfully secured the safety level and other 
specific quality characteristics in the Chinese agrifood sector can be seriously 
questioned.  
 
4. To develop a research methodological approach in order to undertake empirical 
analysis in three selected Chinese GI networks 
After examining different paradigms and research strategies under social research 
categories, this research adopted the interpretivist paradigm and case study research 
strategy. With 67 GI networks in Jiangxi province, China, where the writer comes 
from, three sample cases, namely “Gannan navel orange”, “Nanfeng mandarin” and 
“Wuyuan green tea”, were carefully chosen based on the criteria identified in the 
literature review section that may influence power relationships, such as cultivation 
history, legislative frameworks involved and network structure (including the diverse 
actors), and a pilot research which involved 8 scholars and 12 consumers. 
 
After collecting primary data through semi-structured interviewing and secondary 
data through documentary research methods, qualitative data was analysed in three 
phases, namely transcription, classification, and connection (Kitchin and Tate, 2000) 
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with the help of a specifically designed software for qualitative data management 
called Nvivo8 for ensuring reliability. After the data analyse stage, coded and 
retrieved data were reported as three realist tales (using the language of the facts and 
writing in the third person with a realistic style) based on three cases. 
 
5. To assess the contribution of GIs in the construction of quality of specific Chinese 
agrifood products 
The analysis of three sample cases was completed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7 of the thesis 
respectively. The first theme of each chapter provided a detailed background of the 
respective GI product based on documentary and preliminary research. The main 
emphasis of this theme was on introducing the development of the GI network and 
identifying the main actors involved in the quality forming process. After introducing 
respondents, the second theme of each chapter presented an analysis of the selected 
GI network mainly based on primary data. Crucially, the case studies followed the 
thesis’ conceptual framework for agrifood quality and focused on power relationships 
to explore the quality forming process in the networks reflecting government 
enforcement, organisational influences, economic relationships, and the impact of 
other factors.  
 
All three case studies suggest that the quality development process in these GI 
networks is primarily influenced by economic relationships. “Pre-set” GI standards do 
not have a great impact on quality through GI issuing procedures or quality inspection 
programmes by associations or the government. 
 
6. To provide an overall evaluation of the Chinese GI system in the construction of 
quality  
The comparative evaluation of the three product sectors was completed in Chapter 8 
of the thesis. The analysis first compared the findings for the three case studies then 
expanded the evaluative work into a broader theoretical debate.  
 
Despite their diversity, the three sample cases are actually quite similar in terms of the 
influence of GI schemes on quality. For example, GI standards in all three networks 
are very “basic”, inappropriate or little or no quality checking involved in the GI 
issuing procedure, and no associations or farmers’ co-operatives to play an important 
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role in the quality forming process. The limited influence of GI schemes on quality is 
a common point in the three cases. In term of the broader agrifood debate, the power 
relationship had been indicated as an essential clue to understand and analyse agrifood 
quality. Also, the significant differences between Chinese and “Western” GI schemes 
were summarised in Table 8.2. Overall, the key messages are: the operating procedure, 
driving force and value distribution system are very different between the Chinese and 
Western countries’ GI systems, and the quality of Chinese GI agrifood products may 
not be better than other similar non-GI products.  
 
Based on these findings, the following section will outline directions for future 
research. This discussion completes the final objective of the thesis, to establish a 
foundation for future study.  
 
9.3 Direction for future research 
 
As noted earlier, this research tries to evaluate the effectiveness of GIs in terms of 
developing agrifood quality in contemporary China through the lens of three sample 
cases. Based on the primary and secondary data collected and analysed, the 
effectiveness of GIs in enhancing quality has been evaluated and a number of 
important directions for future research has been briefly highlighted in Chapter 8. At 
this juncture, six key areas for future research are identified systematically. The first 
three are direct extensions of the research while the last three recognise a wider 
research need within Chinese agrifood studies. The rest of the section will briefly 
appraise each of the six possibilities in turn.  
 
Like any research project, it is important to draw lines around what can and cannot be 
achieved. This thesis is not different. The first recommended extension is therefore to 
include those “missing actors in the GI network”. In this research, this would include 
the input (e.g. fertilisers and chemical pesticides) suppliers and final consumers. Both 
of them are important. The information that input suppliers offered would increase the 
reliability of the research, especially with respect to the safety issue. Interviewing 
consumers is particularly important too. Indeed, the need to examine the agrifood 
system from a consumer perspective is already well recognised in the literature (e.g. 
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Goodman, 2003; Kotler and Keller, 2006). The research originally set out to do this 
and included conducting a pilot consumer survey about GI products sold in Nanchang 
city, Jiangxi province. On reflection, such an attitude survey needed more detailed 
consideration and is therefore recommended as an important extension of the research. 
This might include, for example, detailed consumer based field work with people who 
buy or do not buy three GI products to assess why they do so. Meanwhile, since the 
quality aspect attracts researchers’ attention, a large volume of work has been carried 
out to examine producers-consumers relations (e.g. Ilbery and Kneafsey, 2000a; 
Huffman et al., 2007; Sung, 2010). This thesis also has shown that more research is 
clearly needed on exploring the role of consumers and consumption practice in the 
developing and shaping of quality characteristics of GI products. Such work could, for 
instance, consider the impact of business relationships on perceived quality from a 
consumer perspective; what are the motivations for consumers to purchase GI 
products? Can direct selling activities enhance the quality reliability for consumers? 
Which one, GIs or trademarks, are more reliable for consumers to judge quality and 
why? 
 
The second extension is to conduct longitudinal based research on the three cases. The 
case studies clearly indicate the remarkable changes in the three GI networks over the 
last decade. For example, the varieties, the network structure and market price have 
changed a lot in the Wuyuan green tea network. Juska et al. (2000) and Lockie (2002) 
indicated that power is unstable and reversible. It would be instructive to re-assess the 
nature of the investigation within a five or ten year period of time to examine the 
impact of different factors and actors on the quality development process. For 
example, will the set up of a fully developed credit mechanism bring Gannan navel 
orange producers into an industrial system? Can local government play a more active 
role in the Nanfeng mandarin network to regulate production activities if the price 
continues to decrease in the future?  
 
The third extension is to conduct a comparative study. This might include a 
comparison with different GI products (such as chicken, fish, and wine) from different 
provinces to examine potential differences between GI networks and generate more 
reliable results. For example, the power relationships involved in quality development 
processes in GI networks located in the north of China where large-scale industrial 
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agrifood production system dominates may be very different from GI networks in 
Jiangxi province. Also, as mentioned before, this research focuses on the national 
market rather than international markets. The comparative study between these two 
elements within the same GI network may provide more information about the impact 
of different actors in the quality forming process. The role that the local government 
plays in the GI network may thus become clearer through comparing the stricter 
government enforcement in international markets and the weaker government 
enforcement in the national market.  
 
Beside three recommended extensions, during the course of this thesis, three areas 
have developed which warrant future research attention. Based on the evaluation 
chapter, the first area requiring applied research attention is how to combine the GI 
schemes with the local production system more effectively. Missing a well developed 
industrial stage in the Chinese agrifood sector, GIs are mainly treated as a 
promotional tool to improve farm and rural incomes, rather than a quality sign to meet 
changing consumers’ attitudes to industrial agrifood products. Thus, research is 
urgently required to explore the methods to develop an effective GI network which 
can encourage producers to attend GI management programmes and which may thus 
generate appropriate GI standards, avoid the appearance of “Lemon markets”, and 
provide “quality” GI products under effective GI issuing procedures. Such research 
might include more extensive surveys to explore how to stimulate producers to 
become more involved in GI management schemes and address the obstacles to 
establishing independent quality inspectors.  
 
The second area of research recommended here is to examine the position of 
associations/farmers’ co-operatives and the government in the Chinese GI network. In 
China, recent years have witnessed considerable academic and political interest in the 
potential of associations/farmers’ co-operatives in enhancing farmers’ incomes (e.g. 
Guo, 2008; Hu, 2009; Wang et al., 2009; Sun, 2009) and the position of the 
government within the economic system (Wang, 2010; Fu et al., 2011). As 
associations/farmers’ co-operatives funded by the government have had limited value 
in Chinese GI networks, an important research question is raised which relates to the 
wisdom of enabling such associations/farmers’ co-operatives to regulate their 
members’ activities, respond to requirements of consumers/buyers effectively and to 
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protect their members’ benefits successfully in an increasingly sensitive market. 
Meanwhile, the position of the government in GI networks is complicated. Wrapped 
up in this debate is a wider research concern about the Chinese government’s 
regulatory system. Research is thus required to assure how an “effective” GI network 
can be developed in a certain political environment.  
 
The third area to explore is how to secure and enhance agrifood safety in the Chinese 
agrifood sector. Theoretically, consumers can influence production activities through 
their “purchasing power”. But, without agency, it is impossible for individual 
consumers to regulate producers’ activities and thus ensure the quality of agrifood 
products in the market, especially in the invisible safety aspect (see also Mulgan, 
1989). With weak government enforcement and ineffective associations/farmers’ 
co-operatives, in face of regular agrifood quality scandals, there is an increasing need 
to find a way to ensure agrifood safety and protect consumers’ rights.  
 
9.4 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the overall research objectives have been met. The 
thesis has provided an important conceptual framework for agrifood quality and 
empirical insight in terms of understanding the quality development process in 
Chinese GI networks. Throughout, the thesis has explored the use of the term “GIs” 
on developing quality within the Chinese agrifood system. Following the three GI 
networks, the results show the development of Chinese GI networks is driven by 
government with the intention to raise farm and rural incomes rather than in response 
to consumers’ quality requirements, and consequently there remains a focus on 
economic rather than quality concerns. “Basic” GI standards, inappropriate GI issuing 
procedures and weak government enforcement in securing quality based on GI 
standards are becoming unavoidable results. Therefore, an overall conclusion argues 
that the quality of Chinese GI products cannot be secured by Chinese GI schemes 
alone in contemporary China. Such a conclusion does not deny the value associated 
with GIs, at least in an ideological sense. Rather, it is argued that believing GIs can 
bring quality products for consumers and a high income for their producers is too 
simplistic and arbitrary. The effectiveness of GIs on enhancing quality and increasing 




Form a quality perspective, the research shows that Chinese GI schemes cannot 
secure the expected/desired quality characteristics commonly assocaited with GI 
products in the “West”. GIs are treated as a promotional tool rather than a quality sign. 
But, from a rural development perspective, the thesis strongly supports the view that 
the GIs may be a useful tool to enable producers to “add value” to primary products as 
the Wuyuan green tea network demonstrated. This advantage encourages local 
governments to develop GI networks initially. However, the government needs to be 
aware of the danger of bureaucracy and must not be too narrow in their approach 
towards simplifying GI standards and the GI issuing procedure as part of rural 
development projects.  
 
The Chinese GI system is very different from that in Western countries, especially in 
empowering farmers and securing “pre-set” quality characteristics due to specific 
socio-economic environments. Effectively developing the Chinese GI system to 
obtain the benefits of GI schemes requires the attention of specialists and researchers 
in the system design and production monitoring processes. Of course, before that, 




















Acebron, L. and Dopico, D. (2000) 'The Importance of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Cues to 
Expected and Experienced Quality: An Empirical Application for Beef'. Food 
Quality and Preference 11 (3), 229-238  
Addor, F. and Grazioli, A. (2002) 'Geographical Indications beyond Wines and Spirits: 
A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical Indications in the 
WTO/TRIPS Agreement'. The Journal of World Intellectual Property 5 (6), 
865-898  
Akerlof, G. (1970) 'The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism'. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (August), 488-500  
Alasuutari, P., Brannen, J., and Bickman, L. (2009) 'Social Research in Changing 
Social Conditions'. in The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods. ed. by 
Alasuutari, P., Bickman, L., and Brannen, J. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1-8  
Allacre, G. and Boyer, R. (1995) The Great Transformation of Agriculture. Paris: 
INRA Economica  
Allaire, G. (2004) 'Quality in Economics: A Cognitive Perspective'. in Qualities of 
Food. ed. by Harvey, M., McMeekin, A., and Warde, A. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 61-93  
Allanson, P. (1992) 'Farm Size Structure in England and Wales, 1939-89'. Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 43 (2), 137-148  
Allen, J. (2003) Lost Geographies of Power. Malden/Oxford/Melbourne/Berlin: 
Blackwell Publishing  
Allen, P. and Kovach, M. (2000) 'The Capitalist Composition of Organic: The 
Potential of Markets in Fulfilling the Promise of Organic Agriculture'. Agriculture 
and Human Values 17 (3), 221-232  
American Society for Quality (2010) Glossary [online] available from 
<http://www.asq.org/glossary/q.html> [30, April 2010]  
Anania, G. and Nisticò, R. (2004) 'Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in 
Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute Cannot be Fully Trusted?'. 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 160 (4), 681-701  
Appadurai, A. (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. 
Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press  
 
 224 
Ash, R. (2006) 'Population Change and Food Security in China'. in Critical Issues in 
Contemporary China. ed. by Tubikewicz, C. New York and London: Routledge, 
143-166  
Atkins, P. and Bowler, I. (2001) Food in Society: Economy, Culture, Geography. 
London: Arnold  
Atkinson, P. and Coffey, A. (1997) 'Analysing Documentary Realities'. in Qualitative 
Research: Theory, Method, and Practice. ed. by Silverman, D. London: Sage, 
77-92 
Babcock, B. A. and Clemens, R. (2004) Geographical Indications and Property 
Rights: Protecting Value-Added Agricultural Products, MATRIC Briefing Paper 
04-MBP 7. Ames, Iowa 50011-1070: Midwest Agribusiness Trade Research and 
Information Center, Iowa State University  
Barham, E. (2003) 'Translating Terroir: The Global Challenge of French AOC 
Labeling'. Journal of Rural Studies 19 (3), 127-138  
Barling, B. (2004) 'Food Agencies as an Institutional Response to Policy Failure by 
the UK and the EU'. in Qualities of Food. ed. by Harvey, M., McMeekin, A., and 
Warde, A. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 108-128  
Barro, R. (2000) 'Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries'. Journal of Economic 
Growth 5 (1), 5-32  
Bateman, H., Sargeant, H., and McAdam, K. (2006) Dictionary of Food Science and 
Nutrition. London: A &C Black Publishers Ltd.  
Beardsworth, A. and Keil, T. (1997) Sociology on the Menu: An Invitation to the 
Study of Food and Society. London: Routledge  
Beck, U. (2001) 'Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured 
Uncertainties'. in The New Social Theory Reader: Contemporary Debates. ed. by 
Seidman, S. and Alexander, J. London: Routledge, 267-275  
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. trans. by Ritter, M. London: 
Sage  
BeiJing ZhongJunShiJi GIs Researching Team (2011) The Second Investigation 
Report of the GIs in China [online] available from 
<http://district.ce.cn/zg/201101/15/t20110115_22143582.shtml> [15, Sep. 2011]  
Bell, D. and Valentine, G. (1997) Consuming Geographies: We are Where we Eat. 
London: Routledge  
 
 225 
Benbrook, C., Zhao, X., Yáñez, J., Davies, N., and Andrews, P. (2008) New Evidence 
Confirms the Nutritional Superiority of Plant-Based Organic Foods [online] 
available from 
<http://www.organic-center.org/reportfiles/5367_Nutrient_Content_SSR_FINAL_
V2.pdf> [2, May 2010]  
Bendell, T. (1989) The Quality Gurus: What can they do for Your Company?. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry  
Benton, T. (1994) 'Biology and Social Theory in the Environmental Debate'. in Social 
Theory and Global Environment. ed. by Redcliff, M. and Benton, T. London: 
Routledge, 28-50  
Beresford, L. (1999) Symposium on the International Protection of Geographical 
Indications. 'The Protection of Geographical Indications in the United States of 
America'. held 1 & 2, Sep. at Somerset West, cape Province, South Africa: WIPO  
Bergeaud-Blackler, F. (2004) 'Social Definitions of Halal Quality: The Case of 
Maghrebi Muslims in France'. in Qualities of Food. ed. by Harvey, M., McMeekin, 
A., and Warde, A. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
94-107  
Biggart, N. and Beamish, T. (2003) 'The Economic Sociology of Conventions: Habit, 
Custom, Practice, and Routine in Market Order'. Annual Review of Sociology 29, 
443-464  
Blaikie, N. (2000) Designing Social Research. Cambridge: Polity Press  
Block, F. (1990) Postindustrial Possibilities: A Critique of Economic Discourse. 
Berkeley: University of California Press  
Bloor, D. (1999) 'Anti-Latour'. Studies in History & Philosophy of Science Part A 
30A (1), 81-112  
Bonanno, A., Busch, L., Friedland, W., Gouveia, L., and Mingione, E. (eds.) (1994) 
From Columbus to ConAgra: The Globalization of Agriculture and Food. Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas  
Boston Consulting Group (2010) A New BCG Study Finds that Middle-Class and 
Affluent Consumers in China's Smaller Cities are More Eager to Spend and Trade 
Up than their Big-City Counterparts [online] available from 
<http://www.bcg.com/media/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?id=tcm:12-65132> [10, 
June 2011]  
 
 226 
Bowen, S. and Zapata, A. (2009) 'Geographical Indications, Terroir, and 
Socioeconomic and Ecological Sustainability: The Case of Tequila'. Journal of 
Rural Studies 25 (1), 108-119  
Bowler, I. and Ilbery, B. (1987) 'Redefining Agricultural Geography'. Area 19 (4), 
327-332  
Bristow, M. (2007) China Tackles Tainted Food Crisis [online] available from 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6288096.stm> [6, May 2010]  
Brogaard, S. and Zhao, X. (2002) 'Rural Reforms and Changes in Land Management 
and Attitudes: A Case Study from Inner Mongolia, China'. Ambio 31, 219-225  
Brown, A. (2010) 'The Legal/Accounting Milieu of the French Wine Industry'. Legal 
Issues in Business: The Wine Industry (12), 11-18  
Bryman, A. (2008) Social Research Method. 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press  
Bryman, A. and Burgess, R. (eds.) (1994) Analyzing Qualitative Data. London: 
Routledge  
Burningham, K. and Cooper, G. (1999) 'Being Constructive: Social Constructionism 
and the Environment'. Sociology 33 (2), 297-316  
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis. London: Heinemann  
Busch, L. and Juska, A. (1997) 'Beyond Political Economy: Actor-Networks and the 
Globalisation of Agriculture'. Review of International Political Economy 4 (4), 
688-708  
Buttel, F. (1996) 'Theoretical Issues in Global Agrifood Restructuring'. in 
Globalization and Agri-Food Restructuring: Perspectives from the Australasia 
Region. ed. by Burch, D., Rickson, R., and Lawrence, G. Aldershot: Avebury, 
17-44  
Cain, P. and Hopkins, A. (1993) British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 
1688-1914. London: Longman  
Callon, M., Méadel, C., and Rabeharisoa, V. (2002) 'The Economy of Qualities'. 
Economy and Society 31 (2), 194-217  
Callon, M. (1998) 'Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in 
Economics'. in the Laws of the Market. ed. by Callon, M. Oxford: Blackwell, 1-57  
 
 227 
Callon, M. (1991) 'Techno-Economic Networks and Irreversibility'. in A Sociology of 
Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination. ed. by Law, J. London: 
Routledge, 132-161  
Calvin, L., Gale, F., Hu, D., and Lohmar, B. (2006) 'Food Safety: Improvements 
Underway in China'. Amber Waves 4 (5), 16-21  
Castree, N. (1996) 'Birds, Mice and Geography: Marxism and Dialectics'. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 21 (2), 342-362  
Celine, A. (1998) The Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée (AOC) and Other Official 
Product Identification Standards [online] available from 
<www.rural.org/publications/aoc.pdf> [20, June 2011]  
Cheng, G. and Li, Z. (2006) 'The Development of Wuyuang Green Tea Industry in the 
Tenth Five-Year Planning'. Newsletter of Sericulture and Tea (124), 25-26  
Cheng, H. (2006) 'The History of Wuyuan Tea Industry'. Agricultural Archaeology 2, 
287-290  
China Daily (2008) Chinese Farmers' Income to be Doubled [online] available from 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-10/13/content_7097899.htm> [10, 
June 2010]  
China Daily (2004) Rural Income Rises, but Growth Slow [online] available from 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/26/content_300981.htm> [10, 
June 2010]  
China Quality Daily (2009) The Effects of Protection LongJing Tea as an GI Product 
[online] available from <http://shipin.people.com.cn/GB/9984103.html> [7, May 
2010]  
Cloke, P., Cook, I., Crang, P., Goodwin, M., Painter, J., and Philo, C. (2004) 
Practicing Human Geography. London: Sage  
Cloke, P., Le Heron, R., and Roche, M. (1990) 'Towards a Geography of Political 
Economy Perspective on Rural Change: The Example of New Zealand'. 
Geografiska Annaler 72B (1), 13-25  
Comité National des Appellations d'Origine (2010) Superficie et Recolte Par Region 
2008 [online] available from 
<https://www.inao.gouv.fr/fichier/AOC-Vins-2008-superficie-recolte-par-region.xl
s> [29, June 2011]  
Cook, I., and Crang, P. (1996) 'The World on a Plate: Culinary Culture, Displacement 
and Geographical Knowledges'. Journal of Material Culture 1 (2), 131-153 
 
 228 
Cook, I., Crang, P., and Thorpe, M. (1996) Paper Presented at the IBG/RGS Annual 
Conference. 'Amos Gitai's Ananas: Commodity Systems, Documentary 
Filmmaking and New Geographies of Food'. held Jan. at Glasgow University  
Cornia, G. and Court, J. (2001) Inequality, Growth and Poverty in the Era of 
Liberalization and Globalization. Helsinki, Finland: UNU World Institute for 
Development Economics Research  
Countiss, A. and Tilley, D. (1995) 'Protocol Analysis of Meat Buyer's Product 
Selection'. Agribusiness 11 (1), 87-95  
Crosby, L., DeVito, R., and Pearson, J. (2003) 'Manage Your Customers' Perception 
of Quality'. Review of Business 24 (1), 18-24  
Crosby, P. (1979) Quality is Free: The Art of Making Quality Certain. New York: 
New American Library  
Crotty, M. (1998) The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in 
the Research Process. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage  
Csurgó, B., Kovách, I., and Kučerov, E. (2008) 'Knowledge, Power and Sustainability 
in Contemporary Rural Europe'. Sociologia Ruralis 48, 292-312  
Dahl, R. (1989) Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press  
Daly, M., Wilson, M., and Vasdev, S. (2001) 'Income Inequality and Homicide Rates 
in Canada and the United'. Canadian Journal of Criminology 43 (219), 236  
Das, K. (2006) 'International Protection of India's Geographical Indications with 
Special Reference to 'Darjeeling' Tea'. The Journal of World Intellectual Property 
9 (5), 459-495  
Data Monitor (2004) French Wines: Consumption Concerns in the Bordeaux 
Vineyards [online] available from 
<http://www.datamonitor.com/store/News/french_wines_consumption_concerns_i
n_the_bordeaux_vineyards?productid=F0C178FE-F4A8-42E3-9342-8F38D52988
A9> [11, Feb. 2012]  
de Roest, K. and Menghi, A. (2000) 'Reconsidering 'Traditional' Food: The Case of 
Parmigiano Reggiano Cheese'. Sociologia Ruralis 40 (4), 439-451  
Deng, Y. (2005) Middle Class Society a Long Way Off in China [online] available 
from 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/18/content_417241.htm> [7, 
May 2010]  
 
 229 
Denscombe, M. (2002) Ground Rules for Good Research. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press  
Denscombe, M. (1998) The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research 
Projects. Buckingham: Open University Press  
Denton, L. and Xia, K. (1995) 'Food Selection and Consumption in Chinese Markets: 
An Overview'. Journal of International Food and Agribusiness Marketing 7 (1), 
55-77  
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (2005b) 'Paradigms and Perspectives in Contention'. in 
The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (Third Edition). ed. by Denzin, N. 
and Lincoln, Y. London: Sage Publications Ltd., 183-190  
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (2005a) 'Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of 
Qualitative Research'. in The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Third 
Edition). ed. by Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. Thousand Oaks/ London/ New York: 
Sage, 1-32  
Department of Commerce of Jiangxi Province (2003) Guideline of Agriculture 
Industry [online] available from 
<http://www.jxdoftec.gov.cn/chushi/zhaoshang/zsxm_e/mainindex.asp?dm=A01> 
[May, 20 2010]  
Dicken, P., Kelly, P., Olds, K., and Yeung, H. (2001) 'Chains and Networks, 
Territories and Scales: Towards a Relational Framework for Analysing the Global 
Economy'. Global Networks 1 (2), 89-112  
Doel, C. (1996) 'Market Development and Organizational Change: The Case of the 
Food Industry'. in Retailing, Consumption and Capital: Towards the New Retail 
Geography. ed. by Wrigley, N. and Lowe, M. Harlow: Longman, 48-67  
Donald, J. (2009) ' Contested Notions of Quality in a Buyer-Driven Commodity 
Cluster: The Case of Food and Wine in Canada '. European planning studies 17(2), 
263-280  
Dong, J. (2008) 'The Problems and Possible Solutions in the Development Processes 
of the Gannan Navel Orange Industry'. Economic Vision (10), 22-23  
Donkin, S., Dowler, E., Stevenson, S., and Turner, S. (1999) 'Mapping Access to 
Food at a Local Level'. British Food Journal 101 (7), 554-564  
Douglas, M. and Isherwood, B. (1980) The World of Goods: Towards and 
Anthropology of Consumption. Harmondsworth: Penguin  
 
 230 
du Gay, P., Hall, S., Janes, L., Mackay, H., and Negus, K. (1997) Doing Cultural 
Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman. London: Sage  
Dunant, S. and Porter, R. (1996) 'Introducing Anxiety'. in The Age of Anxiety. ed. by 
Dunant, S. and Porter, R. London: Virago Press, ix-xviii  
DuPuis, E. and Goodman, D. (2005) 'Should we Go "Home to Eat?": Toward a 
Reflexive Politics of Localism'. Journal of Rural Study 21, 359-371  
Eden, S., Bear, C., and Walker, G. (2008) 'Understanding and (Dis)Trusting Food 
Assurance Schemes: Consumer Confidence and the 'Knowledge Fix''. Journal of 
Rural Studies 24 (1), 1-24  
Edmonds, R. (2006) 'China's Environmental Problems'. in Crirtical Issues in 
Contemporary China. ed. by Tubilewicz, C. New York and London: Routledge, 
113-142  
Engardio, P., Dexter, R., Balfour, F., and Einhorn, B. (2007) 'Broken China'. Business 
Week July 23 (38), 45  
Eves, A. and Cheng, L. (2007) 'Cross-Cultural Evaluation of Factors Driving 
Intention to Purchase New Food Products – Beijing, China and South-East 
England'. International Journal of Consumer Studies 31 (4), 410-417  
Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D., and Loayza, N. (2002) 'Inequality and Violent Crime'. 
Journal of Law & Economics 45 (1), 1-41  
Fan, H., Ye, Z., Zhao, W., Tian, H., Qi, Y., and Busch, L. (2009) 'Agriculture and 
Food Quality and Safety Certification Agencies in Four Chinese Cities'. Food 
Control 20, 627-630  
Fang, Z., Xu, X., Gu, Q., Liu, S., and Chen, J. (2009) 'A Quality Examination of 
Nanfeng Mandarins from Different Places in the Jiangxi Province'. South China 
Fruits 38 (3), 22-23  
Featherstone, M. (1987) 'Leisure, Symbolic Power and the Life Course'. in Sport, 
Leisure and Social Relations. ed. by Horne, J., Jary, D., and Tomlinson, A. London: 
Routledge, 113-138  
Feigenbaum, A. (1956) 'Total Quality Control'. Harvard Business Review 34 (6), 
93-101  
Fine, B., Heasman, M., and Wright, J. (1996) Consumption in the Age of Affluence: 
The World of Food. New York: Routledge  
 
 231 
Fine, B. (1994) 'Towards a Political Economy of Food'. Review of International 
Political Economy 1 (3), 519-545  
Fischler, C. (1988) 'Food, Self and Identity'. Social Science Information 27 (2), 
275-292  
Fisher, C. (2007) Researching and Writing a Dissertation: A Guidebook for Business 
Students. United Kingdom: Pearson Education Limited  
Flick, U. (1998) An Introduction to Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and 
Applications. London: Sage  
Florida Citrus Mutual (2009) Citrus Statistics [online] available from 
<http://flcitrusmutual.com/citrus-101/citrusstatistics.aspx> [20, June 2011]  
Florida Citrus Mutual (2007) About FCM [online] available from 
<http://www.flcitrusmutual.com/about/fcmoverview.aspx> [5, May 2010]  
Florida Department of Citrus (2010) Scientific Research Home [online] available from 
<http://www.fdocgrower.com/sr.php> [6, May 2010]  
Florida Department of Citrus (2008c) Florida Citrus Commission [online] available 
from <http://www.floridajuice.com/fcc.php> [6, May 2010]  
Florida Department of Citrus (2008b) Florida Department of Citrus [online] available 
from <http://www.floridajuice.com/fdoc.php> [6, May 2010]  
Florida Department of Citrus (2008a) History of Ctrus [online] available from 
<http://www.floridajuice.com/> [5, May 2010]  
Florida's Natural Growers (2010) Co-Op History [online] available from 
<http://www.floridasnatural.com/co-op/history> [5, May 2010]  
Foddy, W. (1993) Constructing Questions for Interviews and Questionnaires: Theory 
and Practice in Social Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
Fontana, A. and Frey, J. (2003) 'The Interview: From Structured Questions to 
Negotiated Text'. in Handbook of Qualitative Research. ed. by Denzin, N. and 
Lincoln, Y. London: Sage, 61-106  
Fonte, M. (2008) 'Knowledge, Food and Place: A Way of Producing, a Way of 
Knowing'. Sociologia Ruralis 48 (3), 200-222  
Food Standards Agency (2011) What the Agency does [online] available from 




Food Standards Australia New Zealand (2011) The Australia New Zealand Food 
Standards Code – A Guide for Consumers [online] available from 
<http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/foodstandards/theaustralianewzeala5151.cfm> 
[13, June 2011]  
Forbes, K. (2000) 'A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and 
Growth'. American Economic Review 90 (4), 869-887  
Found, W. C. (1971) A Theoretical Approach to Rural Land-use Patterns. London: 
Edward Arnold  
Freidberg, S. (2003) 'Culture, Conventions and Colonial Constructs of Rurality in 
South–North Horticultural Trades'. Journal of Rural Studies 19 (1), 97-109  
Friedland, W., Barton, A., and Thomas, R. (1981) Manufacturing Green Gold. New 
York: Cambridge University Press  
Fu, Z., Li, Y., and Song, K. (2011) Changing Economy and the Role Government 
Playing. Beijing: China National School of Administration Press 
Fuller, F., Tuan, F., and Wailes, E. (2002) 'Rising Demand for Meat: Who Will Feed 
China's Hogs?'. in China’s Food and Agriculture: Issues for the 21st Century. ed. 
by Gale, F. Washington, DC: Economic Research Service, United States 
Department of Agriculture, 17-19  
Gade, D. (2004) 'Tradition, Territory, and Terroir in French Viniculture: Cassis, 
France, and Appellation Controlee'. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 94 (4), 848-867  
Gale, F. (2006) 'Food Expenditures by China's High-Income Households'. Journal of 
Food Distribution Research 37 (1), 7-13  
Gale, F., Bryan, L., and Francis, T. (2005) China's New Farm Subsidies. 
http://chinese.hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uploads/images/G3YqRBpWgqBIVX0ef
2Kqvg/uscn_t_usda_2005wrs0501.pdf edn: United States Department of 
Agriculture  
Gamble, P. and Taddei, J. (2007) 'Restructuring the French Wine Industry: The Case 
of the Loire'. Journal of Wine Research 18 (3), 125-145  
Ganzhou Gannan Navel Orange E-Market Co. Ltd (2011) The Marketing Information 
[online] available from <http://www.qcdzjy.com/> [29, July 2011]  
Ganzhou Navel Orange Association (2005) The Regulations of Ganzhou Navel 




8%84%90%E6%A9%99%E5%8D%8F%E4%BC%9A&ct=clnk> [05, March 
2011]  
Garvin, D. (1987) 'Competing on the Eight Dimensions of Quality'. Harvard Business 
Review 65 (6), 101-109  
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (2010) 
Mission [online] available from 
<http://english.aqsiq.gov.cn/AboutAQSIQ/Mission/> [5, May 2010]  
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (2008) A 
Permit of Protecting Rongcheng Green Asparagus, Wuyuan Green Tea, Dafang 
Rhizoma Gastrodiae, Liannan Coreless Lemon, and Zhangxi Apios Americana, as 
GI Products -- no. 122, 2008 [online] available from 
<http://www.aqsiq.gov.cn/zwgk/jlgg/zjgg/2008/200811/t20081114_97325.htm> 
[30, October 2011]  
General Administration for Quality, Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (2005) 
Provisions on Protection of GI Products [online] available from 
<http://www.aqsiq.gov.cn/zwgk/jlgg/zjl/zjl20052006/200610/t20061027_12254.ht
m> [5, May 2010]  
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and 
Standardisation Administration of the People's Republic of China (2008) The 
National Standard: Product of geographic indication — Nanfeng mandarin (GB/T 
19051-2008) [Act of Parliament] Beijing: The General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine  
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and 
Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China (2006) The 
National Standards of the Gannan Navel Orange [Act of Parliament] Beijing: 
China National Standard  
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and 
Standardisation Administration of the People's Republic of China (2003) The 
National Standard: Product of destination of origin or geographic indication — 
Nanfeng orange (GB 19051-2003) [Act of Parliament] Beijing: The General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine  
General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China (2011) 
Regulations for the Implementation of the Standardization Law of the People's 
Republic of China [online] available from 
<http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab637/module18166/info38530.htm
> [27, July 2011]  
 
 234 
Gereffi, G., Korzeniewicz, M., and Korzeniewicz, R. (1994) 'Introduction: Global 
Commodity Chains'. in Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism. ed. by Gereffi, 
G. and Korzeniewicz, M. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1-14  
Goodman, D. (2004) 'Rural Europe Redux? Reflections on Alternative Agro-Food 
Networks and Paradigm Change'. Sociologia Ruralis 44 (1), 3-16  
Goodman, D. (2003) 'The Quality 'Turn' and Alternative Food Practices: Reflections 
and Agenda'. Journal of Rural Studies 19 (1), 1-7  
Goodman, D. (2002) 'Rethinking Food Production–Consumption: Integrative 
Perspectives'. Sociologia Ruralis 42 (4), 271-277  
Goodman, D. and DuPuis, B. (2002) 'Knowing Food and Growing Food: Beyond the 
Production–Consumption Debate in the Sociology of Agriculture'. Sociologia 
Ruralis 42 (1), 5-22  
Goodman, D. (2001) 'Ontology Matters: The Relational Materiality of Nature and 
Agro-Food Studies'. Sociologia Ruralis 41 (2), 182-200  
Goodman, D. (1999) 'Agro-Food Studies in the 'Age of Ecology': Nature, 
Corporeality, Bio-Politics'. Sociologia Ruralis 39 (1), 17-38  
Goodman, D. and Watts, M. (1997) Globalising Food: Global Questions and Global 
Restructuring. London: Routledge  
Granovetter, M. (1985) 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness'. American Journal of Sociology 91 (3), 481-510  
Gu, X. (2005) 'A Notice of the Wuyuan Tea Industry'. Agricultural Archaeology 2, 
374-375  
Guan, X. and Qiu, C. (2011) 'Chinese Tea Consumption'. Chinese Tea Industry 6, 
13-14  
Guba, E. and Lincoln, Y. (2005) 'Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and 
Emerging Influences'. in The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research. ed. by 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 191-215  
Guion, L. (2002) Triangulation: Establishing the Validity of Qualitative Studies 
(Electronic Version). Gainesville: Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, 
University of Florida  
Guo, M. (2008) Developing the Industrial Agriculture Sector in China. Zhengzhou: 
Zhengzhou University Publisher  
 
 235 
Guthman, J. (2004) 'Back to the Land: The Paradox of Organic Food Standards'. 
Environment and Planning 36 (3), 511-528  
Guthman, J. (2008) 'Neoliberalism and the Making of Food Politics in California'. 
Geoforum 39 (3), 1171-1183  
Hamel, J., Dufour, S., and Fortin, D. (1993) Case Study Methods. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage  
Handler, M. (2007) 'Trade Mark Dilution in Australia'. European Intellectual 
Property Review 29 (8), 307-318  
Harvey, D. (2004) 'Policy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political 
Pains'. Agricultural Economics 31 (2-3), 265-275  
Harvey, M., McMeekin, M., and Warde, A. (2004) 'Introduction: Food and Quality'. 
in Qualities of Food. ed. by Harvey, M., McMeekin, M., and Warde, A. 
Manchester: Manchester University, 1-18  
Hayes, D., Lence, S., and Babcock, B. (2005) 'Geographic Indications and 
Farmer-Owned Brands: Why do the U.S. and E.U. Disagree?'. EuroChoices 4 (2), 
28-35  
Hayes, D., Lence, S., and Stoppa, A. (2004) 'Farm-Owned Brands'. Agribusiness 20 
(3), 269-285  
Healey, M. and Rawlinson, M. (1993) 'Interviewing Business Owners and Managers: 
A Review of Methods and Techniques'. Geoforum 24 (3), 339-355  
Heffernan, W., Hendrickson, M., and Gronski, B. (1999) Consolidation in the Food 
and Agriculture System. Washington, D.C.: National Farmers Union  
Henchion, M. and McIntyre, B. (2000) 'Regional Imagery and Quality Products: The 
Irish Experience'. British Food Journal 102 (8), 630-644  
Hendrickson, M. and Heffernan, W. (2002) 'Opening Spaces through Relocalization: 
Locating Potential Resistance in the Weaknesses of the Global Food System'. 
Sociologia Ruralis 42 (4), 347-369  
Hennessy, D. (1998) 'The Production Effects of Agricultural Income Support Policies 
under Uncertainty'. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80 (1), 46-57  
Henson, S. (2000) 'The Process of Food Quality Belief Formation from a Consumer 
Perspective'. in Quality Policy and Consumer Behaviour in the European Union. 
ed. by Becker, T. Kiel: University of Kiel, 73-89  
 
 236 
Henson, S. and Northen, J. (2000) 'Consumer Assessment of the Safety of Beef at the 
Point of Purchase: A Pan-European Study'. Journal of Agricultural 51 (1), 90-205  
Henson, S. and Caswell, J. (1999) 'Food Safety Regulation: An Overview of 
Contemporary Issue'. Food Policy 24 (6), 589-603  
Henson, S. (1995) 'Consumer Willingness to Pay for Reductions in the Risk of Food 
Poisoning in the UK'. Journal of Agricultural Economics 47 (3), 403-420  
Hinrichs, C. (2000) 'Embeddedness and Local Food Systems: Notes on Two Types of 
Direct Agricultural Market'. Journal of Rural Studies 16 (3), 295-302  
Holloway, L., Kneafsey, M., Venn, L., Cox, R., Dowler, E., and Tuomainen, H. (2007) 
'Possible Food Economies: A Methodological Framework for Exploring Food 
Production–Consumption Relationships'. Sociologia Ruralis 47 (1), 1-19  
Hong, T. and Yang, Y. (2009) 'Rising and Declining of Wuyuan Tea Traders'. 
Agricultural Archaeology 2, 272-275  
Horkheimer, M. (1982) Critical Theory. New York: Seabury Press  
Hu, D. (2010) Distribution Agrifood Products to Supermarkets. Beijing: China 
Meteorological Press  
Hu, F. (2008) 'The Price Research of Chinese Grians (from the 1990s)'. China Grain 
Economy (5), 23-25  
Hu, Z. (2009) An Empirical Research of Developing Farmers' Co-Operatives. 
Hangzhou: Zhejing University Press  
Huang, C., Qi, C., and Liu, J. (2011) 'The Gannan Navel Orange Market in 2010'. 
China Fruit News (5), 10-14  
Huang, G. (2007b) 'The Nanfeng Mandarin Industry'. in The Nanfeng Mandarin. ed. 
by Huang, G. Beijing: XinHua Publication, 115-117  
Huang, G. (2007a) 'Good Reputation of Nanfeng Mandarins since the Old Time'. in 
The Nanfeng Mandarin. ed. by Huang, G. BeiJing: XinHua Publication, 17-20  
Huang, Y., Chen, Q., Jiao, Y., Zhou, X., and Guo, Y. (2009) The "Selling Problem" of 
Agrifood Products in Guangdong Province——the Market of Shatang Oranges 
Expanding to the Northern China [online] available from 




Huffman, W., Rousu, M., Shogren, J., and Tegene, A. (2007) 'The Effects of Prior 
Beliefs and Learning on Consumers' Acceptance of Genetically Modified Foods'. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63 (1), 193-206  
Hughes, A. and Reimer, S. (eds.) (2004) Geographies of Commodity Chains. London: 
Routledge/Taylor & Francis  
Hughes, A. (2000) 'Retailers, Knowledges and Changing Commodity Networks: The 
Case of the Cut Flower Trade'. Geoforum 31 (2), 175-190  
Hughes, A. (1996) 'Retail Restructuring and the Strategic Significance of Food 
Retailers' Own-Labels: A UK-USA Comparison'. Environment & Planning A 28 
(12), 2201  
Hunt, S. and Frewer, L. (2001) 'Trust in Sources of Information about Genetically 
Modified Food Risks in the U.K.'. British Food Journal 103 (1), 46-63  
IBM (2008) IBM Survey Reveals Erosion of Trust and Confidence in Food Retailers 
and Manufacturers Grows Internationally [online] available from 
<http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/26268.wss> [6, May 2010]  
Ilbery, B. and Maye, D. (2005b) 'Food Supply Chains and Sustainability: Evidence 
from Specialist Food Producers in the Scottish/English Borders'. Land use Policy 
22 (4), 331-344  
Ilbery, B. and Maye, D. (2005a) 'Alternative (Shorter) Food Supply Chains and 
Specialist Livestock Products in the Scottish-English Borders'. Environment and 
Planning A 37, 823-844  
Ilbery, B., Morris, C., Buller, H., Maye, D., and Kneafsey, M. (2005) 'Product, 
Process and Place: An Examination of Food Marketing and Labelling Schemes in 
Europe and North America'. European Urban & Regional Studies 12 (2), 116-132  
Ilbery, B. and Kneafsey, M. (2000b) 'Registering Regional Speciality Food and Drink 
Products in the United Kingdom: The Case of PDOs and PGIs'. Area 32 (3), 
317-325  
Ilbery, B. and Kneafsey, M. (2000a) 'Producers Constructions of Quality in Regional 
Speciality Food Production: A Case Study from South West England'. Journal of 
Rural Studies 16 (2), 217-230  
Ilbery, B. and Kneafsey, M. (1998) 'Product and Place: Promoting Quality Products 
and Services in the Lagging Rural Regions of the European Union'. European 
Urban & Regional Studies 5 (4), 329-341  
 
 238 
Ilbery, B. and Kneafsey, M. (1999) 'Niche Markets and Regional Speciality Food 
Products in Europe: Towards a Research Agenda'. Environment & Planning A 31 
(12), 2207-2222  
Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (2007) 
China's Food Quality and Safety [online] available from 
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2007/200905/t307870.htm> [30, April 2010]  
Jackson, P., Ward, N., and Russell, P. (2006) 'Mobilising the Commodity Chain 
Concept in the Politics of Food and Farming'. Journal of Rural Studies 22 (2), 
129-141  
Jeppesen, L. and Molin, M. (2003) 'Consumers as Co-Developers: Learning and 
Innovation outside the Firm'. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 15 (3), 
363-383  
Jiangxi Province Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision (2006) Processing 
Technique Standards of Pollution-Free Wuyuan Green Tea (DB36/T 500-2006) 
[Act of Parliament] Wuyuan County: provincial standards  
Jin, C. (2011) 'DongHu Vinegar Series in Shanxi Province'. Food Global Industry (5), 
74-75  
Johnson, R. (1996) 'The Story so Far: And further Transformations?'. in Introduction 
to Contemporary Cultural Studies. ed. by Punter, D. London: Longman, 277-313  
Jovchelovitch, S. and Gervais, M. (1999) 'Social Representations of Health and Illness: 
The Case of the Chinese Community in England'. Journal of Community & 
Applied Social Psychology 9 (4), 247-260  
Juran, J. and Godfrey, B. (1999) Juran's Quality Handbook. 5th edn. New York: 
McGraw-Hill  
Juran, J. (1951) Quality Control Handbook. 1st edn. New York: McGraw-Hill  
Juska, A., Lourdes, G., Gabriel, J., and Koneck, S. (2000) 'Negotiating 
Bacteriological Meat Contamination Standards: The Case of E. Coli O157:H7'. 
Sociologia Ruralis 40 (2), 249-271  
Juska, A. and Busch, L. (1994) 'The Production of Knowledge and Production of 
Commodities: The Case of Rapeseed Technoscience'. Rural Sociology 59 (4), 
581-597  
Kang, J., Yu, X., Xie, D., Li, Z., Shi, Z., and Yang, Q. (2002) 'The Pesticide 
Remaining Inspection in the Lingbo Area in 2001'. Chinese Journal of Health 
Laboratory 12 (3), 318-318  
 
 239 
Kaplan, B. and Maxwell, J. (1994) 'Qualitative Research Methods for Evaluating 
Computer Information Systems'. in Evaluating Health Care Information Systems: 
Methods and Applications. ed. by Anderson, J., Aydin, C., and Jay, S. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage, 45-68  
Keidel, A. (2007) China's Economic Fluctuations: Implications for its Rural Economy. 
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  
Kitchin, R. and Tate, N. (2000) Conducting Research into Human Geography: Theory, 
Methodology and Practice. London: Prentice Hall  
Kneafsey, M., Holloway, L., Venn, L., Cox, R., Dowler, E., and Tuomainen, H. (2008) 
Reconnecting Consumers, Producers and Food. Oxford: Berg  
Kneller, G. (1984) Movement of Thought in Modern Education. New York: John 
Wiley  
Kotler, P. and Keller, K. (2006) Marketing Management. 12th edn. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall  
Krippner, G. (2001) 'The Elusive Market: Embeddedness and the Paradigm of 
Economic Sociology'. Theory & Society 30 (6), 775-810  
Kuznesof, S., Tergear, A., and Moxey, A. (1997) 'Regional Foods: A Consumer 
Perspective'. British Food Journal 99 (6), 199-206  
Kvale, S. (1996) Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. 
London: Sage  
Lamprinopoulou, C., Tregear, A., and Ness, M. (2006) 'Agrifood SMEs in Greece: 
The Role of Collective Action'. British Food Journal 108 (8), 663-676  
Lancaster, K. (1979) Variety, Equity and Efficiency. Oxford: Basil Blackwell  
Lang, T. and Wiggins, P. (1985) 'The Industrialisation of the UK Food System: From 
Production to Consumption'. in The Industrialisation of the Countryside. ed. by 
Healey, M. and Ilbery, B. Norwich: Geo Books, 45-56  
Larner, W. and Le Heron, R. (2002) 'From Economic Globalisation to Globalising 
Economic Processes: Towards Post-Structural Political Economies'. Geoforum 33 
(4), 415-419  
Latour, B. (1987) Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press  
Law, J. (1994) Organising Modernity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell  
 
 240 
Lee, M. and Bankston, W. (1999) 'Political Structure, Economic Inequality and 
Homicide: A Cross-National Analysis'. Deviant Behavior 20 (1), 27-55  
Leslie, D. and Reimer, S. (1999) 'Spatializing Commodity Chains'. Progress in 
Human Geography 23 (3), 401-420  
Levitt, T. (1960) 'Marketing Myopia'. Harvard Business Review 38 (4), 45-56  
Lewins, A. and Silver, C. (2007) Using Software in Qualitative Research: A 
Step-by-Step Guide. London: Sage  
Lewis, D. (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard  
Lewis, J. and Ritchie, J. (2003) 'Generalising from Qualitative Research'. in 
Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and 
Reseachers. ed. by Lewis, J. and Ritchie, J. London: Sage, 263-286  
Liang, M., Luo, S., and Li, Y. (2008) 'Improving the Effeciency of the Nanfeng 
Mandarin Industry'. Modern Horticulture (1), 11-13  
Lincoln, Y. and Guba, E. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage  
Lindlof, T. and Taylor, B. (2002) Qualitative Communication Research Methods. 2nd 
edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  
Liu, L. (2006) 'Quality of Life as a Social Representation in China: A Qualitative 
Study'. Social Indicators Research 75, 217-240  
Liu, W. and Qiu, J. (2006) An Investigation of Framers' Incomes in the Nanfeng 
County [online] available from 
<http://www.jxzb.gov.cn/2006-7/2006771912162.htm> [15, Aug. 2011]  
Lockie, S. and Halpin, D. (2005) 'The "Conventionalisation" Thesis Reconsidered: 
Structural and Ideological Transformation of Australian Organic Agriculture'. 
Sociologia Ruralis 45 (4), 284-307  
Lockie, S. (2002) ''the Invisible Mouth': Mobilizing 'the Consumer' in Food 
Production–Consumption Networks'. Sociologia Ruralis 42 (4), 278-294  
Lockie, S. (2001) 'Food, Place and Identity: Consuming Australia's 'Beef Capital''. 
Journal of Sociology 37 (3), 239-255  
Lockie, S. and Kitto, S. (2000) 'Beyond the Farm Gate: Production-Consumption 
Networks and Agri-Food Research'. Sociologia Ruralis 40 (1), 3-19  
Logothetis, N. (1992) Managing of Total Quality. London: Prentice Hall International  
 
 241 
Longnan County Government (2010) How to use the GI Lables of the Gannan Nanvel 
Orange [online] available from 
<http://www.jxln.gov.cn/lnqcw/tzgj/cyjs/201008/t20100823_45393.htm> [15, Aug. 
2011]  
Loureiro, m. and McCluskey, J. (2000) 'Assessing Consumer Response to Protected 
Geographical Identification Labeling'. Agribusiness 16 (3), 309-320  
Lv, W. (2001) 'The Developing of Wuyuan Tea Trading Activities'. Agricultural 
Archaeology 4, 356-357  
MacKenzie, D. (1990) 'The Green Consumer'. Food Policy 15 (6), 461-466  
MacLeod, C. (2007) Chinese Say U.S. Shares Blame in Food Scandal [online] 
available from 
<http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2007-05-25-china-food-scandal
_N.htm> [30, April 2010]  
Macnaghten, P. and Urry, J. (1998) Contested Natures. London: Sage  
Macnaghten, P. and Urry, J. (1995) 'Towards a Sociology of Nature'. Sociology 29 (2), 
203-220  
Mannion, A. and Bowlby, S. (1992) 'Introduction'. in Environmental Issues in the 
1990s. ed. by Mannion, A. and Bowlby, S. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 3-20  
Mansfield, B. (2003b) 'Fish, Factory Trawlers, and Limitation Crab: The Nature of 
Quality in the Seafood Industry'. Journal of Rural Studies 19 (1), 9-21  
Mansfield, B. (2003a) 'Spatializing Globalization: A 'Geography of Quality' in the 
Seafood Industry'. Economic Geography 79 (1), 1-16  
Marsden, T. and Smith, E. (2005) ' Ecological Entrepreneurship: Sustainable 
Development in Local Communities through Quality Food Production and Local 
Branding'. Geoforum 36 (4), 440-445  
Marsden, T. (2004) 'Theorising Food Quality: Some Issues in Understanding its 
Competitive Production and Regulation'. in Qualities of Food. ed. by Harvey, M., 
McMeekin, A., and Warde, A. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 129-155  
Marsden, T., Flynn, A., and Harrison, M. (2000b) Consuming Interests: The Social 
Provision of Foods. London: University of London press  
Marsden, T., Banks, J., and Bristow, G. (2000a) 'Food Supply Chain Approaches: 
Exploring their Role in Rural Development'. Sociologia Ruralis 40 (4), 424-438  
 
 242 
Marsden, T. (2000) 'Food Matters and the Matter of Food: Towards a New Food 
Governance?'. Sociologia Ruralis 40 (1), 20-29  
Marsden, T. (1998) 'Agriculture Beyond the Treadmill? Issues for Policy, Theory and 
Research Practice'. Progress in Human Geography 22 (2), 265-275  
Marsden, T., Munton, R., Ward, N., and Whatmore, S. (1996) 'Agricultural 
Geography and the Political Economy Approach: A Review'. Economic 
Geography 72 (4), 361-375  
Marsden, T. and Arce, A. (1995) 'Constructing Quality: Emerging Food Networks in 
the Rural Transition'. Environment and Planning A 27 (8), 1261-1279  
Marsden, T., Lowe, P., Munton, R., and Flynn, A. (1993) Constructing the 
Countryside. London: UCL Press  
Marsden, T. (1992) 'Exploring a Rural Sociology for the Fordist Transition: 
Incorporating Social Relations into Economic Restructuring'. Sociologia Ruralis 
32 (2), 209-230  
Marsden, T. (1988) 'Exploring Political Economy Approaches in Agriculture'. Area 
20 (4), 315-322  
Marsden, T., Harrison, M., and Flynn, A. (1998) 'Creating Competitive Space: 
Exploring the Social and Political Maintenance of Retail Power'. Environment & 
Planning A 30 (3), 481  
Martin, P. and Turner, B. (1986) 'Grounded Theory and Organizational Research'. The 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 22 (2), 141-157  
Marx, k. (1958 (1970)) Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Reprint). 
London: Lawrence and Wishart  
Maye, D., Holloway, L., and Kneafsey, M. (2007) Alternative Food Geographies: 
Representation and Practice. Oxford: Elsevier  
Maye, D. and Ilbery, B. (2006) 'Regional Economies of Local Food Production 
Tracing Food Chain Links between `Specialist' Producers and Intermediaries in the 
Scottish-English Borders'. European Urban & Regional Studies 13 (4), 337-354  
McMillan, J., Whalley, J., and Zhu, L. (1989) 'The Impact of China's Economic 
Reforms on Agricultural Productivity Growth'. Journal of Political Economy 97 
(4), 781-807  
Mennell, S. (1996) All Manners of Food: Eating and Taste in England and France 
from the Middle Ages to the Present. Urbana: University of Illionis Press 
 
 243 
Mensah, L. and Julien, D. (2011) 'Implementation of Food Safety Management 
Systems in the UK'. Food Control 22, 1216-1225  
Miele, M. and Murdoch, J. (2002) 'The Practical Aesthetics of Traditional Cuisines: 
Slow Food in Tuscany'. Sociologia Ruralis 42 (4), 312-329  
Miller, D. and Salkind, N. (2002) Handbook of Research Design and Social 
Measurement. 6th edn. London: Sage  
Millstone, E. and Lang, T. (eds.) (2003) The Atlas of Food. London: Earthscan  
Ministry of Agriculture (2010) Main Functions of the Ministry of Agriculture [online] 
available from <http://english.agri.gov.cn/ga/amoa/mandates/> [5, May 2010]  
Ministry of Agriculture (1997) China Agricultural Development Report 1996. BeiJing: 
China Agricultural Press  
Ministry of Health (2010) Mission [online] available from < 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohwsjdj/pzyzz/200804/33
439.htm> [5, May 2010]  
Mitchell, D., Ingco, M., and Duncan, R. (1997) The World Food Outlook. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press  
Mohan, J. (2002) 'Geographies of Welfare and Social Exclusion: Dimensions, 
Consequences and Methods'. Progress in Human Geography 26 (1), 65-75  
Moore, G. (2010) 'Research Methods for International Relations Studies: Assembling 
an Effective Toolkit'. in Handbook of International Relations. ed. by Wang, G. 
Beijing: RenMing University Press  
Moran, W., Blunden, G., and Greenwood, J. (1993) 'The Role of Family Farming in 
Agrarian Change'. Progress in Human Geography 17 (1), 22-42  
Morgan, K., Marsden, T., and Murdoch, J. (2006) 'Localized Quality in Tuscany'. in 
Worlds of Food: Place Power, and Provenance in the Food Chain. ed. by Morgan, 
K., Marsden, T., and Murdoch, J. Oxford: Oxford University Express, 89-108  
Morgan, K. and Murdoch, J. (2000) 'Organic Vs. Conventional Agriculture: 
Knowledge, Power and Innovation in the Food Chain'. Geoforum 31 (2), 159-173  
Morris, C. and Young, C. (2004) 'New Geographies of Agro-Food Chains: An 
Analysis of UK Quality Assurance Schemes'. in Geographies of Commodity 
Chains. ed. by Hughes, A. and Reimer, S. London: Routledge, 83-101  
 
 244 
Morris, C. and Young, C. (2000) ''Seed to Shelf', 'Teat to Table', 'Barley to Beer' and 
'Womb to Tomb': Discourses of Food Quality and Quality Assurance Schemes in 
the U.K.'. Journal of Rural Studies 16 (1), 103-115  
Mulgan, G. (1989) 'The Power of the Weak'. in New Times: The Changing Face of 
Politics in the 1990s. ed. by Hall, S. and Jacques, M. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart  
Murdoch, J. and Miele, M. (2004) 'A New Aesthetic of Food? Relational Reflexivity 
in the 'Alternative' Food Movement'. in Qualities of Food. ed. by Harvey, M., 
McMeekin, A., and Warde, A. Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 156-175  
Murdoch, J. (2001) 'Ecologising Sociology: Actor-Network Theory, Co-Construction 
and the Problem of Human Exemptionalism'. Sociology 35 (1), 111-133  
Murdoch, J. (2000) 'Networks - A New Paradigm of Rural Development?'. Journal of 
Rural Studies 16 (4), 407-419  
Murdoch, J., Marsden, T., and Banks, J. (2000) 'Quality, Nature, and Embeddedness: 
Some Theoretical Consideration in the Context of the Food Sector'. Economic 
Geography 76 (2), 107-125  
Murdoch, J. and Miele, M. (1999) 'Back to Nature: Changing 'Worlds of Production' 
in the Food Sector'. Sociologia Ruralis 39 (4), 465-483  
Murdoch, J. (1998) 'The Space of Actor-Network Theory'. Geoforum 29 (4), 357-374  
Murdoch, J. (1997b) 'Towards a Geography of Heterogeneous Associations'. Progress 
in Human Geography 21 (3), 321-337  
Murdoch, J. (1997a) 'Inhuman/Nonhuman/Human: Actor-Network Theory and the 
Prospects for a Nondualistic and Symmetrical Perspective on Nature and Society'. 
Environment and Planning D 15 (6), 731-756  
Murdoch, J. (1995) 'Actor-Networks and the Evolution of Economic Forms: 
Combining Description and Explanation in Theories of Regulation, Flexible 
Specialization, and Networks'. Environment & Planning A 27 (5), 731-757  
Murdoch, J. (1994) 'Some Comments on 'Nature' and 'Society' in the Political 
Economy of Food'. Review of International Political Economy 1 (3), 571-577  




Nanfeng County Government (2011b) The Implementation of the 2010 National 
Economic and Social Development Planning and the 2011 National Economic and 
Social Development Planning [online] available from 
<http://www.jxnf.gov.cn/?thread-7494-1.html> [15, Aug. 2011]  
Nanfeng County Government (2011a) The Project of Improving Quality of Nanfeng 
Mandarin [online] available from <http://www.jxnf.gov.cn/?thread-4311-1.html1> 
[15, Aug. 2011]  
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011) China Statistic Year Book 2011 [online] 
available from <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2011/indexch.htm> [30, Dec. 
2011]  
National Research Council (2010) Strategic Planning for the Florida Citrus Industry: 
Addressing Citrus Greening Disease (Huanglongbing). Washington D. C.: The 
National Academeies Press  
Negrini, R., Nicoloso, L., Crepaldi, P., Milanesi, E., Marino, R., Perini, D., Pariset, L., 
Dunner, S., Leveziel, H., Williams, J., and Marsan, P. (2008) 'Traceability of Four 
European Protected Geographic Indication (PGI) Beef Products using Single 
Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNP) and Bayesian Statistics'. Meat Science 80 (4), 
1212-1217  
Nelson, R. (2004) 'Risk Management Behaviour by the Northern Ireland Food 
Consumer'. International Journal of Consumer Studies 28 (2), 186-193  
Ngige, J. and Wagacha, J. (1999) The International Workshop on Markets, Rights and 
Equity: Rethinking Agricultural Standards in a Shrinking World. 'Impact of Food 
and Agricultural Standards on Producers, Processors, Workers, Retailers and 
Consumers with Respect to International Trade: A Case Study'. held 
October31–November 1 at East Lansing, MI.  
Nichols, P. (1991) Social Survey Methods. Oxford: Oxfam  
Nie, J. (2008) Developing Counties in the Middle and Western China in People's 
Tribune. 1st, July, 48-50  
Nygard, B. and Storstad, O. (1998) 'De-Globalisation of Food Markets? Consumer 
Perception of Safe Food: The Case of Norway'. Sociologia Ruralis 38 (1), 35-53  
Nykiel, R. (2007) Handbook of Marketing Research Methodologies for Hospitality 
and Tourism. Binghamton, New York: The Haworth Hospitality & Tourism Press  
O'Reilly, S. and Haines, M. (2004) 'Marketing Quality Food Products - A Comparison 
of Two SME Marketing Networks'. Food Economics 1, 137-150  
 
 246 
Orlikowski, W. and Baroudi, J. (1991) 'Studying Information Technology in 
Organizations: Research Approaches and Assumptions'. Information Systems 
Research 2 (1), 1-28  
Ortega, D., Wang, H., Wu, L., and Olynk, N. (2011) 'Modeling Heterogeneity in 
Consumer Preferences for Select Food Safety Attributes in China'. Food Policy 36 
(2), 318-324  
Ouyang, H. (2011) A Report of Consumer Confidence on Food Safety: 2010-2011 in 
Xiao Kang. Jan., 35-38  
Overton, J. and Heitger, J. (2008) 'Maps, Markets and Merlot: The Making of an 
Antipodean Wine Appellation'. Journal of Rural Studies 24 (4), 440-449  
Padgett, D. (2008) Qualitative Methods in Social Work Research. 2nd edn. London: 
Sage  
Pagano, P. (2004) An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between Inequality 
and Growth [online] available from 
<http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td04/td536_04/td536en/en
_tema_536.pdf> [10, June 2010]  
Page, B. (1997) 'Restructuring Pork Production, Remaking Rural Iowa'. in 
Globalising Food: Agrarian Questions and Global Restructuring. ed. by Goodman, 
D. and Watts, M. London: Routledge, 133-157  
Page, B. (1996) 'Across the Great Divide: Agriculture and Industrial Geography'. 
Economic Geography 72 (4), 376-397  
Parrott, N., Wilson, N., and Murdoch, J. (2002) 'Spatializing Quality: Regional 
Protection and the Alternative Geography of Food'. European Urban & Regional 
Studies 9 (3), 241-261  
Patton, M. (2002) Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods. 3rd edn. London: 
Sage  
Perotti, R. (1996) 'Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say'. 
Journal of Economic Growth 1 (2), 149-187  
Ponte, S. and Gibbon, P. (2005) 'Quality Standards, Conventions and the Governance 
of Global Value Chains'. Economy and Society 34 (1), 1-31  
Porter, M. (1985) Competitive Advantage. New York: The Free Press  




Reid, M., Li, E., Bruwer, J., and Grunert, K. (2001) 'Food-Related Lifestyles in a 
Crosscultural Context: Comparing Australia with Singapore, Britain, France and 
Denmark.'. Journal of Food Products Marketing 7 (4), 57-75  
Renard, M. (2005) 'Quality Certification, Regulation and Power in Fair Trade'. 
Journal of Rural Studies 21 (4), 419-431  
Renard, M. (2003) 'Fair Trade: Quality, Market and Conventions'. Journal of Rural 
Studies 19 (1), 87-96  
Renting, H., Marsden, T., and Banks, J. (2003) 'Understanding Alternative Food 
Networks: Exploring the Role of Short Food Supply Chains in Rural Development'. 
Environment & Planning A 35 (3), 393-411  
Roberts, D. and Engardio, P. (2006) 'Secrets, Lies, and Sweatshops'. Business Week 
November, 27, 50-58  
Robinson, G. M. (2003) Geographies of Agriculture: Globalisation, Restructuring 
and Sustainability. Harlow: Prentice Hall  
Roth, A., Tsay, A., Pullman, M., and Gray, J. (2008) 'Unraveling the Food Supply 
Chain: Strategic Insights from China and the 2007 Recalls'. Journal of Supply 
Chain Management 44 (1), 22-39  
Rubin, H. and Rubin, I. (1995) Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  
Sage, C. (2003) 'Social Embeddedness and Relations of Regard: Alternative 'Good 
Food' Networks in South-West Ireland'. Journal of Rural Studies 19 (1), 47-60  
Salais, R. and Storper, M. (1992) 'The Four 'Worlds' of Contemporary Industry'. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 16 (2), 169-193  
Sarantakos, S. (2005) Social Research. 3rd edn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan  
Schaeffer, R. (1993) 'Standardization, GATT and the Fresh Food System'. 
International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 3 (1), 71-81  
Scheurich, J. (1995) 'A Postmodernist Critique of Research Interviewing'. 
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 8 (3), 239-252  
Schwandt, T. (2000) 'Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Enquiry; 
Interpretivism, Hermeneutics and Social Constructionism'. in Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. ed. by Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. London: Sage, 189-213  
 
 248 
Shadish, W. (1995) 'Philosophy of Science and the Quantitative-Qualitative Debates: 
Thirteen Common Errors'. Evaluation and Program Planning 18 (1), 63-75  
Shine, A., O’Reilly, S., and O’Sullivan, K. (1997) 'Consumer use of Nutritional 
Labelling'. British Food Journal 99 (8), 290-296  
Slee, B. and Kirwan, J. (2007) 105th EAAE Seminar on International Marketing and 
International Trade of Quality Food Products. 'Exploring Hybridity in Food 
Supply Chains'. held 8-10, March at Bologna  
Smith, S. (1996) 'Positivism and Beyond'. in International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond. ed. by Smith, S., Booth, K., and Zalewski, M. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 11-46 
Smithers, J., Lamarche, J., and Joseph, A. (2008) 'Unpacking the Terms of 
Engagement with Local Food at Farmers' Market: Insights from Ontario'. Journal 
of Rural Studies 24 (3), 337-350  
Snape, D. and Spencer, L. (2003) 'The Foundations of Qualitative Research'. in 
Qualitative Research Practice - a Guide for Social Science Students and 
Researchers. ed. by Rithie, J. and Lewis, J. London: SAGE Publications, 1-23  
Soil Association (2010) Organic Market Report 2010 [online] available from 
<http://www.soilassociation.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bTXno01MTtM=&tabi
d=116> [10, Feb. 2012]  
Song, S. and Chen, A. (2006) 'China's Rural Economy after WTO: Problems and 
Strategies'. in China's Rural Economy After WTO: Problems and Strategies. ed. by 
Song, S. and Chen, A. Hampshire, England: Ashgate publishing Limited, 3-10  
Sood, C., Jaggi, S., Kumar, V., Ravindranath, S., and Shanker, A. (2004) 'How 
Manufacturing Processes Affect the Level of Pesticide Residues in Tea'. Journal of 
the Science of Food and Agriculture 84, 2123-2127  
Soper, K. (1995) What is Nature?. Oxford: Blackwell  
Spencer, L., Ritchie, J., and O'connor, W. (2003) 'Analysis: Practice, Principles and 
Processes'. in Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students 
and Researchers. ed. by Lewis, J. and Ritchie, J. London: Sage, 199-218  
Stake, R. (2005) 'Qualitative Case Study'. in The Sage Handbook of Qualitative 
Research. ed. by Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. London: Sage, 443-466  
Stake, R. (1995) The Art of Case Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  
 
 249 
Stassart, P. and Whatmore, S. (2003) 'Metabolising Risk: Food Scares and the 
Un/Re-Making of Belgian Beef'. Environment & Planning A 35 (3), 449-462  
State Administration for Industry and Commerce of P.R.C. (2010) Mission [online] 
available from <http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Mission/> [5, May 2010]  
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2007) White 
Paper on Food Quality and Safety [online] available from 
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/gqbps/2007/200905/t308057.htm> [10, June 2010]  
State Food and Drag Administration, P.R.C. (2012b) Main Responsibilities [online] 
available from <http://eng.sfda.gov.cn/WS03/CL0756/> [17, March 2012]  
State Food and Drag Administration, P.R.C. (2012a) Organisational Chart [online] 
available from <http://eng.sfda.gov.cn/WS03/CL0763/> [16, March 2012]  
State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C. (2007) Measures for the Registration and 
Administration of Collective Marks and Certification Marks [online] available 
from 
<http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/zcfg/flfg/sb/bmgz/200804/t20080403_369227.
html> [5, May 2010]  
State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C. (2011) The Promotion Plan for the 
Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2011 [online] 
available from 
<http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/developing/201104/t20110426_601292.html> [09, 
December 2011]  
Statistic Bureau of Jiangxi and Jiangxi investigation team of National Statistic Bureau 
(2011) Jiangxi Statistical Yearbook 2011. BeiJing: China Statistics press  
Storper, M. (1997) The Regional World: Territorial Development in a Global 
Economy. London: The Guildford Press  
Storper, M. and Salais, R. (1997) Worlds of Production: The Action Frameworks of 
the Economy. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press  
Sun, Y. (2009) An Benefits Analysing of Farmers' Co-Operatives. Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press  
Sung, Y. (2010) 'Consumer Learning Behavior in Choosing Electric Motorcycles'. 
Transportation Planning and Technology 33 (2), 139-155  
Tam, W. and Yang, D. (2005) 'Food Safety and the Development of Regulatory 
Institutions in China'. Asian Perspective 29 (4), 5-36  
 
 250 
Tang, W. (2006) 'The Distribution Channel of the Nanfeng Mandarin'. Modern 
Horticulture Special Issue, 10-12  
Tansey, G. and Worsley, T. (1995) The Food System: A Guide. London: Earthscan  
Tarrant, J. (1974) Agricultural Geography. Newton Abbot: David and Charles  
Taylor, A., Coveney, J., Ward, P., Dal Grande, E., Mamerowb, L., Henderson, J., and 
Meyer, S. (2012) 'The Australian Food and Trust Survey: Demographic Indicators 
Associated with Food Safety and Quality Concerns'. Food Control 25 (2), 476-483  
Teil, G. and Hennion, A. (2004) 'Discovering Quality Or Performing Taste? A 
Sociology of the Amateur'. in Qualities of Food. ed. by Harvey, M., McMeekin, A., 
and Warde, A. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 19-37  
Tellis, W. (1997) 'Introduction to Case Study'. The Qualitative Report 3 (2), 1-5  
The Center For Agri-food Quality & Safety, the ministry of Agriculture of the Peoples 
Republic of China (2008) Measures for the Administration of Geographical 
Indications of Agricultural Products [online] available from 
<http://www.aqsc.gov.cn/policy/policyShow.asp?policyId=46> [6, May 2010]  
The Food Standards Agency (2011) Role of the Agency [online] available from 
<http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/> [13, June 2011]  
The Parma Ham Consortium (2007) 'Parma Ham' Designation of Origin 
Specifications and Dossier [online] available from 
<http://www.prosciuttodiparma.com/ned/download/guarantee-specifications.pdf> 
[5, May 2010]  
The People’s Government of Fuzhou (2009) The Nanfeng Mandarin Industry 
Development Planning [online] available from 
<http://xxgk.jxfz.gov.cn/nf/bmgkxx/pwb_1/fzgh/fzgh/200904/t20090427_535279.
htm> [5, Aug. 2011]  
The research group of Xiao Kang magazine (2007) 'Chinese Food Index 2006-2007' 
in Xiao Kang 38 (2), 14-15  
Thevenot, L., Moody, M., and Lafaye, C. (2000) 'Forms of Valuing Nature: 
Arguments and Modes of Justification in French and American Environmental 
Disputes'. in Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of 
Evaluation in France and the United States. ed. by Lamont, M. and Thevenot, L. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 229-272  
Thomas, R. W. and Huggett, R. J. (1980) Modelling in Geography: A Mathematical 
Approach. London: Harper & Row  
 
 251 
Tocqueville, A. (2000) Democacy in America. trans. by Grant, S. Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company  
Tovey, H. (1997) 'Food, Environmentalism and Rural Sociology: On the Organic 
Farming Movement in Ireland'. Sociologia Ruralis 37 (1), 21-37  
Trademark office (2003) Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China [online] 
available from <http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/english/show.asp?id=47&bm=flfg> [5, May 
2010]  
Tregear, A., Arfini, F., Belletti, G., and Marescotti, A. (2007) 'Regional Foods and 
Rural Development: The Role of Product Qualification'. Journal of Rural Studies 
23 (1), 12-22  
Tregear, A. (2003) 'From Stilton to Vimto: Using Food History to Re-Think Typical 
Products in Rural Development'. Sociologia Ruralis 43 (2), 91-107  
Ulin, R. (2002) 'Work as Cultural Production: Labour and Self-identity among 
Southwest French Wine-Growers'. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
Inst. (n.s.) (8), 691-712  
United State Patent and Trademark office (2010) Trademark FAQs [online] available 
from <http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp> [5, May 2010]  
Valentine, G. (2002) 'In-Corporations: Food, Bodies and Organizations'. Body and 
Society 8 (2), 1-20  
Van der Ploeg, J., Renting, H., Brunori, G., Knickel, K., Mannion, J., Marsden, T., de 
Roest, K., and Sevilla-Guzmán, E. V., F. (2000) 'Rural Development: From 
Practices and Policies towards Theory'. Sociologia Ruralis 40 (4), 391-408  
Vaughan, D. (1992) 'Theory Elaboration: The Heuristics of Case Analysis'. in What is 
a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry. ed. by Ragin, C. and Becker, 
H. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 173-202  
Veeck, A. and Burns, A. (2005) 'Changing Tastes: The Adoption of New Food 
Choices in Post-Reform China'. Journal of Business Research 58 (5), 644-652  
Veeck, A. (2003) 'Consumer Response to Changing Food Systems in Urban China'. 
Advances in Consumer Research 30, 142  
Venn, L., Kneafsey, M., Holloway, L., Cox, R., Dowler, E., and Tuomainen, H. (2006) 
'Researching European 'Alternative' Food Networks: Some Methodological 
Considerations'. Area 38 (3), 248-258  
 
 252 
Vidich, A. and Lyman, S. (2000) 'Qualitative Methods: Their History in Sociology 
and Anthropology'. in Handbook of Qualitative Research (Second Eds.). ed. by 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 37-84  
Vittori, M. (2010) 'The International Debate on Geographical Indications (GIs): The 
Point of View of the Global Coalition of GI Products--oriGIn'. The Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 13 (2), 304-314  
Wan, G. and Chen, E. (2000) 'A Micro-Empirical Analysis of Land Fragmentation 
and Scale Economies in Rural China'. in China's Agriculture at the Crossroads. ed. 
by Yang, Y. and Tian, W. London: Macmillan, 131-147  
Wan, J., Peng, S., and Xiao, X. (2009) 'An Attitude Analysis of Farmers to Industrial 
Co-Operation: A Case Study of the Gannan Navel Orange'. Issues in Agricultural 
Economy (8), 32-37  
Wang, T. (2010) Government Enforcement and Changing Chinese Economy. Beijing: 
China Development Press  
Wang, W., Dong, X., and Li, Q. (2009) Co-Operatives and Rural Developing in 
China. Hefei: Anhui People Press.  
Wang, X. and Kireeva, I. (2007) 'Protection of Geographical Indications in China: 
Conflicts, Causes and Solutions'. The Journal of World Intellectual Property 10 (2), 
79-96  
Wang, Z., Li, Y., and Cai, B. (2011) 'The Problems of Setting Standards and 
Developing Quality Securing System in the Nanfeng Mandarin Industry'. Modern 
Horticulture (6), 54-56  
Warde, A. (1997) Consumption, Food and Taste: Culinary Antimonies and 
Commodity Culture. London: Sage  
Watts, D., Ilbery, B., and Maye, D. (2005) 'Making Reconnections in Agro-Food 
Geography: Alternative Systems of Food Provision'. Progress in Human 
Geography 29 (1), 22-40  
Watts, M. and Goodman, D. (1997) 'Agrarian Questions: Global Appetite, Local 
Metabolism: Nature, Culture, and Industry in Fin-De-Siecle Agro-Food Systems'. 
in Globalizing Food, Agrarian Questions and Global Restructuring. ed. by 
Goodman, D. and Watts, M. Dordrecht: Routledge, 1-34  
Weatherell, C., Tregear, A., and Allinson, J. (2003) 'In Search of the Concerned 
Consumer: UK Public Perceptions of Food, Farming and Buying Local'. Journal of 
Rural Studies 19 (2), 233-244  
 
 253 
Whatmore, S., Stassart, P., and Renting, H. (2003) 'What's Alternative about 
Alternative Food Networks?'. Environment & Planning A 35 (3), 389-391  
Whatmore, S. (2002) Hybrid Geographies: Natures Cultures Spaces. London: Sage  
Whatmore, S. and Thorne, L. (1997) 'Nourshing Networks: Alternative Geographies 
of Food'. in Globalising Food: Agrarian Questions and Global Restructuring. ed. 
by Goodman, D. and Watts, M. J. London and New York: Routledge, 287-304  
Whatmore, S. (1994) 'From Farming to Agri-Business'. in Geographies of Global 
Change. ed. by Johnston, R., Taylor, P., and Watts, M. Oxford: Blackwell, 36-49  
White, C., Woodfield, K., and Ritchie, J. (2003) 'Reporting and Presenting Qualitative 
Data'. in Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and 
Researchers. ed. by Lewis, J. and Ritchie, J. London: Sage, 287-320  
Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2009) The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies 
almost always do Better. London: Allen Lane  
Williams, J. (2005) Understanding the Overuse of Chemical Fertiliser in China: A 
Synthesis of Historic Trends, Recent Studies, and Field Experiences [online] 
available from <http://forestry.msu.edu/china/new%20folder/jo_fertiliser.pdf> [6, 
May 2010]  
Wineyard Intelligence (2010) Bordeaux Vineyards Average Market Value 1991-2010 
[online] available from 
<http://www.vineyardintelligence.com/assets/files/SAFER%20vineyard%20prices.
pdf> [11, Feb. 2012]  
Winter, M. (2003b) 'Geographies of Food: Agro-Food Geographies - Making 
Reconnections'. Progress in Human Geography 27 (4), 505-513  
Winter, M. (2003a) 'Embeddedness, the New Food Economy and Defensive Localism'. 
Journal of Rural Studies 19 (1), 23-32  
Worcester, R. (1998) 'More than Money'. in The Good Life. ed. by Christie, I. and 
Nash, L. London: Demos Publication, 21-30  
World Bank (2011b) Gross Domestic Product 2010 [online] available from 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf> [1, 
July 2011]  
World Bank (2011a) Gross National Income per Capita 2010, Atlas Method and PPP 
[online] available from 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf> 
[10, Feb. 2012]  
 
 254 
World Bank (2006) China's Compliance with Food Safety Requirements for Fruits 
and Vegetables: Promoting Food Safety, Competitiveness, and Poverty Reduction. 
BeiJing and Washington D.C.: World Bank and China Agriculture Press  
World Bank (2003) GNI per Capita 2001, Atlas Method and PPP [online] available 
from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/GNIPC.pdf> [10, Feb. 
2012]  
World Intellectual Property Organization (2010b) The Lisbon Agreement for the 
Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration 1958 
[online] available from 
<http://www.wipo.int/lisbon/en/legal_texts/lisbon_agreement.htm#P22_1099> [30, 
April 2010]  
World Intellectual Property Organization (2010a) Madrid Agreement for the 
Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods [online] 
available from 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/madrid/trtdocs_wo032.html#P24_540> [30, 
April 2010]  
World Intellectual Property Organization (2004) WIPO Intellectual Property 
Handbook: Policy, Law and use. Switzerland: World Intellectual Property 
Organization  
World Intellectual Property Organization (1998) Intellectual Property Reading 
Material. Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization  
World Trade Organization Trips: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights [online] available from 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3b_e.htm#3> [15, May 2009]  
Xiao, L. and Hu, X. (2005) 'The Status and Influences the GIs in Chinese Food 
Industry'. Food Science and Technology (7), 1-4  
XinHua News (2007b) The Annual Central Economic Work Conference, 2007 [online] 
available from <http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2007-12/05/content_826113.htm> [29, 
April 2009]  
XinHua News (2007a) China has 80m Middle Class Members [online] available from 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-06/21/content_899488.htm> [7, 
May 2010]  
Xiong, J. (2007) 'Industrialisation of the Wuyuan Green Tea Industry'. Journal of 
Jiangxi Agricultural University 6 (4), 40-43  
 
 255 
Xun, G., Lin, Y., Li, Z., Yang, C., and Chao, Z. (2010) 'An Investigation of 
Non-Material Culture in Shangxiaoqi Village in the Wuyuang County'. 
Agricultural Archaeology 2, 265-270  
Yan, F. (2006) 'Improving the Competitiveness of the Nanfeng Mandarin'. Modern 
Horticulture (Special Issue), 16-24  
Yan, H. (2007) 'The Possible Ways to Develop Wuyuan Green Tea Industry'. 
Agricultural Archaeology 271, 271-273  
Yarwood, R. (2002) Countryside Conflicts. Geographical Association, Sheffield. 
Yin, R. (2009) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 4th edn. London: Sage  
Yin, R. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 3rd edn. Newbury Park: 
Sage  
Zeng, X., Sun, Y., and Wang, X. (2007) 'The Selling Model Analysis of the Gannan 
Navel Orange'. The Construction of the Old Revolutionary Area (12), 26-27  
Zhong, J., Liu, H., and Qin, F. (2010) 'Developing the Industrial Agriculture Sector in 
China (Electornic Copy)'. China Development Observation (8)  
Zhu, X. (2007) 'Developing the Nanfeng Mandarin Industry'. in The Nanfeng 


















Appendix 1: Semi-structured interviewing guide 
 
[Explain the overall structure of the interview and inform that all the information will 
be treated for research purpose only and suitable anonymity will be maintained] 
 
Interview details 
Date of interview: 
Location of interviewee: 
Name of the Interviewee: 
Age: 
Education qualification: 
The experience in the network (how long and position): 
Telephone number (if possible): 
 
[This section to be completed before/after the interview] 
 
A: The general questions: 
Q1: What do you understand by agri-food quality? 
Q2: How do you judge the quality of your products? 
 
B: Political influences: 
Q3: Are there any laws/regulations/standards you have to obey? If so, list them and 
explain what sort of punishment you will get if break them. If not, why? / Are there 
any laws/regulations/standards that producers and processors must obey, how to force 
them to obey? 
Q4: Who or which organisation/government departments did check the quality of your 
products before? If so, how frequent does the programme run and what is the 
inspection result? / Did your department/association organise quality checking 
programme before? If so, how frequent does the programme run and what is the 
inspection result? 
Q5: Is enhancing government enforcement to regulate production activities according 
to laws/regulations/standards a means to improve quality? Why? 




C: Social influences: 
Q7: Do you attend any association or co-operative? If so, what are aims of them? 
What they did in last several years? Do they have a great impact on production 
activities/quality? 
Q8: How do you grow/process your products?  
Q9: What is the most important thing you believe impact quality of your products? 
How does it work? Are there any other factors? 
Q10: Who are the quality judgers in the network? 
Q11: Will you suffer any punishement if you sell products with “sub-quality” to 
contracted middlemen/processing companies? 
Q12: What is your incentive to improve the quality? 
 
D: Economic questions: 
Q13: Do you/producers obtain a suitable profit in the market? Why? (May compare 
with other non-GI products) 
Q14: Could you list the quality criteria of your products in the market? 
Q15: Do you believe increasing inputs can improve quality and thus receive a high 
economic reward in the market? Why? 
Q16: Are the prices very different between quality GI products and sub-quality GI 
products, and GI products and similar products without GIs? Do you have any 
example? 
 
E: GI questions 
Q17 : Could you explain what GIs are? Why your products are called GI products? 
Q18: Did you see GI lables before? How can you get GI lables? Would you like to 
apply GIs/stick GI lables on your products? Why? 
Q19: What are GI lables? – Trademarks? Quality signs? A sort of market technique? 
Do you believe all agrifood products with GIs are quality products? Why? 
Q20: Did the quality of the product change over the last five years? Do you believe 





Appendix 2: Tree nodes and sub-nodes of the three cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
